My architecture considers an ApiGateway (ApiGee) that dispatches requests to a service behind.
All APIs (http and rest) have an authorization mechanism. So, the client needs to authenticate itself to an IAM before operate with my APIs.
In order to avoid bad security design, all services behind the ApiGateway accept authenticated requests.
For (technical and business) requirements reasons, I need to use internal/external different authentication mechanisms: when a client sends a request, that has to contains the authorization information provided by IAM1. Instead, the services behind accept authenticated APIs that contains Auth information that came from IAM2.
For the translation, I create a service 'translation-token-service' that exposes an API for implementing the token translation.
My desiderata is to "link" ApiGee to the 'translation-token-service' in order to let the clients to continue to use the authorization from IAM1 and the behind services to continue to use the authorization information from IAM2: when a request arrives, ApiGee should invoke the 'translation-token-service' for having a token with IAM2 authorization information, injects them into the request and dispatches it to the right behind service.
NB: the token conversation made by ApiGee should be in some how cached (I don't care about the storage type). So if a client makes two call with the same token, the first invocation asks to convert the token, the second one doesn't, for performance reason.
NB: IAM1 is not oidc compliant, IAM2 does.
How can I implement this flow?
Related
Does OAuth Client Credentials flow provide superior security compared to an API that exposes a custom authorization/access endpoint which produces a temporary access token used to perform requests against an API?
From my perspective:
Both expose the same data, namely an identifier and a secret and both submit data over a secured SSL connection. Both can receive an access token securely and both could be setup to revoke access tokens.
Short answer is, "no" but there is a broader consideration. The point of this flow is that it is coming from your own known server to the protected endpoint. It is a supported exception to user oauth security, in other words. But it allows the same overall protection scheme for the endpoint even if you are reducing from the full protections afforded by other flows. The point is that a custom authorization endpoint that mimics oauth for client credentials only is not a full authentication solution. However, if you will never have users and never need the other flows, then that is the important trade-off. In that case you are correct in your assessment, but you have added the risk of needing a broader range of flows in the future that you will then have to custom code.
We have a .NET microservice based app where the Gateway is built using Ocelot. Until now we didn't do any authentication in the Gateway, the frontend calls an Authentication Provider service which responds with an JWT token, the token gets added to request headers and then, the new requests go through gateway and each particular microservice is concerned with authentication and authorization.
We also have API Key based authentication in place, but it's not used until now.
I added a new microservice with authentication done by API Key and I want to handle authorization in the Gateway. That means the gateway should check the claims based on JWT token and if claims matches forward the request to the microservice using an API key header.
How can I do it with Ocelot, instead of writing controllers and actions for each corresponding microservice controllers and actions? I thought about implementing Delegating Handlers to take care of it, but maybe there is a better way?
A clean way to do this, is to have the access token between the client and the API gateway and to then use the token exchange flow between the gateway and the underlying APIs so as to keep a potential attack surface on the initial access token small and avoid exposing internal mechanics (e.g. multiple audiences of underlying APIs in your initial access token, multiple api scopes).
There are many sources of information about this online. Here's one to get you started.
In a microservice architecture, an API gateway lays in front of the API. The purpose of this is e.g. changing some request / response parameters, for single entry point or checking authentication etc. Now I would like to protect my API using OAuth2 flows to obtain an access token. The problem is to decide who is the actual OAuth client, I will demonstrate it by using a SPA example:
a) Is it the SPA that started the oauthorize request (to the api gateway) by using the implicit grant. Then, the Api gateway would simply route the request through to the OAuth authorization server, acting as a single entry point, with the /authorize stuff from the implicit flow
b) Is it the API Gateway itself, meaning the SPA sends the username and password of the enduser to the api gateway (of course, here the SPA needs to be trusted with the end users credentials), which then acts on its own as an oauth client using the resource owner password grant
c) dismiss the api gateway at all and create the oauth authorization server "parallel" to the api gateway, meaning you would loose the single entry point etc.
The following picture demonstrate a very abstract architecture, and the question is about the numer "[2]", if this request is initiated by the SPA and passed through by the api gateway, or if the api gateway is intercepting the request and acting on its own as an oauth client?
OAuth with API Gateway
My guess is to always use the best fitting grant type for a specific client, regardless of an API gateway being in between or not. This would mean, that when it comes to OAuth, the API Gateway would simply pass the client authorization request through, whatever grant type it used. Therefore, [2] in the picture would come from the client, and not from the API Gateway acting as the OAuth client. Is this correct? As mentioned, this really gets tricky when it comes to first party apps as you probably could use the password credentials grant, which has huge drawbacks,e.g. no refreshing possible for SPAs.
Please bear in mind that this is a purely opinion based answer, because your question is pretty vague.
I don't like the idea about using the API Gateway as the point which authenticates requests. I think that this defeats the Single Responsibility Principle. The gateways purpose usually is to expose your backend to external clients, perhaps change the contract for some specific clients, etc. But it shouldn't also authenticate calls. Besides it would have to do so based on the data passed to it, which you would have to gather somewhere else anyway.
Another thing which is I think undesirable, is that you're considering using the resource owner password grant for your SPA. This is not the correct use case for this grant flow. You could look into this article, which explains it much better than I could: https://www.scottbrady91.com/OAuth/Why-the-Resource-Owner-Password-Credentials-Grant-Type-is-not-Authentication-nor-Suitable-for-Modern-Applications
I would suggest you use the Implicit grant type and use the api gateway to only route calls to the backend, don't authenticate the calls on that layer.
If you're using a spring cloud api gateway (essentially a zuul proxy), you will have to add proper configuration so that it forwards all security headers and redirects. This example works for me:
server:
use-forward-headers: true
zuul:
addHostHeader: true
routes:
<your oauth server route>:
url: <your oauth server url>
path: <if youve got any prefix>
sensitiveHeaders:
stripPrefix: false
It doesn't matter, what Krzysztof Chris Mejka in previous answer like or dislike. Take a look at BCP - https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-browser-based-apps#section-6
Latest recommendation from oauth working group at IETF is to use a kind of Api gateway/reverse proxy, another words - you need to keep tokens out of js entirely.
I have project with many micro services each one doing its job. One of them responsible for authentication and authorization. But its not clear how other services should check users permissions. Is there any mechanism to deal with this task?
One of the best approaches is the OAuth delegation protocol with JSON token JWT
Authentication in micro-services architecture
the user send his credentials to the OAuth server
The server Checks the user's information (from LDAP server for example), then gives him an access token
the user send his request with the access token to the API Gateway
the API Gateway extracts out the access_token from the request, then he will talks to the Token Exchange endpoint to validate it and then issues a JWT
this JWT That contains all the necessarily information about the user will be sent to the micro-service.
the micro-service also should verify the validity of the token by talking to the token exchange endpoint.
when the token is checked, the micro-service can start its job.
I think this link will be useful for you Securing Microservices
You said that this responsibility belongs to a microservice. So, the other microservices don't check permissions, they delegate.
If you use an API Gateway and the other microservices are not accessible from the outside then it calls the authentication/authorisation microservice before forwarding the request to the upstream microservice.
If you don't use an API Gateway then each microservice call the authentication/authorisation microservice before actually performing the action.
I'm developing a REST API that requires authentication. Because the authentication itself occurs via an external webservice over HTTP, I reasoned that we would dispense tokens to avoid repeatedly calling the authentication service. Which brings me neatly to my first question:
Is this really any better than just requiring clients to use HTTP Basic Auth on each request and caching calls to the authentication service server-side?
The Basic Auth solution has the advantage of not requiring a full round-trip to the server before requests for content can begin. Tokens can potentially be more flexible in scope (i.e. only grant rights to particular resources or actions), but that seems more appropriate to the OAuth context than my simpler use case.
Currently tokens are acquired like this:
curl -X POST localhost/token --data "api_key=81169d80...
&verifier=2f5ae51a...
×tamp=1234567
&user=foo
&pass=bar"
The api_key, timestamp and verifier are required by all requests. The "verifier" is returned by:
sha1(timestamp + api_key + shared_secret)
My intention is to only allow calls from known parties, and to prevent calls from being reused verbatim.
Is this good enough? Underkill? Overkill?
With a token in hand, clients can acquire resources:
curl localhost/posts?api_key=81169d80...
&verifier=81169d80...
&token=9fUyas64...
×tamp=1234567
For the simplest call possible, this seems kind of horribly verbose. Considering the shared_secret will wind up being embedded in (at minimum) an iOS application, from which I would assume it can be extracted, is this even offering anything beyond a false sense of security?
Let me seperate up everything and solve approach each problem in isolation:
Authentication
For authentication, baseauth has the advantage that it is a mature solution on the protocol level. This means a lot of "might crop up later" problems are already solved for you. For example, with BaseAuth, user agents know the password is a password so they don't cache it.
Auth server load
If you dispense a token to the user instead of caching the authentication on your server, you are still doing the same thing: Caching authentication information. The only difference is that you are turning the responsibility for the caching to the user. This seems like unnecessary labor for the user with no gains, so I recommend to handle this transparently on your server as you suggested.
Transmission Security
If can use an SSL connection, that's all there is to it, the connection is secure*. To prevent accidental multiple execution, you can filter multiple urls or ask users to include a random component ("nonce") in the URL.
url = username:key#myhost.com/api/call/nonce
If that is not possible, and the transmitted information is not secret, I recommend securing the request with a hash, as you suggested in the token approach. Since the hash provides the security, you could instruct your users to provide the hash as the baseauth password. For improved robustness, I recommend using a random string instead of the timestamp as a "nonce" to prevent replay attacks (two legit requests could be made during the same second). Instead of providing seperate "shared secret" and "api key" fields, you can simply use the api key as shared secret, and then use a salt that doesn't change to prevent rainbow table attacks. The username field seems like a good place to put the nonce too, since it is part of the auth. So now you have a clean call like this:
nonce = generate_secure_password(length: 16);
one_time_key = nonce + '-' + sha1(nonce+salt+shared_key);
url = username:one_time_key#myhost.com/api/call
It is true that this is a bit laborious. This is because you aren't using a protocol level solution (like SSL). So it might be a good idea to provide some kind of SDK to users so at least they don't have to go through it themselves. If you need to do it this way, I find the security level appropriate (just-right-kill).
Secure secret storage
It depends who you are trying to thwart. If you are preventing people with access to the user's phone from using your REST service in the user's name, then it would be a good idea to find some kind of keyring API on the target OS and have the SDK (or the implementor) store the key there. If that's not possible, you can at least make it a bit harder to get the secret by encrypting it, and storing the encrypted data and the encryption key in seperate places.
If you are trying to keep other software vendors from getting your API key to prevent the development of alternate clients, only the encrypt-and-store-seperately approach almost works. This is whitebox crypto, and to date, no one has come up with a truly secure solution to problems of this class. The least you can do is still issue a single key for each user so you can ban abused keys.
(*) EDIT: SSL connections should no longer be considered secure without taking additional steps to verify them.
A pure RESTful API should use the underlying protocol standard features:
For HTTP, the RESTful API should comply with existing HTTP standard headers. Adding a new HTTP header violates the REST principles. Do not re-invent the wheel, use all the standard features in HTTP/1.1 standards - including status response codes, headers, and so on. RESTFul web services should leverage and rely upon the HTTP standards.
RESTful services MUST be STATELESS. Any tricks, such as token based authentication that attempts to remember the state of previous REST requests on the server violates the REST principles. Again, this is a MUST; that is, if you web server saves any request/response context related information on the server in attempt to establish any sort of session on the server, then your web service is NOT Stateless. And if it is NOT stateless it is NOT RESTFul.
Bottom-line: For authentication/authorization purposes you should use HTTP standard authorization header. That is, you should add the HTTP authorization / authentication header in each subsequent request that needs to be authenticated. The REST API should follow the HTTP Authentication Scheme standards.The specifics of how this header should be formatted are defined in the RFC 2616 HTTP 1.1 standards – section 14.8 Authorization of RFC 2616, and in the RFC 2617 HTTP Authentication: Basic and Digest Access Authentication.
I have developed a RESTful service for the Cisco Prime Performance Manager application. Search Google for the REST API document that I wrote for that application for more details about RESTFul API compliance here. In that implementation, I have chosen to use HTTP "Basic" Authorization scheme. - check out version 1.5 or above of that REST API document, and search for authorization in the document.
In the web a stateful protocol is based on having a temporary token that is exchanged between a browser and a server (via cookie header or URI rewriting) on every request. That token is usually created on the server end, and it is a piece of opaque data that has a certain time-to-live, and it has the sole purpose of identifying a specific web user agent. That is, the token is temporary, and becomes a STATE that the web server has to maintain on behalf of a client user agent during the duration of that conversation. Therefore, the communication using a token in this way is STATEFUL. And if the conversation between client and server is STATEFUL it is not RESTful.
The username/password (sent on the Authorization header) is usually persisted on the database with the intent of identifying a user. Sometimes the user could mean another application; however, the username/password is NEVER intended to identify a specific web client user agent. The conversation between a web agent and server based on using the username/password in the Authorization header (following the HTTP Basic Authorization) is STATELESS because the web server front-end is not creating or maintaining any STATE information whatsoever on behalf of a specific web client user agent. And based on my understanding of REST, the protocol states clearly that the conversation between clients and server should be STATELESS. Therefore, if we want to have a true RESTful service we should use username/password (Refer to RFC mentioned in my previous post) in the Authorization header for every single call, NOT a sension kind of token (e.g. Session tokens created in web servers, OAuth tokens created in authorization servers, and so on).
I understand that several called REST providers are using tokens like OAuth1 or OAuth2 accept-tokens to be be passed as "Authorization: Bearer " in HTTP headers. However, it appears to me that using those tokens for RESTful services would violate the true STATELESS meaning that REST embraces; because those tokens are temporary piece of data created/maintained on the server side to identify a specific web client user agent for the valid duration of a that web client/server conversation. Therefore, any service that is using those OAuth1/2 tokens should not be called REST if we want to stick to the TRUE meaning of a STATELESS protocol.
Rubens