Can any one explain where can I find Registration Authority (RA) and Validation Authority (VA) of a website such as wikipedia in Browser like Google Chrome? also how can I document the X.509 record ?
The Registration Authority (RA) certificate will not necessarily be visible to you as the relying party. When a website such as Wikipedia enrols for a certificate they will approach a CA to request a certificate. That process normally happens through a Registration Authority and it is therefore the website administrators who will view the RA certificate. This RA certificate could be used for a HTTPS connection by a web front-end, or it could be used for some form of automated enrolment process, such as SCEP or ACME.
Of course, you could look at the name of the certificate issuer then visit their website to see if you can access the RA and thereby view the RA certificate. But I'm sure you've got better things to do.
The Validation Authority (VA) may operate a CRL distribution point over HTTP, FTP, LDAP etc., or it may operate an OCSP service. It is likely that a VA certificate (if used) would be visible to you when you (as the relying party) verifies a certificate.
You are more likely to see the VA's certificate on an OCSP response than a CRL distribution point as the latter tend to operate over non-TLS protocols.
how can I document the X.509 record ?
I'm afraid I don't know what you mean.
Related
I have a short question: why do I need a SSL certificate (I mean only the certificate not the SSL connection)?
In my case Google Chrome deteced, that the connection is encrypted and secure, but everything is red because I created the certificate by myself.
Why I need a SSL certificate, if the connection is secure?
Just because traffic to 192.168.xxx.xxx doesn't leave the boundary of your network doesn't mean that it's safe.
Especially if you have BYODs attached to the network (and even if not, you don't want to be a hard shell with a juicy interior), someone can bring a compromised laptop or phone, attach it to the network, and a virus can intercept everything going on the network (see firesheep).
So you have to assume that the network is malicious - treat your LAN as if it were the internet.
So now the question goes back - why can't I rely on a self-signed certificate (both on a local network as well as the internet)?
Well, what are you protecting against? TLS (SSL) protects against two things:
Interception - even if I MITM you (I become your router), I can't read what you're sending and receiving (so I can't read your Credit Card numbers or password)
Spoofing - I can't inject code between you and the server.
So how does it work?
I connect to the server and get a certificate signed by a CA. This CA is considered trusted by the browser (they have to go through all kinds of audits to get that trust, and they get evicted if they break it). They verify that you control the server and then sign your public key.
So when the client gets the signed public key from the server, he knows he's going to encrypt a message that only the destination server can decrypt, as the MITM wouldn't be able to substitute his own public key for the server's (his public key wouldn't be signed by a CA).
Now you can communicate securely with the server.
What would happen if the browser would accept any SSL cert (self signed)?
Remember how the browser can tell the official cert from a fake MITM cert? By being signed by a CA. If there's no CA, there's literally no way for the browser to know if it's talking to the official server or a MITM.
So self-signed certs are a big no-no.
What you can do, though, is you can generate a cert and make it a "root" cert (practically, start your own CA for your internal computers). You can then load it into your browsers CA store and you'll be able to communicate through SSL without having to go through something like letsencrypt (which, by the way, is how enterprise network monitoring tools work).
In cryptography, a certificate authority or certification authority
(CA) is an entity that issues digital certificates. A digital
certificate certifies the ownership of a public key by the named
subject of the certificate. This allows others (relying parties) to
rely upon signatures or on assertions made about the private key that
corresponds to the certified public key. A CA acts as a trusted third
party—trusted both by the subject (owner) of the certificate and by
the party relying upon the certificate. The format of these
certificates is specified by the X.509 standard.
(from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Certificate_authority)
You are not a trusted CA. Basically, if you sign your own certificate then there is no one that is able to vouch that the server is truly what it is. If you had a valid, trusted third party vouch for you then the certificate would be "valid."
Having a self-signed certificate doesn't necessarily mean that the website is dangerous, its just that the identity of the server can't be verified and thus it is more risky for the vistor.
Self-created or Self Signing Certificate are not trusted by all browsers. As we know at this time all browsers are more strict towards security. Let’s be clear about something right up front, the browsers do not trust you. Period.
It may seem harsh but it’s just a fact, browsers’ jobs are to surf the internet while protecting their users and that requires them to be skeptical of everyone or everything.
The browsers do, however, trust a small set of recognized Certificate Authorities. This is because those CA’s follow certain guidelines, make available certain information are regular partners with the browsers. There’s even a forum, called the CA/B forum, where the CA’s and Browsers meet to discuss baseline requirements and new rules that all CA’s must abide to continue being recognized.
It’s highly regulated.
And you are not a part of the CA/B forum.
The better option is to obtain an SSL Certificate from a trusted certificate authority.
Here's what you need to know about a Self Signed SSL Certificate
I have a portofolio website runing on a IIS Windows server if that matters.But some people complained that they get "website unsafe" when navigating the website.I personaly didnt get that error , and I tried the website on other diveces and they didnt get it either.
Could have something to do with SSL Certificate ? I didn't bought one ,but I have a self signed certificate according to ssl checker
.Do I need to buy a trusted SSL Certificate ? Or is there another problem ?
On my website i have a "Contact us" page with a web form that users should fill with name,email...
EDIT: I don't know if it's ok to post the website link here, if it's needed let me know .
EDIT: Link to website here.
This is a general problem with self-signed certificates, as the visitors of you website, or their browser, are not able to verify the identity of your server. The reason for this is, that there is no Certification Authority that signed it, thus the browser does not have a (root) certificate that is in the chain of trust linked to your certificate.
This problem with self-signed certificates is well explained in this post
The risks are for the client. The point of the SSL server certificate is that it is used by the client to know the server public key, with some level of guarantee that the key indeed belongs to the intended server. The guarantee comes from the CA: the CA is supposed to perform extensive verification of the requester identity before issuing the certificate.
When a client (the user and his Web browser) "accepts" a certificate which has not been issued by one of the CA that the client trusts (the CA which were embedded in Windows by Microsoft), then the risk is that the client is currently talking to a fake server, i.e. is under attack. Note that passive attacks (the attacker observes the data but does not alter it in any way) are thwarted by SSL regardless of whether the CA certificate was issued by a mainstream CA or not.
On a general basis, you do not want to train your users to ignore the scary security warning from the browser, because this makes them vulnerable to such server impersonation attacks (which are not that hard to mount, e.g. with DNS poisoning). On the other hand, if you can confirm, through some other way, that the certificate is genuine that one time, then the browser will remember the certificate and will not show warnings for subsequent visits as long as the same self-signed certificate is used. The newly proposed Convergence PKI is an extension of this principle. Note that this "remembered certificate" holds as long as the certificate is unchanged, so you really want to set the expiry date of your self-signed certificate in the far future (but not beyond 2038 if you want to avoid interoperability issues).
It shall be noted that since a self-signed certificate is not "managed" by a CA, there is no possible revocation. If an attacker steals your private key, you permanently lose, whereas CA-issued certificates still have the theoretical safety net of revocation (a way for the CA to declare that a given certificate is rotten). In practice, current Web browser do not check revocation status anyway.
I have a simple question (maybe stupid) and i didn't find any clear answer to it. If i get a certificate from a trusted signing company (like verisign...) for one of my server (web for instance), i'll have private an public keys. With this certificate can i set up my own intermediate CA and sign cert request and the be trusted by every one (i know that's shouldn't be..)? My real question is : what will prevent me for issuing certificate and how the company can garanty that nobody does ??
Thanking in advance!
The certificate issued for your web site is suitable for SSL/TLS and is not suitable for issuing other certificates (Key Usage field is different). Consequently while you technically can generate another certificate using yours as a CA, such generated certificate won't be trusted by properly implemented and configured validators (those that check Key Usage).
You are not paying verisign or other certificate organisation for the certificate publishing but for the certificate validation, this meens that they have web services that respond if your certificate is valid or not, if it is still active and not expired and your contact information as requested.
Unfortunatly this is something you have to live with it and pay them if you really need ssl over your site.
I have used a homemade certificate for my lan server and when i visit this https site a big red warning notifies me that this site is malicious and it has not a valid certificate. This doesn't bother me but I am sure that all of my clients would have freeked out if they see such a bold warning popping up to their browser.
what can you do? it's a companies' world
I know how to create self-signed SSL certificates, but how must a certificate request be formulated so that the certifying authority grants the certificate the ability to sign certificates?
Let's say I am chief of networks operations in a company. Different IT departments have their own networks they can certify others to connect to, but I have to grant their certificates the ability to sign certificates rather than they creating their own self-signed certificates?
Most of the work involved in setting attributes and other pieces of information into a certificate is administrative.
You shouldn't worry much about the certificate request itself. Any decent CA will tear apart the certificate requests it receive to extract the public key and associate it with whatever pieces of information it wants to form the certificate. It should only insert pieces of information that (a) it has been able to verify by some other means (e.g. domain validation, or numerous paper forms, ...) and (b) it's willing to vouch for (and possibly be liable for to a degree, depending on the terms and conditions).
Some well known CAs have schemes to become an intermediate CA. They'll issue you with such a CA certificate. (Hopefully, it's hard to sign up for these schemes...)
If you're deploying your own internal CA and want intermediate CAs, the intermediate CA certificates you issue should have the cA boolean of the basic constraints extension set to true (see RFC 5280). (This is not so much an issue with the certificate requests, but with the certificates you issue.)
A friend of mine asked me why we pay so much for SSL certificates if everyone could theoretically issue one. Why indeed? And how do we judge if the little lock in the browser is really trustworthy?
Certificates are cryptographically signed by something called a Certificate Authority(CA), and each browser has a list of CAs it implicitly trusts. These CAs are entities that have a set of cryptographic keys that can be used to sign any certificate, often for a fee. Any certificate signed by a CA in the trusted list will give a lock on a browser, because it's proven to be "trusted" and belongs to that domain.
You can self-sign a certificate, but the browser will warn you that the signer is not trusted, either by showing a big error box before allowing you in, or showing a broken lock icon.
In addition, even a trusted certificate will give an error if it's used for the wrong domain, or is modified to include another domain. This is ensured because the certificate includes the domains it is allowed to be used for, and it also has a cryptographic checksum/fingerprint that ensures its integrity.
This is not 100% safe at the moment, as there is the possibility to fake CA certificates that use MD5, see this link: http://www.phreedom.org/research/rogue-ca/. Though it has to be noted that this is pretty hard, as they exploited a weakness in an already existing CA, which may or may not have been closed by now.
In essence, we trust the certificates as much as we trust that our browser providers know how to select "proper" CAs. Those CAs are only trusted on virtue of their reputation, as a single misstep theoretically would be a very heavy blow on their trustworthiness if detected.
The whole CA business is amazing. I've purchased a couple of certificates from rapidssl.com, and all the "proof" they required was:
I could receive mail to the domain.
I could answer my phone.
That was it. Keep in mind, when trusting the little locks in the browser.
First, some background on strong public/private key cryptography, which SSL is based on:
A key has two parts, the private part and the public part. The public key can be used to encrypt material that requires the private key to decrypt. This allows the use of open communication channels to communicate securely.
One important aspect of public/private key cryptography is that the private key can be used to digitally sign a message which can be verified using the public key. This gives the receiver of a message the ability to verify concretely that the message they received was sent by the sender (the holder of the key).
The key to SSL certificates is that encryption keys themselves can be digitally signed.
A "certificate" is composed of a private/public key pair as well as digitally signed data. When someone buys an SSL certificate they generate a private/public key and submit the public key to a Certification Authority (CA) to be signed. The CA performs an appropriate level of due diligence on the buyer of the SSL certificate and signs the certificate with their private key. The SSL certificate will be bound to a particular website or set of websites and is essentially the CA indicating that they trust the owner of the private key of the certificate to be the proper owner of those websites.
The root certificates (public keys and other meta-data) for trusted CAs are included by default in major shipping browsers and operating systems (in windows, type "certmgr.msc" into a run prompt to see the certificate manager). When you connect to a web server using SSL the server will send you its SSL certificate including the public key and other meta data, all of which is signed by the CA. Your browser is able to verify the validity of the certificate, through the signature and the preloaded root certificates. This creates a chain of trust between the CA and the web server you are connecting to.
Because we have to trust someone.
Trusted SSL certificates have signatures of trusted authorities. For example, VeriSign has a deal with Microsoft, that their certificate is built in your browser. So you can trust every page with a VeriSign trusted certificate.
This graphic really picks the point:
RA = Registration Authority
CA = Certification Authority
VA = Validation Authority
Rough outline: A user applies for a
certificate with his public key at a
registration authority (RA). The
latter confirms the user's identity to
the certification authority (CA) which
in turn issues the certificate. The
user can then digitally sign a
contract using his new certificate.
His identity is then checked by the
contracting party with a validation
authority (VA) which again receives
information about issued certificates
by the certification authority.
If you are not using one of the accepted CAs people will get a message box when accessing the site talking about an untrusted certificate. That won't help to generate traffic to the site.
The lock only means that the site owner showed a CA some kind of proof that he really is who he claims to be. You must judge on your own if you trust that person/site.
It's like a stranger showing you a photo ID. Do you trust him more because you know for sure his name is John Doe? Probably not.
But when people you trust told you: "John Doe" is a good guy. The proof that the guy in front of you actually IS "John Doe", than you might choose to trust him as well.
Why? Because you're paying to ride along on someone elses reputation.... to vouch for you.
Its all about whose validating your claim to be you. Despite some of the documentaries Ive watched lately, and the recession, I'm still more likely to believe corporate America when they confirm your identity to me, than I am the Russian mafia. Even though both can just as easily issue certificates.
The amount you pay is basically just (how much it costs them to secure that reputation and/or suppress any security breaches) + (however much they can afford to gouge the market as a margin %).
Now the barriers to entry are quite high, cos its really expensive to earn that trust, so theres not a lot of competition. Therefore chances are the price isn't going to fall anytime soon.... unless Sony or GE etc decide to play.
You pay for a certificate so that when you go HTTPS (which you should for anything a little sensitive) your clients don’t get big warnings and go call your support saying that you have infected them & al…
Very little security, lot of FUD.
If you have the possibility of giving your clients your own certificate directly, do it. But it is a rare case.
Let's create an attack scenario.
Suppose the DNS was corrupted and https://facebook.com/ points to attacker's IP.
You sit down to your PC and open Facebook to loose few minutes on pointless scrolling. And then BANG, Certificate invalid error shows on your screen. Attacker signed https://facebook.com/ with his own cert to make sure no one will leave his copied facebook page because it's not encrypted so it looks suspicious. If browser wouldn't check certificate's authority, then attacker could sign corrupted page with his cert and you won't be aware you're connecting to the wrong IP.
So the attacker has 2 options to choose from:
Sign corrupted facebook page with his cert, so users will see an error.
Don't use https on his corrupted page.
Certificates are built on a chain of trust, and if let anyone be a signing authority, we would be implicitly trusting everyone. It's a bit scary today though, since there are over 200 so called "trusted authorities" whose certs are built into your browser!
There is one free CA that I know of though: StartCom. They issue free SSL certs, but they are only accepted in Firefox, not IE. (Not sure about Safari or Opera).
The other answers have explained the CA-system. The perspectives project aims to deploy a new approach to SSL, where you can choose whom to trust: http://perspectives-project.org/