I configured freeradius which use ldap as a backend database.(in ldap, i stored password in ssha)
Because ldap does not support mschap, I Use eap-ttls with pap for authentication.
In freeradius server, when I run freeradius in debug mode, I see username and password of client in cleartext.freeradius output
so, as I said before, because I use ldap as a backend database, I can't use mschap (which is the only secure way I know for client to send his password). I just want to know is there another way to send password that is not visible in output of freeradius?
I Found this options in windows, but I don't know if they are useful for my case or not.
windows interface configuration
Thanks.
Related
I have setauth_password_format: scram in ejabberd.yml and ldap auth method.
LDAP authentication works only for passwords in plaintext.
I can even set scram hash value as a password in my xmpp client and successfully login, since ejabberd checks it as a plain text against LDAP record, but how do I make ejabberd hash the password with scram before checking it against the LDAP record?
I thought auth_password_format would do that, but apparently it still thinks userPassword attribute in the LDAP record is in plain text.
Is there some additional check that ejabberd preforms on the userPassword value to see if it is indeed scram and then fails for some reason? Or is it ignoring auth_password_format option when ldap is set as auth method? Or something else entirely?
Is there a way as a non-erlang developer that I can make this work? The only idea I have is to use external auth scripts if ejabberd cant use scram and ldap together for some reason, but I would really like it if I can just set this up in the configuration file instead.
Looking at the ejabberd source code, scram is mentioned in ejabberd_auth.erl, ejabberd_auth_mnesia.erl and ejabberd_auth_sql.erl. There is no mention to scram in the other authentication methods, which points to what you concluded.
In this sense, I later noticed that the SCRAM section mentions only internal (Mnesia) and SQL auth methods:
https://docs.ejabberd.im/admin/configuration/authentication/#scram
I would say that external auth will not support it either.
I'm using cypress-ntlm-auth plugin in my cypress automation project, providing me windows authentication (Ntlm, kerberos etc.)
In particular, I use the ntlmSso option for Negotiate with my app. If the server sends an authentication challenge, the ntlm-proxy will perform a NTLM or Negotiate login handshake with the credentials of the user running the test client.
The problem is that I need to use a pre-defined user (to be used in my pre-prod environment) to make api requests, instead of the logged on user on the computer.
How can I do that? thanks in advance
The cypress-ntlm-auth library allows you to specify this with cy.ntlm(), by passing in hosts, username, password, and domain.
cy.ntlm(["my.host.com"], "myUser", "myPass", "myDomain")
Check out the docs here. Take note of their strategy on storing passwords.
I am creating a login page with an authentication using LDAP. I could see LDAP3 packages for flask with login forms as well. I am looking for a form where the developer of the portal(say me or anyone in our team) should not be able to add any print statements and sniff the username and password when someone log in...
The flask form is exposing the password variable as a plain string. Even if it doesn't expose , it is possible to put a print statement in the flask_form validate function.
Is there any option available like the form is bundled as binary or c-python module where the developer has no option to sniff the credentials at all..
If not possible or no options available as they know off, any other framework like django helps for these usecase?
By design, server-side LDAP authentication requires the server receive the username & password from the user and relay that information to the LDAP server. This means a developer could insert a line that logs all credentials out somewhere, grab the passwords from process traces, dump memory, etc. If you don't want any of the developers or system administrators to have access to user passwords, use some type of federated authentication instead of LDAP.
In a federated authentication scheme, the user auths against some other source (e.g. ADFS) and your app checks a token that essentially says "this trusted other auth source says the person is Lisa".
If multiple systems join ldap authentication, then any administrator of any one of them can get the password of any user's account.right？
Applications authenticating against an LDAP directory are not going to be able to access all of the user passwords en mass provided you do not not permit direct read access to the attribute or you do not store your passwords in clear text (if you use something like ldapsearch to dump an entry and have userpassword:: followed by a bunch of random looking 'stuff', that's an easily decoded clear text password). App I allow to access my LDAP server aren't given access to read all of the userPassword values to attempt reversing them out to clear text (and I'm using a decent encryption mechanism to store userPassword value). I restrict the application service account to reading contact-type attributes (phone number, address) and group objects. The only way they get the user's password is by asking the user for it and binding against my directory with those credentials. Can an app admin grab credentials for those who use the application? Sure, they could.
On an out of the box application, I could attach a debugger and access the username/password values as they transit the application. With custom-written applications, it's even easier to grab the credentials. The application takes the username and password as user input and binds to the LDAP server to validate the username and password. As an LDAP server admin, there's nothing I can do to prevent the application developer from making calls and doing other things with that username and password. "Other things" may be legit -- I've handled LDAP directory migrations by authenticating against the old system and, on success, creating the user in the new directory LDAP with the password the old directory just accepted. It was an ugly way to migrate directories, but it worked. "Other things" may be malicious. Is it likely to encounter an app admin or developer who is siphoning off credentials? Depends on who authenticating through your LDAP directory.
This isn't a unique failing of LDAP -- any authentication back-end that you let other people use directly suffers from the same problem. If you don't want the app admins/developers intercepting user credentials, look into federated identify management (FIM) -- an authentication mechanisms where the app (service provider, in FIM terminology) doesn't have access to the username and password but rather validates a token of some sort that was created after a trusted "identity provider" authenticated the username and password.
I have a web application (PHP, but doesn't matter). It uses LDAP for authentication (already working), and it allows users to search LDAP (already working).
But when searching, I use a generic process account to bind() and then run the search().
What I would like is to use the LDAP account that logs in to be the same account that binds for the searching. But the only way I see to do that is to store the user's credentials in the sessions (bad!).
Nutshell: can I get a "state/session/??" token from LDAP, to bind() and then search() on subsequent http requests?
(btw, using Active Directory.)
Basic LDAP doesn't provide anything like this. The credentials that you present when binding are used for the rest of the connection, so if you could keep an LDAP connection open across multiple HTTP requests (and share LDAP connections among however many server jobs you have running), then you could avoid saving credentials.
There are various extensions to LDAP floating around (including several within Active Directory), so it's possible that one of those adds sessions-across-connections, but if so, I'm not aware of it.
As a sort-of-workaround, because Active Directory supports GSSAPI and because of how Kerberos works, you ought to be able to use the user's credentials to request a Kerberos ticket for accessing LDAP then store that ticket as your "state/session/??" token. This Kerberos ticket would only be valid for accessing LDAP and would auto-expire, so this would avoid the pitfalls of storing the user's credentials in the session. I don't know if your LDAP library supports GSSAPI and would give you enough control to do this or not.