Can Root CA Certificate located in the middle of certificate path? - ssl

I made a program that connects to website(tls) and save certificate chain to files.
Sometimes certificate chain from a website is looking different from what I expected.
One of this certificate chain is issued from Sectigo(ex Comodo) CA.
I think "AddTrust External CA Root" should located in the last certificate of chain but is located in second certificate in its chain.(please look at below Certificate chain part )
$ openssl s_client -showcerts -connect adblockplus.org:443
CONNECTED(00000003)
depth=3 C = SE, O = AddTrust AB, OU = AddTrust External TTP Network, CN = AddTrust External CA Root
verify return:1
depth=2 C = US, ST = New Jersey, L = Jersey City, O = The USERTRUST Network, CN = USERTrust RSA Certification Authority
verify return:1
depth=1 C = GB, ST = Greater Manchester, L = Salford, O = Sectigo Limited, CN = Sectigo RSA Extended Validation Secure Server CA
verify return:1
depth=0 serialNumber = HRB 73508, jurisdictionC = DE, businessCategory = Private Organization, C = DE, postalCode = 50825, ST = Nordrhein-Westfalen, L = K\C3\B6ln, street = Lichtstra\C3\9Fe 25, O = Eyeo GmbH, OU = COMODO EV SSL, CN = www.adblockplus.org
verify return:1
---
Certificate chain
0 s:/serialNumber=HRB 73508/jurisdictionC=DE/businessCategory=Private Organization/C=DE/postalCode=50825/ST=Nordrhein-Westfalen/L=K\xC3\xB6ln/street=Lichtstra\xC3\x9Fe 25/O=Eyeo GmbH/OU=COMODO EV SSL/CN=www.adblockplus.org
i:/C=GB/ST=Greater Manchester/L=Salford/O=Sectigo Limited/CN=Sectigo RSA Extended Validation Secure Server CA
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
...
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
1 s:/C=SE/O=AddTrust AB/OU=AddTrust External TTP Network/CN=AddTrust External CA Root
i:/C=SE/O=AddTrust AB/OU=AddTrust External TTP Network/CN=AddTrust External CA Root
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
...
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
2 s:/C=US/ST=New Jersey/L=Jersey City/O=The USERTRUST Network/CN=USERTrust RSA Certification Authority
i:/C=SE/O=AddTrust AB/OU=AddTrust External TTP Network/CN=AddTrust External CA Root
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
...
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
3 s:/C=GB/ST=Greater Manchester/L=Salford/O=Sectigo Limited/CN=Sectigo RSA Extended Validation Secure Server CA
i:/C=US/ST=New Jersey/L=Jersey City/O=The USERTRUST Network/CN=USERTrust RSA Certification Authority
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
...
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
---
Server certificate
subject=/serialNumber=HRB 73508/jurisdictionC=DE/businessCategory=Private Organization/C=DE/postalCode=50825/ST=Nordrhein-Westfalen/L=K\xC3\xB6ln/street=Lichtstra\xC3\x9Fe 25/O=Eyeo GmbH/OU=COMODO EV SSL/CN=www.adblockplus.org
issuer=/C=GB/ST=Greater Manchester/L=Salford/O=Sectigo Limited/CN=Sectigo RSA Extended Validation Secure Server CA
my question is:
Is this case is normal?
Is the web server(adblockplus this time) making Certificate path ?
How to determine valid certificate path?
Any comments are welcome. thanks

A TLS-was-SSL server is supposed to send the certificate chain in the correct order in the handshake, but some don't, and most clients including OpenSSL will still handle it correctly, by matching up issuer=subject names, as long as the leaf (end-entity) cert is first. Note the trace of the validation process:
depth=3 C = SE, O = AddTrust AB, OU = AddTrust External TTP Network, CN = AddTrust External CA Root
verify return:1
depth=2 C = US, ST = New Jersey, L = Jersey City, O = The USERTRUST Network, CN = USERTrust RSA Certification Authority
verify return:1
depth=1 C = GB, ST = Greater Manchester, L = Salford, O = Sectigo Limited, CN = Sectigo RSA Extended Validation Secure Server CA
verify return:1
depth=0 serialNumber = HRB 73508, jurisdictionC = DE, businessCategory = Private Organization, C = DE, postalCode = 50825, ST = Nordrhein-Westfalen, L = K\C3\B6ln, street = Lichtstra\C3\9Fe 25, O = Eyeo GmbH, OU = COMODO EV SSL, CN = www.adblockplus.org
verify return:1
You can see that the certificates were used in the correct top-to-bottom order even though they weren't received in the correct bottom-to-top order.
This misbehavior is common enough TLS 1.3 was changed to officially permit it. Compare TLS 1.2 in RFC 5246 7.4.2:
certificate_list ... The sender's
certificate MUST come first in the list. Each following
certificate MUST directly certify the one preceding it. Because
certificate validation requires that root keys be distributed
independently, the self-signed certificate that specifies the root
certificate authority MAY be omitted from the chain, under the
assumption that the remote end must already possess it in order to
validate it in any case.
to TLS 1.3 in RFC 8446 4.4.2, emphasis added:
... The sender's certificate MUST come in the first
CertificateEntry in the list. Each following certificate SHOULD
directly certify the one immediately preceding it. Because
certificate validation requires that trust anchors be distributed
independently, a certificate that specifies a trust anchor MAY be
omitted from the chain, provided that supported peers are known to
possess any omitted certificates.
Note: Prior to TLS 1.3, "certificate_list" ordering required each
certificate to certify the one immediately preceding it; however,
some implementations allowed some flexibility. Servers sometimes
send both a current and deprecated intermediate for transitional
purposes, and others are simply configured incorrectly, but these
cases can nonetheless be validated properly. For maximum
compatibility, all implementations SHOULD be prepared to handle
potentially extraneous certificates and arbitrary orderings from any
TLS version, with the exception of the end-entity certificate which
MUST be first.
(And the same is true in the other direction for client certificates, but they are used only very rarely, while server certificates almost always are.)

Related

Openssl Certificate Chain

Executed the command:
openssl s_client -connect (redacted):443
and I get the output
depth=1 C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = R3
verify error:num=20:unable to get local issuer certificate
verify return:1
depth=0 CN = *.(redacted)
verify return:1
---
Certificate chain
0 s:CN = *.(redacted)
i:C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = R3
1 s:C = US, O = Let's Encrypt, CN = R3
i:O = Digital Signature Trust Co., CN = DST Root CA X3
---
What does the error "unable to get local issuer certificate" mean? From the above I can see that the full chain is there, and that the root CA "DST Root CA X3" signed the "R3" cert. So surely that R3 cert does not need to be explicitly trusted? Is this good enough?
Is this cause for concern?
verify error:num=20:unable to get local issuer certificate
The trust chain from the leaf (server certificate) via the intermediate chain certificates (R3) must end in a locally trusted root CA (DST Root CA X3). Obviously this root CA is not locally trusted in the CA store used by your openssl setup (or maybe you have explicitly used -CApath or -CAfile).

Another situation where I get X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY

As a followup to this original question:
Unable to get certificate locally
I did solve the original problem as jww answered.
And I have now followed the same steps of importing the certificate chain for our company site, from "comodo". I simply added them to the file which I originally used with the "google.com" root certs.
Now, although this still works fine with "google", when I connect to our company website, I still get the error code 20 on the SSL_get_verify_result() call.
Is this a result of our using a "wildcard" certificate? i.e.: *.domain.com.
The version of OpenSSL I am currently using is 1.0.1g.
I don't see any other differences from my perspective.
Thanks for any advice.
----- Updated ------
First, let me comment that I am not mentioning our domain, and not posting too much material from the OpenSSL command, as I am not familiar enough with what should be kept confidential.
What I did was combine the base64 encoded certificates into one big file, as the previous post instructed. And I obtained them via the browser "export" utility in the same manner for both. That means the certificates that we use, as well as the google certificates from my previous post are all concatenated. Specifically it looks like this now:
Our Company Cert
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
....
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
and it is signed by these guys - ComodoRSA
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
....
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
and that is signed at the root here - ComodoRoot
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
....
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
and this is the GOOGLE G3 who signed the "www.google.com"
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
....
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
and the GOOGLE G3 is signed by this one - globalSign
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----
....
-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Then the code segment I use to test looks like this:
strcpy(host,"our.domain.com");
// strcpy(host,"www.google.com");
/* Build our SSL context*/
ctx = initialize_ctx(KEYFILE,NULL);
/* Connect the TCP socket*/
sock = tcp_connect(host,port);
And then later...
result = SSL_get_verify_result(ssl);
switch(result) {
case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED : break;
case X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN : break;
case X509_V_OK : break;
case X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT : break;
default :puts("Certificate doesn't verify");
}
Simply put, this same code, using this same CRT file, does not give me a "20" error when I use the www.google.com" host, but does give me an error "20" when I use our server. The extent of the test involves changing that commented out name of the host.
Connections to the HTTPS server with commercial clients (Chrome, IE, FF...) have no errors.
As for the comment that recommended the command, I get the following (hopefully I pasted the necessary information):
For Google:
depth=2 OU = GlobalSign Root CA - R2, O = GlobalSign, CN = GlobalSign verify return:1
depth=1 C = US, O = Google Trust Services, CN = Google Internet Authority G3
verify return:1
depth=0 C = US, ST = California, L = Mountain View, O = Google LLC, CN = www.google.com
verify return:1
read:errno=0
---- other stuff ----
Certificate chain
0 s:/C=US/ST=California/L=Mountain View/O=Google LLC/CN=www.google.com
i:/C=US/O=Google Trust Services/CN=Google Internet Authority G3
1 s:/C=US/O=Google Trust Services/CN=Google Internet Authority G3
i:/OU=GlobalSign Root CA - R2/O=GlobalSign/CN=GlobalSign
---
And for our domain, I am getting the following (company specifics hidden):
depth=2 C = GB, ST = Greater Manchester, L = Salford, O = COMODO CA Limited, CN = COMODO RSA Certification Authority
verify error:num=20:unable to get local issuer certificate
verify return:0
read:errno=10054
---- other stuff ---
Certificate chain
0 s:/C=US/postalCode=00000/ST=IL/L=city/street=main/O=company./OU=PremiumSSL Wildcard/CN=*.domain.com
i:/C=GB/ST=Greater Manchester/L=Salford/O=COMODO CA Limited/CN=COMODO RSA Organization Validation Secure Server CA
1 s:/C=GB/ST=Greater Manchester/L=Salford/O=COMODO CA Limited/CN=COMODO RSA Organization Validation Secure Server CA
i:/C=GB/ST=Greater Manchester/L=Salford/O=COMODO CA Limited/CN=COMODO RSA Certification Authority
2 s:/C=GB/ST=Greater Manchester/L=Salford/O=COMODO CA Limited/CN=COMODO RSA Certification Authority
i:/C=SE/O=AddTrust AB/OU=AddTrust External TTP Network/CN=AddTrust External CA Root
----
Now, the chain is that our certificate is signed by "ComodoRSA", and that it is signed by "ComodoRoot".
However, as I originally indicated, our certificate is a "wildcard" certificate, where the google certificate isn't.
So that was my question: Is there a problem using wild card certificates with the version of openSSL 1.0.1g?
--- EDIT2 ----
I am adding more content to the post, so I can include an image from the browser.
Our certificate is on a live web site, and is not self signed.
I am checking the common name in a portion of the code not shown. In this post I am only hoping for advice on this error.
I found a site that uses the same chain we use: DrudgeReport.com
I simply extracted the certificates with the browser, and saved them into a file. This was identical to the steps I used form the google.com site. (View certificate and copy to file)
The result from Drudge is error 19 which is "self signed", not error 20 which was my error. The root level (comodo secure) is the same when I copy to file from either site (as I would expect).
As I learn this from your comments and the link, I see the next intermediate question is: how do I know what certificates are being sent by the server, and which were in the store? Then I would know which to import. What, if any, is the indicator from the openssl command output you provided?
The educational material on openssl and this is rather difficult to find. Just a lot of doc, which to a novice such as myself, is rather circular in it's definitions.
Thanks for your feedback so far.
So that was my question: Is there a problem using wild card certificates with the version of openSSL 1.0.1g?
It is not a problem of wildcard certificates. In fact, your code does not even check the subject of the certificate at all (i.e. your code is insecure), it mostly checks the certificate chain, expiration and purpose of the certificate. And the error message from openssl s_client clearly points out the problem:
verify error:num=20:unable to get local issuer certificate
Thus, the problem is not the certificate subject but that it cannot find a local trust anchor. Looking at the certificate chain provided by your server gives the following certificate chain:
[1] CN=*.domain.com, issued by [2]
[2] CN=COMODO RSA Organization Validation Secure Server CA, issued by [3]
[3] CN=COMODO RSA Certification Authority, issued by [ROOT]
The expected [ROOT] is "CN=AddTrust External CA Root" - only this CA is not in your list of trusted root CA.
While you give not the detailed names of the certificates you have in your local trust store my guess is that the CA you call "ComodoRoot" is similar to what I have as "[3] CN=COMODO RSA Certification Authority" in the list. Only, in your trust store it is likely the self-signed version of the certificate while in the certificate chain provided by the server it is a certificate issued by "[ROOT] CN=AddTrust External CA Root". Both certificates have the same public and private key which means that the signatures in certificate chain can be successfully validated with both.
But, the old (and long unsupported version) of OpenSSL you are using can not properly deal with this kind of situation. It will follow the certificate chain send by the server and then expect the last certificate in the chain signed by on of the certificates in your trust store. If this fails it will not check if a shorter chain might be validated successfully instead.
This means it will succeed if you either have "CN=AddTrust External CA Root" in your trust store or if the server sends a short chain which ends with "[2] CN=COMODO RSA Organization Validation Secure Server CA" since then it will find the issuer for this (your "ComodoRoot", i.e. "CN=COMODO RSA Certification Authority") in your trust store.
For a more detailed explanation of this problem see this answer at stackoverflow.com or this article. Note that there is no way to fix this in code with OpenSSL 1.0.1 - you need to either add the missing certificate to your trust store or make changes to the certificate chain send by the server.

openssl verify not working with GeoTrust Certificate

I have a newly purchased GeoTrust domain certificate and a matching CA file and would like to verify with openssl.
openssl verify -verbose -purpose any
-CAfile /full/path/sub.domain.com-geotrust.crt /full/path/sub.domain.com.crt
From this page: https://secure.marumoto.us/motowiki/tiki-index.php?page=Verify+a+Certificate+Chain
The issuer of each certificate in the chain should match the subject of the next certificate in the chain. For example the issuer of myserver.mydomain.com.cert should match the subject of myintermediate_ca.cert, and the issuer of myintermediate_ca.cert should match the subject of myroot_ca.cert. You can use the following command to view a certificate in .pem or base64 format.
From
openssl x509 -text -in sub.domain.crt and
openssl x509 -text -in sub.domain-geotrust.crt (CA root file)
sub.domain.com
Subject: OU=GT44865949,
OU=See www.geotrust.com/resources/cps (c)15,
OU=Domain Control Validated - QuickSSL(R),
CN=sub.domain.com
Issuer:
commonName = GeoTrust DV SSL CA - G4
organizationalUnitName = Domain Validated SSL
organizationName = GeoTrust Inc.
countryName = US
Intermediate:
Subject:
commonName = GeoTrust DV SSL CA - G4
organizationalUnitName = Domain Validated SSL
organizationName = GeoTrust Inc.
countryName = US
Issuer:
commonName = GeoTrust Global CA
organizationName = GeoTrust Inc.
countryName = US
Root:
Subject:
commonName = GeoTrust Global CA
organizationName = GeoTrust Inc.
countryName = US
Issuer:
organizationalUnitName = Equifax Secure Certificate Authority
organizationName = Equifax
countryName = US
It appears my Issuer and Subject fields are matching up properly but I am getting the following error with openssl:
error 20 at 0 depth lookup:unable to get local issuer certificate
/full/path/sub.domain.com.crt: /OU=GT44865949/OU=See www.geotrust.com/resources/cps (c)15/OU=Domain Control Validated - QuickSSL(R)/CN=sub.domain.com
error 20 at 0 depth lookup:unable to get local issuer certificate
I'd like to use this and a similar GeoTrust certificate at a different subdomain to do two-way SSL authentication at a restful web url but the certs won't verify with 'openssl verify' against the CA files issued with them. Any suggestions much appreciated.
As per discussion, it is a matter of allowing openssl to see the entire validation chain: with both GeoTrust CA intermediates and the root.
openssl should be run with CADir parameter containing all the 3 CAs in PEM format. The actual root for GeoTrust can either be extracted from your favourite browser, or here: filedropper.com/geotrustglobalca.
When you configure your actual server, just make sure that you send the intermediates on the Server Hello, some sites don't do that and break clients that do not have the intermediates cached.
Following on from RomanK's answer, you can get the GeoTrust Global CA from their root certificate store. They have a number of primary/universal/global certificates listed there, so make sure to get the right one for your intermediate certificate.
As per the chain display, the root certificate is not self signed . Its shows its issued by Equifax. Openssl will continue giving the error "local issuer certificate not found" till it gets a self signed root certificate. When it comes across a root self signed then it's able to verify the certificate chain as complete.

How to verify certificate chain with openssl

I am trying to verify a certificate file with OpenSSL. Can you explain me why s_client connection succeeds, but verify file with the same certificate chain fails? How can I verify the file?
Note I compiled OpenSSL 1.0.1k myself, it shouldn't be using any distro-specific config. And I provided the same CAfile to both commands.
$ openssl s_client -CAfile /etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt -connect www.google.com:443
WARNING: can't open config file: /usr/local/ssl/openssl.cnf
CONNECTED(00000003)
depth=3 C = US, O = Equifax, OU = Equifax Secure Certificate Authority
verify return:1
depth=2 C = US, O = GeoTrust Inc., CN = GeoTrust Global CA
verify return:1
depth=1 C = US, O = Google Inc, CN = Google Internet Authority G2
verify return:1
depth=0 C = US, ST = California, L = Mountain View, O = Google Inc, CN = www.google.com
verify return:1
---
Certificate chain
0 s:/C=US/ST=California/L=Mountain View/O=Google Inc/CN=www.google.com
i:/C=US/O=Google Inc/CN=Google Internet Authority G2
1 s:/C=US/O=Google Inc/CN=Google Internet Authority G2
i:/C=US/O=GeoTrust Inc./CN=GeoTrust Global CA
2 s:/C=US/O=GeoTrust Inc./CN=GeoTrust Global CA
i:/C=US/O=Equifax/OU=Equifax Secure Certificate Authority
---
...
Verify return code: 0 (ok)
---
If I run it with -showcerts argument, it outputs all three certificates sent from server. I concatenated them into file google.pem. But the chain can't be verified. See:
$ openssl verify -CAfile /etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt google.pem
WARNING: can't open config file: /usr/local/ssl/openssl.cnf
google.pem: C = US, ST = California, L = Mountain View, O = Google Inc, CN = www.google.com
error 20 at 0 depth lookup:unable to get local issuer certificate
Applying a patch suggested on https://stackoverflow.com/a/27606964/1823988 doesn't help.
I found it. openssl verify doesn't expect certificate file to contain its chain. Chain needs to be passed with -untrusted argument. It works with the same file, trust is still determined by finding a trusted root in -CAfile.
openssl verify -CAfile /etc/pki/tls/certs/ca-bundle.crt -untrusted google.pem google.pem

SSL Certificate - Certification Path in browser different from Certificate Chain File

I recently purchased a free SSL certificate from Comodo. It came with a certification authority bundle file that contains all of the intermediate certificates as well as the root certificate. When I run the command "openssl s_client -connect www.mydomain.com:443 -showcerts" it shows a certificate path that looks like this:
depth=4 C = SE, O = AddTrust AB, OU = AddTrust External TTP Network, CN = AddTrust External CA Root
verify return:1
depth=3 C = US, ST = UT, L = Salt Lake City, O = The USERTRUST Network, OU = http://www.usertrust.com, CN = UTN-USERFirst-Hardware
verify return:1
depth=2 C = GB, ST = Greater Manchester, L = Salford, O = COMODO CA Limited, CN = COMODO Certification Authority
verify return:1
depth=1 C = GB, ST = Greater Manchester, L = Salford, O = COMODO CA Limited, CN = EssentialSSL CA
verify return:1
depth=0 OU = Domain Control Validated, OU = Free SSL, CN = www.mydomain.com
verify return:1
However, when I go to www.mydomain.com in any browser and look at the certificate presented by the server, it shows the following certificate path (taken from IE9 certificate window):
COMODO
EssentialSSL CA
www.mydomain.com
Notice that there are fewer certificates in the chain (depth of 2 versus 4 from the openssl command), and that the root certificate is the COMODO certificate as opposed to the AddTrust External CA Root certificate. Can someone explain why the browser shows a different path than the openssl command?
Note, in both cases the certificate chain presented by the server passes validation (verify result 0 from openssl, no warnings in the browser).
IE9 has the comodo ca as a trusted authority in its trust chain, and therefore doesn't show the signers of the comodo ca.
OpenSSL s_client -showcerts shows the whole certificate chain.