Consider an API that a client accesses directly (machine to machine) and that doesn't require user-specific authentication. The way I understand it, in client_credentials, the client must store a client_id and client_secret that it uses to acquire and refresh tokens. With an API key, the client just stores the key. What makes OAuth more secure in this case? It would appear to me that if the API key is never compromised, no attacker could pose as the intended client. And if the API key is compromised, it is effectively the same as compromising the client_id and client_secret, which an attacker would be able to use to obtain tokens and access the data in the API, posing as the client.
edit: clarified this is a machine-to-machine call
TLDR;
The difference comes down to direct access vs. delegated access.
OAuth allows you to make delegated access. The benefits of delegated access don't change if there is a user involved or not. The same arguments that make the OAuth Authorization code flow attractive for user-to-machine access, apply to the OAuth Client credentials flow for machine-to-machine access.
Ask yourself, do you want the resource server to handle client credentials or not?
On confidential clients for machine-to-machine access, the cost of delegated access vs. direct access may very well outweigh the benefits. That's why so many APIs still use API keys. You'll have to decide that for your individual use case.
Differences
In the OAuth client credentials flow, the client sends an access token to the resource server, which it got beforehand by the authorization server after presenting its client ID and secret. The resource server never sees the client secret. With an API key, the client sends the key with every request.
OAuth adds an additional layer of indirection with the authorization server, such that the credentials themselves never get transmitted to the resource server. This allows the authorization server to give the client only access for a limited amount of time or with limited permissions, without ever needing to change the actual client credentials. It also allows to revoke access tokens without revoking the credentials themselves. For multiple instances of a client this allows you to revoke access for some but not all.
Of course this all comes at the cost of a more complex implementation, and an additional roundtrip from the client to the authorization server.
I won't touch on transmission (URL, header, body, etc.) or format (random string, signed JWT, etc.), since these can be the same for access tokens just as for API keys.
Another, maybe not so obvious, advantage of OAuth is having a clear spec that libraries, documentation and discussions can be based on. With direct access there is no single best practice and different people may understand different things when referring to direct access methods like API keys.
With client credential flow your Client Id and Client Secret are sent to the authorization server to get back an access token. For all subsequent request to the API/resource servers, you pass the access token and not the client credentials themselves. The access token is usually a JWT, which is a set of encoded claims including the token expiry (exp), not before (nbf), token issuer (iss), authorized party (azp), roles, permissions, etc.
This has a number of advantages over a simple API Key approach. e.g.
If the access token (which is included in requests to the API/resource server) is compromised, it's only valid until it expires (which is typically ~1 day for M2M tokens). If an API Key is compromised, it can be used indefinitely or until it's explicitly blocked by the API/resource server.
JWT access tokens are encoded JSON objects that contains a number of fields (a.k.a. claims) that can be used for fine grained authorization e.g. roles, permissions, grant type, authorized party etc. An API Key is generally opaque and is all or nothing when it comes to auth.
You machine tokens can get validated and authorized on the API/resource servers the same way as your user tokens, so you don't end up with multiple auth implementations on the back-end.
OAuth Client Credentials Flow
What is the security difference between API Keys and the client credentials flow of OAuth?
OAuth client credentials flow is not meant to be used by public clients, just between machines.
From auth0.com/docs:
Client Credentials Flow
With machine-to-machine (M2M) applications, such as CLIs, daemons, or services running on your back-end, the system authenticates and authorizes the app rather than a user. For this scenario, typical authentication schemes like username + password or social logins don't make sense. Instead, M2M apps use the Client Credentials Flow (defined in OAuth 2.0 RFC 6749, section 4.4), in which they pass along their Client ID and Client Secret to authenticate themselves and get a token.
So, I am not sure what is your scenario, but I will assume in my reply that you are referring to public clients.
If it is in the public client code, then it is public
The way I understand it, in client_credentials, the client must store a client_id and client_secret that it uses to acquire and refresh tokens.
Yes, it needs to be stored in the client code for the client to be able to obtain the OAuth token.
If you use the client_secret from a web app or mobile app you are making it public, therefore not a secret anymore.
Extracting secrets from public clients
For example, in a web app all it takes to extract the client_secret is to hit F12 in the browser and search for it, thus how much time can this take?
Now, in a mobile app, some may think it's secure because they are compiled into a binary but is almost as easy as it is in the browser, because we have several open-source tools that can help us with this task, like the MobSF framework, and on Linux, you can even achieve this with the strings command. Using the MobSF to perform static binary analysis on the mobile app binary allows for anyone without hacking knowledge to easily extract the client_secret in minutes, just like I show in my article How to Extract an API key from a Mobile App with Static Binary Analysis:
The range of open source tools available for reverse engineering is huge, and we really can't scratch the surface of this topic in this article, but instead, we will focus in using the Mobile Security Framework(MobSF) to demonstrate how to reverse engineer the APK of our mobile app. MobSF is a collection of open-source tools that present their results in an attractive dashboard, but the same tools used under the hood within MobSF and elsewhere can be used individually to achieve the same results.
So, the process of extracting the api-key in my article is the same you will use to extract the client_secret or any other string of your interest in the mobile app binary.
OAuth or API Key?
What makes OAuth more secure in this case? It would appear to me that if the API key is never compromised, no attacker could pose as the intended client. And if the API key is compromised, it is effectively the same as compromising the client_id and client_secret, which an attacker would be able to use to obtain tokens and access the data in the API, posing as the client.
If used from a public client neither are secure, because if read my linked article, you understand by now how easy is to bypass an API Key or extract the client_secret and client_id.
So, if your client is public you should not use the OAuth client credential flow, thus you need to go with the insecure API key approach or you can be more diligent and try to apply defence-in-depth approaches, but this will depend if the API clients are only web apps or mobile apps or both.
If your API clients are only web apps I invite you to read my answer to the question Secure API data from calls out of the app, especially the section dedicated to Defending the API Server.
In the case the API clients are only mobile apps then I recommend you to read this answer I gave to the question How to secure an API REST for mobile app?, especially the sections Securing the API Server and A Possible Better Solution.
On the other hand, if your API clients are both a web app and a mobile app I recommend you to apply the security measures more relevant to you from both answers linked above.
Remember that security is always about adding as many layers of defences as you can afford or it's required by law. Even in the past century, the castles were built with a lot of different security defence layers, thus this is nothing new to the digital era.
Do You Want To Go The Extra Mile?
In any response to a security question I always like to reference the excellent work from the OWASP foundation.
For APIS
OWASP API Security Top 10
The OWASP API Security Project seeks to provide value to software developers and security assessors by underscoring the potential risks in insecure APIs, and illustrating how these risks may be mitigated. In order to facilitate this goal, the OWASP API Security Project will create and maintain a Top 10 API Security Risks document, as well as a documentation portal for best practices when creating or assessing APIs.
For Mobile Apps
OWASP Mobile Security Project - Top 10 risks
The OWASP Mobile Security Project is a centralized resource intended to give developers and security teams the resources they need to build and maintain secure mobile applications. Through the project, our goal is to classify mobile security risks and provide developmental controls to reduce their impact or likelihood of exploitation.
OWASP - Mobile Security Testing Guide:
The Mobile Security Testing Guide (MSTG) is a comprehensive manual for mobile app security development, testing and reverse engineering.
For Web Apps
The Web Security Testing Guide:
The OWASP Web Security Testing Guide includes a "best practice" penetration testing framework which users can implement in their own organizations and a "low level" penetration testing guide that describes techniques for testing most common web application and web service security issues.
What's the difference between SAML and federated login with OAuth? Which solution makes more sense, if a company wants to use a third-party webapp, and but also wants single sign-on and be the authentication authority?
They solve different problems.
SAML is a set of standards that have been defined to share information about who a user is, what his set of attributes are, and give you a way to grant/deny access to something or even request authentication.
OAuth is more about delegating access to something. You are basically allowing someone to "act" as you. Its most commonly used to grant access api's that can do something on your behalf.
They are two completely different things.
Some examples that might help out.
OAuth think of an twitter. Lets say you are using Google Buzz and Twitter, and you want to write an app to be able to keep the two synchronised. You basically can establish trust between your app and twitter. First time you go to link the app to twitter, you do the classic prompt to log into twitter, and then that confirmation box pops up and asks "Would you like to grant access to «your app name»?" once you click "yes", the trust has been established, and now your app can act as you on Twitter. It can read your posts, as well as make new ones.
SAML - For SAML think of some type of "agreement" between two unrelated membership systems. In our case we can use US Airways and Hertz. There is no shared set of credentials that can take you from one site to another, but lets say Hertz wants to offer a "deal" to US Airways. (Granted I know this is an extreme example, but bear with me). After buying a flight, they will offer a free rental car to its Chairman members. US Airways and Hertz would setup some form of trust, and some way to identify the user. In our case our "federated id" would be the email address, and it would be a one way set of trust Hertz trusts that US Airways identity provider will deliver a token that is accurate and in a secure manner. After booking the flight US Airways identity provider would generate a token and populate how they have authenticated the user, as well as "attributes" about the person in our case the most important attribute would be his status level in US Airways. Once the token has been populated it passes it via some type of reference, or encoded in a url and once we get to Hertz, it looks at the token, validates it and now can allow for the free rental car.
The problem with this SAML example is it's only one specialized use case out of many. SAML is a standard and there are almost too many ways that you can implement it.
Alternatively, if you dont care about authorization, you could almost argue that asserting authentication via SAML and OpenID.
Have a look at this simple explanation summarized here:
Many people are confused about the differences between SAML, OpenID
and OAuth, but it’s actually very simple. Although there is some
overlap, here is a very simple way of distinguishing between the
three.
OpenID – single sign-on for consumers
SAML – single sign-on for enterprise users
OAuth – API authorization between applications
For folks comfortable with OO design patterns, I think there's a nice corollary to wrapper patterns. Think of Facade, Decorator and Proxy patterns. Fundamentally these are all the same, they're just wrappers... The difference is the intention of each pattern.
Similarly, SAML, OAuth and OpenID all facilitate different intentions via a common underlying mechanism, which is redirection to a service provider/identity authority for some private interaction, followed by redirection to the originating third party app.
Looking around on the net you will find overlap between the protocols' capabilities. Authentication via OAuth is perfectly reasonable. SSO over OAuth may not make a lot of sense though as SAML and OpenID are specifically geared towards federated identity.
To the question itself, in a corporate context SAML sounds more appropriate than OAuth for SSO. I'd bet if you look at the third party apps you'd like to integrate with your corporate identities, you'll find they're already designed to integrate with SAML/LDAP/Radius etc. IMO OAuth is more appropriate for Internet interaction between applications or perhaps applications comprising a Service Oriented Architecture in a large corporate environment.
Authorization rules may be specified in a corporate environment in other ways too. LDAP is a common tool for this. Organizing users into groups and associating application privileges against group membership is a widespread approach. Just so happens LDAP can be used for authentication too. Active Directory is a great example, though I prefer OpenLDAP.
Found Good article here
SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) is set of standards to achieve Single Sign On (SSO), Federation and Identity Management.
Example : A user (principal) authenticates with a flight booking website, AirFlyer (identity provider) which has SSO configured via SAML with a shuttle booking website,Shuttler (service provider). Once authenticated to Flyer, the user can book shuttles on Shuttler without requiring authentication
OAuth (Open Authorization) is a standard for authorization of resources. It does not deal with authentication.
Example : A photo sharing mobile app (OAuth consumer) that allows users import photos from their Instagram account (OAuth provider) which sends a temporary access token or key to the photo sharing app that expires after some hours.
They handle a subtle use case
SAML - Sharing credential (e.g., SSO) of a user to various service providers (e.g., web or web service)
OAuth - A User delegating an App to access a resource on behalf of his/her
SAML has a variety of "profiles" to choose from allow other users to "log in" to your site. SAML-P or SAML Passive is very common and fairly simple to set up. WS-Trust is similar and it too allows for federation among websites.
OAuth is designed for authorization. You can read more here:
What's the difference between OpenID and OAuth?
SAML is for authentication - mainly used in Single Sign On scenario. OAuth is for authorization of resource representations.
JSON Web Token (JWT) is an alternative for SAML XML Tokens. JWT can be used with OAuth
A good reference is SAML vs. OAuth: Which One Should I Use?
The terms federation really means connection identities across systems. It's related to SSO but they aren't quite the same. I Found this blog post really helpful in terms of what federation really means.
I'm really trying to understand the difference between OpenID and OAuth? Maybe they're two totally separate things?
OpenID is about authentication (ie. proving who you are), OAuth is about authorisation (ie. to grant access to functionality/data/etc.. without having to deal with the original authentication).
OAuth could be used in external partner sites to allow access to protected data without them having to re-authenticate a user.
The blog post "OpenID versus OAuth from the user’s perspective" has a simple comparison of the two from the user's perspective and "OAuth-OpenID: You’re Barking Up the Wrong Tree if you Think They’re the Same Thing" has more information about it.
There are three ways to compare OAuth and OpenID:
1. Purposes
OpenID was created for federated authentication, that is, letting a third-party authenticate your users for you, by using accounts they already have. The term federated is critical here because the whole point of OpenID is that any provider can be used (with the exception of white-lists). You don't need to pre-choose or negotiate a deal with the providers to allow users to use any other account they have.
OAuth was created to remove the need for users to share their passwords with third-party applications. It actually started as a way to solve an OpenID problem: if you support OpenID on your site, you can't use HTTP Basic credentials (username and password) to provide an API because the users don't have a password on your site.
The problem is with this separation of OpenID for authentication and OAuth for authorization is that both protocols can accomplish many of the same things. They each provide a different set of features which are desired by different implementations but essentially, they are pretty interchangeable. At their core, both protocols are an assertion verification method (OpenID is limited to the 'this is who I am' assertion, while OAuth provides an 'access token' that can be exchanged for any supported assertion via an API).
2. Features
Both protocols provide a way for a site to redirect a user somewhere else and come back with a verifiable assertion. OpenID provides an identity assertion while OAuth is more generic in the form of an access token which can then be used to "ask the OAuth provider questions". However, they each support different features:
OpenID - the most important feature of OpenID is its discovery process. OpenID does not require hard coding each the providers you want to use ahead of time. Using discovery, the user can choose any third-party provider they want to authenticate. This discovery feature has also caused most of OpenID's problems because the way it is implemented is by using HTTP URIs as identifiers which most web users just don't get. Other features OpenID has is its support for ad-hoc client registration using a DH exchange, immediate mode for optimized end-user experience, and a way to verify assertions without making another round-trip to the provider.
OAuth - the most important feature of OAuth is the access token which provides a long lasting method of making additional requests. Unlike OpenID, OAuth does not end with authentication but provides an access token to gain access to additional resources provided by the same third-party service. However, since OAuth does not support discovery, it requires pre-selecting and hard-coding the providers you decide to use. A user visiting your site cannot use any identifier, only those pre-selected by you. Also, OAuth does not have a concept of identity so using it for login means either adding a custom parameter (as done by Twitter) or making another API call to get the currently "logged in" user.
3. Technical Implementations
The two protocols share a common architecture in using redirection to obtain user authorization. In OAuth the user authorizes access to their protected resources and in OpenID, to their identity. But that's all they share.
Each protocol has a different way of calculating a signature used to verify the authenticity of the request or response, and each has different registration requirements.
OpenID is (mainly) for identification/authentication, so that stackoverflow.com knows that I own chris.boyle.name (or wherever) and therefore that I am probably the same person who owned chris.boyle.name yesterday and earned some reputation points.
OAuth is designed for authorization to take actions on your behalf, so that stackoverflow.com (or wherever) can ask permission to, say, Tweet on your behalf automatically, without knowing your Twitter password.
Many people still visit this so here's a very simple diagram to explain it
Courtesy Wikipedia
OAuth
Used for delegated authorization only -- meaning you are authorizing a third-party service access to use personal data, without giving out a password. Also OAuth "sessions" generally live longer than user sessions. Meaning that OAuth is designed to allow authorization
i.e. Flickr uses OAuth to allow third-party services to post and edit a persons picture on their behalf, without them having to give out their flicker username and password.
OpenID
Used to authenticate single sign-on identity. All OpenID is supposed to do is allow an OpenID provider to prove that you say you are. However many sites use identity authentication to provide authorization (however the two can be separated out)
i.e. One shows their passport at the airport to authenticate (or prove) the person's who's name is on the ticket they are using is them.
OpenID is an open standard and decentralized authentication protocol controlled by the OpenID Foundation.
OAuth is an open standard for access delegation.
OpenID Connect (OIDC) Combines the features of OpenID and OAuth i.e. does both Authentication and Authorization.
OpenID take the form of a unique URI managed by some "OpenID provider" i.e identity provider (idP).
OAuth can be used in conjunction with XACML where OAuth is used for ownership consent and access delegation whereas XACML is used to define the authorization policies.
OIDC uses simple JSON Web Tokens (JWT), which you can obtain using flows conforming to the OAuth 2.0 specifications. OAuth is directly related to OIDC since OIDC is an authentication layer built on top of OAuth 2.0.
For example, if you chose to sign in to Auth0 using your Google account then you used OIDC. Once you successfully authenticate with Google and authorize Auth0 to access your information, Google will send back to Auth0 information about the user and the authentication performed. This information is returned in a JSON Web Token (JWT). You'll receive an Access Token and, if requested, an ID Token. Types of Token : Source: OpenID Connect
Analogy:
An organisation use ID card for identification purpose and it contains chips, it stores details about Employee along with Authorization i.e. Campus/Gate/ODC access. ID card act as a OIDC and Chip act as a OAuth. more examples and form wiki
Use OAuth if your users might just want to login with Facebook, or Twitter. Use OpenID if your users are neckbeards that run their own OpenID providers because they "don't want anyone else owning their identity".
The explanation of the difference between OpenID, OAuth, OpenID Connect:
OpenID is a protocol for authentication while OAuth is for
authorization. Authentication is about making sure that the guy you
are talking to is indeed who he claims to be. Authorization is about
deciding what that guy should be allowed to do.
In OpenID, authentication is delegated: server A wants to authenticate
user U, but U's credentials (e.g. U's name and password) are sent to
another server, B, that A trusts (at least, trusts for authenticating
users). Indeed, server B makes sure that U is indeed U, and then tells
to A: "ok, that's the genuine U".
In OAuth, authorization is delegated: entity A obtains from entity B
an "access right" which A can show to server S to be granted access; B
can thus deliver temporary, specific access keys to A without giving
them too much power. You can imagine an OAuth server as the key master
in a big hotel; he gives to employees keys which open the doors of the
rooms that they are supposed to enter, but each key is limited (it
does not give access to all rooms); furthermore, the keys
self-destruct after a few hours.
To some extent, authorization can be abused into some
pseudo-authentication, on the basis that if entity A obtains from B an
access key through OAuth, and shows it to server S, then server S may
infer that B authenticated A before granting the access key. So some
people use OAuth where they should be using OpenID. This schema may or
may not be enlightening; but I think this pseudo-authentication is
more confusing than anything. OpenID Connect does just that: it abuses
OAuth into an authentication protocol. In the hotel analogy: if I
encounter a purported employee and that person shows me that he has a
key which opens my room, then I suppose that this is a true employee,
on the basis that the key master would not have given him a key which
opens my room if he was not.
(source)
How is OpenID Connect different than OpenID 2.0?
OpenID Connect performs many of the same tasks as OpenID 2.0, but does
so in a way that is API-friendly, and usable by native and mobile
applications. OpenID Connect defines optional mechanisms for robust
signing and encryption. Whereas integration of OAuth 1.0a and OpenID
2.0 required an extension, in OpenID Connect, OAuth 2.0 capabilities are integrated with the protocol itself.
(source)
OpenID connect will give you an access token plus an id token. The id
token is a JWT and contains information about the authenticated user.
It is signed by the identity provider and can be read and verified
without accessing the identity provider.
In addition, OpenID connect standardizes quite a couple things that
oauth2 leaves up to choice. for instance scopes, endpoint discovery,
and dynamic registration of clients.
This makes it easier to write code that lets the user choose between
multiple identity providers.
(source)
Google's OAuth 2.0
Google's OAuth 2.0 APIs can be used for both authentication and
authorization. This document describes our OAuth 2.0 implementation
for authentication, which conforms to the OpenID Connect
specification, and is OpenID Certified. The documentation found in
Using OAuth 2.0 to Access Google APIs also applies to this service. If
you want to explore this protocol interactively, we recommend the
Google OAuth 2.0 Playground.
(source)
OpenID and OAuth are each HTTP-based protocols for authentication and/or authorization. Both are intended to allow users to perform actions without giving authentication credentials or blanket permissions to clients or third parties. While they are similar, and there are proposed standards to use them both together, they are separate protocols.
OpenID is intended for federated authentication. A client accepts an identity assertion from any provider (although clients are free to whitelist or blacklist providers).
OAuth is intended for delegated authorization. A client registers with a provider, which provides authorization tokens which it will accept to perform actions on the user's behalf.
OAuth is currently better suited for authorization, because further interactions after authentication are built into the protocol, but both protocols are evolving. OpenID and its extensions could be used for authorization, and OAuth can be used for authentication, which can be thought of as a no-op authorization.
I believe it makes sense revisit this question as also pointed out in the comments, the introduction of OpenID Connect may have brought more confusion.
OpenID Connect is an authentication protocol like OpenID 1.0/2.0 but it is actually built on top of OAuth 2.0, so you'll get authorization features along with authentication features. The difference between the two is pretty well explained in detail in this (relatively recent, but important) article: http://oauth.net/articles/authentication/
More an extension to the question than an answer, but it may add some perspective to the great technical answers above. I'm an experienced programmer in a number of areas, but a total noob to programming for the web. Now trying to build a web-based application using Zend Framework.
Definitely will implement an application-specific basic username/password authentication interface, but recognize that for a growing number of users the thought of yet another username and password is a deterrent. While not exactly social networking, I know that a very large percentage of the application's potential users already have facebook or twitter accounts. The application doesn't really want or need to access information about the user's account from those sites, it just wants to offer the convenience of not requiring the user to set up new account credentials if they don't want to. From a functionality point of view, that would seem a poster child for OpenID. But it seems that neither facebook nor twitter are OpenID providers as such, though they do support OAuth authentication to access their user's data.
In all the articles I've read about the two and how they differ, it wan't until I saw Karl Anderson's observation above, that "OAuth can be used for authentication, which can be thought of as a no-op authorization" that I saw any explicit confirmation that OAuth was good enough for what I wanted to do.
In fact, when I went to post this "answer", not being a member at the time, I looked long and hard at the bottom of this page at the options for identifying myself. The option for using an OpenID login or obtaining one if I didn't have one, but nothing about twitter or facebook, seemed to suggest that OAuth wasn't adequate for the job. But then I opened another window and looked for the general signup process for stackoverflow - and lo and behold there's a slew of 3rd-party authentication options including facebook and twitter. In the end I decided to use my google id (which is an OpenID) for exactly the reason that I didn't want to grant stackoverflow access to my friends list and anything else facebook likes to share about its users - but at least it's a proof point that OAuth is adequate for the use I had in mind.
It would really be great if someone could either post info or pointers to info about supporting this kind of multiple 3rd-part authorization setup, and how you deal with users that revoke authorization or lose access to their 3rd party site. I also get the impression that my username here identifies a unique stackoverflow account that I could access with basic authentication if I wanted to set it up, and also access this same account through other 3rd-party authenticators (e.g. so that I would be considered logged in to stackoverflow if I was logged in to any of google, facebook, or twitter...). Since this site is doing it, somebody here probably has some pretty good insight on the subject. :-)
Sorry this was so long, and more a question than an answer - but Karl's remark made it seem like the most appropriate place to post amidst the volume of threads on OAuth and OpenID. If there's a better place for this that I didn't find, I apologize in advance, I did try.
After reading and doing some work, I figured the things I needed to know, these are: OpenID Connect, OAuth, JWT and SAML.
I will give a summary, it might help someone:
OpenID Connect (OIDC): If we can login a website using google account, then you are using OIDC.
OAuth: an application wants to access my facebook contact list and do some stuff on my behalf. If I authorise this application, then probably I am using OAuth.
JWT: OAuth uses JWT, JWT (JSON Web Tokens)- It is just a token format. JWT tokens are JSON encoded data structures contains information about issuer, subject (claims), expiration time etc. It is signed for tamper proof and authenticity and it can be encrypted to protect the token information using symmetric or asymmetric approach. JWT is simpler than SAML 1.1/2.0 and supported by all devices and it is more powerful than SWT(Simple Web Token).
Authorization flow in OAuth:
OAuth 2.0 protocol provides several workflows for authorizing a user and obtaining an access token. It depends on the type and architecture of the client which flow is the most suitable.
Below are 2 most used Authorizations flows:
Authorization Code: Suitable for third-party websites which contain a client and a server component.
The user enters credentials to a secure login webpage.
After logging in, the browser is redirected to a special URL (defined by the client), passing an authorization code in the URL.
The third-party server obtains the access token with another HTTP request in the background, using the authorization code.
From https://developers.video.ibm.com/api-basics-authentication/
Note: if you have a frontend application and the server sets a cookie in the browser, then you already have the cookie in your browser and can accees the website.
Client Credentials: Best choice for users developing server-side applications to manage their content or settings.
IBM has a good guide here: https://developers.video.ibm.com/api-basics-authentication
To know all other flows with pros and cons: here: https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/workflow-of-oauth-2-0/
SAML: Also used as an alternative of openid, but it is xml based. because developers find OIDC much easier to work with and because it is more flexible (e.g. working with mobile app is easier than xml based SAML), OIDC looks like it will become the winner.
OpenID Connect (OIDC) vs SAML: there are main differences:
SAML transmits user data in XML format. OIDC transmits user data in JSON format.
SAML calls the user data it sends a SAML Assertion. OIDC calls the
data Claims.
SAML calls the application or system the user is trying to get into
the Service Provider. OIDC calls it the Relying Party.
SAML is old, has more features, but OpenID is gaining more popularity as it is easier to implement, easier to use than XML based SAML
But not all identity providers support OpenID or SAML, if the identity provider you want to integrate only supports SAML, then you have no choice.
Want more OpenID vs SAML? read below:
https://www.onelogin.com/blog/real-difference-saml-oidc
https://auth0.com/intro-to-iam/saml-vs-openid-connect-oidc/
Want more? You can read this OAuth and OpenID analogy:
http://cakebaker.42dh.com/2008/04/01/openid-versus-oauth-from-the-users-perspective/
OpenID proves who you are.
OAuth grants access to the features provided by the authorizing party.
I am currently working on OAuth 2.0 and OpenID connect spec. So here is my understanding:
Earlier they were:
OpenID was proprietary implementation of Google allowing third party applications like for newspaper websites you can login using google and comment on an article and so on other usecases. So essentially, no password sharing to newspaper website. Let me put up a definition here, this approach in enterprise approach is called Federation. In Federation, You have a server where you authenticate and authorize (called IDP, Identity Provider) and generally the keeper of User credentials. the client application where you have business is called SP or Service Provider. If we go back to same newspaper website example then newspaper website is SP here and Google is IDP. In enterprise this problem was earlier solved using SAML. that time XML used to rule the software industry. So from webservices to configuration, everything used to go to XML so we have SAML, a complete Federation protocol
OAuth: OAuth saw it's emergence as an standard looking at all these kind of proprietary approaches and so we had OAuth 1.o as standard but addressing only authorization. Not many people noticed but it kind of started picking up. Then we had OAuth 2.0 in 2012. CTOs, Architects really started paying attention as world is moving towards Cloud computing and with computing devices moving towards mobile and other such devices. OAuth kind of looked upon as solving major problem where software customers might give IDP Service to one company and have many services from different vendors like salesforce, SAP, etc. So integration here really looks like federation scenario bit one big problem, using SAML is costly so let's explore OAuth 2.o. Ohh, missed one important point that during this time, Google sensed that OAuth actually doesn't address Authentication, how will IDP give user data to SP (which is actually wonderfully addressed in SAML) and with other loose ends like:
a. OAuth 2.o doesn't clearly say, how client registration will happen
b. it doesn't mention anything about the interaction between SP (Resource Server) and client application (like Analytics Server providing data is Resource Server and application displaying that data is Client)
There are already wonderful answers given here technically, I thought of giving of giving brief evolution perspective
Nowadays OpenID connect is most relevant so I will explain the difference between OpenID connect and OAuth 2.
OpenID connect specifies the IDToken standard: https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#IDToken
This is the primary contribution of OpenID connect. So it specifies what should be contained in the response after authentication is complete.
The IDToken needs to be a JWT token, and contains information of the user, such as user id, user name, etc. The information returned depends on the claims passed when authorizing. It also contains an expiration date of the token and it should contain the digital signature of the token. This signature is used to validate the token using a public key.
The second big difference is related to the public key. OpenID connect uses something called discovery or well known endpoint. It's an endpoint that is publicly open and just returns a JSON with values such as the public key and authorization endpoints.
https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#SelfIssuedDiscovery
So essentially OpenID is related to authentication since it specifies the IDToken, which is necessary to authenticate a user by checking the digital signature and expiration date of the IDToken.
OAuth deals with authorization especially related to scopes and validating access tokens on the resource server.
However as written here, OpenID uses OAuth 2 authorization for authentication.
https://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html#AuthRequest
An Authentication Request is an OAuth 2.0 Authorization Request that requests that the End-User be authenticated by the Authorization Server.
In short, try to think of OpenID as authentication using the JWT token and OAuth as authorization with scopes.
I'd like to address a particular aspect of this question, as captured in this comment:
OAuth: before granting access to some feature, authentication must be done, right ?. so OAuth = what OpenId does + grants access to some features ? – Hassan Makarov Jun 21 at 1:57
Yes... and no. The answer is subtle, so bear with me.
When the OAuth flow redirects you to a target service (the OAuth provider, that is), it is likely that you'll need to authenticate with that service before a token will be handed back to the client application/service. The resulting token then allows the client app to make requests on behalf of a given user.
Note the generality of that last sentence: specifically, I wrote "on behalf of a given user", not "on behalf of you". It's a common error to assume that "having a capability to interact with a resource owned by a given user" implies "you and the owner of the target resource(s) are one in the same".
Don't make this mistake.
While it's true that you authenticate with the OAuth provider (say, by user name and password, or maybe SSL client certs, or some other means), what the client gets in return should not necessarily be taken as proof of identity. An example would be a flow in which access to another user's resources was delegated to you (and by proxy, the OAuth client). Authorization does not imply authentication.
To handle authentication, you'll likely want to look into OpenID Connect, which is essentially another layer on top of the foundation set by OAuth 2.0. Here's a quote that captures (in my opinion) the most salient points regarding OpenID Connect (from https://oauth.net/articles/authentication/):
OpenID Connect is an open standard published in early 2014 that defines an interoperable way to use OAuth 2.0 to perform user authentication. In essence, it is a widely published recipe for chocolate fudge that has been tried and tested by a wide number and variety of experts. Instead of building a different protocol to each potential identity provider, an application can speak one protocol to as many providers as they want to work with. Since it's an open standard, OpenID Connect can be implemented by anyone without restriction or intellectual property concerns.
OpenID Connect is built directly on OAuth 2.0 and in most cases is deployed right along with (or on top of) an OAuth infrastructure. OpenID Connect also uses the JSON Object Signing And Encryption (JOSE) suite of specifications for carrying signed and encrypted information around in different places. In fact, an OAuth 2.0 deployment with JOSE capabilities is already a long way to defining a fully compliant OpenID Connect system, and the delta between the two is relatively small. But that delta makes a big difference, and OpenID Connect manages to avoid many of the pitfalls discussed above by adding several key components to the OAuth base: [...]
The document then goes on to describe (among other things) token IDs and a UserInfo endpoint. The former provides a set of claims (who you are, when the token was issued, etc, and possibly a signature to verify the authenticity of the token via a published public key without having to ask the upstream service), and the latter provides a means of e.g. asking for the user's first/last name, email, and similar bits of info, all in a standardized way (as opposed to the ad-hoc extensions to OAuth that people used before OpenID Connect standardized things).
Both protocols were created for different reasons. OAuth was created to authorize third parties to access resources. OpenID was created to perform decentralize identity validation. This website states the following:
OAuth is a protocol designed to verify the identity of an end-user and to grant permissions to a third party. This verification results in a token. The third party can use this token to access resources on the user’s behalf. Tokens have a scope. The scope is used to verify whether a resource is accessible to a user, or not
OpenID is a protocol used for decentralised authentication. Authentication is about identity; Establishing the user is in fact the person who he claims to be. Decentralising that, means this service is unaware of the existence of any resources or applications that need to be protected. That’s the key difference between OAuth and OpenID.
OAuth gives you back the access token to access the resource from resource server, OpenID gives you back meta data details about resources in JWT / encrypted token
OpenId uses OAuth to deal with authentication.
By analogy, it's like .NET relies on Windows API. You could directly call Windows API but it's so wide, complex and method arguments so vast, you could easily make mistakes/bugs/security issue.
Same with OpenId/OAuth. OpenId relies on OAuth to manage Authentication but defining a specific Token (Id_token), digital signature and particular flows.
OpenId - Used only for Authentication.
OAuth - Used for both Authentication and Authorization. Authorization depends on the access_token which comes as part of JWT token. It can have details of user permissions or any useful information.
Both can rely on 3rd party auth provider which maintains their accounts. For example OKTA identity provider, User provides the credentials on OKTA login page and on successful login the user is redirected on the consumer application with the JWT token in the header.
OAuth 2.0 is a Security protocol. It is NEITHER an Authentication NOR an Authorization protocol.
Authentication by definition the answers two questions.
Who is the user?
Is the user currently present on the system?
OAuth 2.0 has the following grant types
client_credentials: When one app needs to interact with another app and modify the data of multiple users.
authorization_code: User delegates the Authorization server to issue an access_token that the client can use to access protected resource
refresh_token: When the access_token expires, the refresh token can be leveraged to get a fresh access_token
password: User provides their login credentials to a client that calls the Authorization server and receives an access_token
All 4 have one thing in common, access_token, an artifact that can be used to access protected resource.
The access_token does not provide the answer to the 2 questions that an "Authentication" protocol must answer.
An example to explain Oauth 2.0 (credits: OAuth 2 in Action, Manning publications)
Let's talk about chocolate. We can make many confections out of chocolate including, fudge, ice cream, and cake. But, none of these can be equated to chocolate because multiple other ingredients such as cream and bread are needed to make the confection, even though chocolate sounds like the main ingredient. Similarly, OAuth 2.0 is the chocolate, and cookies, TLS infrastucture, Identity Providers are other ingredients that are required to provide the "Authentication" functionality.
If you want Authentication, you may go for OpenID Connect, which provides an "id_token", apart from an access_token, that answers the questions that every authentication protocol must answer.
OAuth builds authentication on top of authorization: The user delegates access to their identity to the application, which, then, becomes a consumer of the identity API, thereby finding out who authorized the client in the first place http://oauth.net/articles/authentication/