I have installed a SSL certificate (comodo PositiveSSL) for my domain and forced NGINX to only use HTTPS.
I run the test on SSL analyzer
https://sslanalyzer.comodoca.com/?url=domain.com
Validation Type Domain Validated (DV)
Trusted by Microsoft? Yes
Trusted by Mozilla? Yes
We have our mobile app for Android and IOS getting some data from our https://example.com/api webservices.
So i have installed Packet Capture mobile app on my android to verify whether the data transferred between the webservice api and our mobile app is secured.
First i tried with enabling the following in Packet capture mobile app :-
I have contacted comodo ssl support, they said
that the certificate is installed well and its working fine. There is
nothing wrong with the certificate and installation process and the
web-site https://example.com/ is also completely secured with Green Pad
lock on it.
I run the same test on instagram app, when open instagram , showing network error. Like instagram discovering by some way that i am trying to capture a network packets so their app network will be disabled.
I want to do the same way of what instagram did .
Please Advice.
Don't worry, if your certificate is valid and contains the right domain name then you've already done everything needed.
A "man in the middle attack" is an attack done on the client.
The client think the attacker is the website by compromising his DNS
Then the attacker relay in and out traffic from/to the real server.
The server is secure but not the client.
Like RamKumar said the client need to trust the attacker certificate like you did
EDIT:
You can also use TLS with mutual authentication (mTLS).
With this protocol the client AND the server exchange certificate public keys.
It work as follow:
A client requests access to a protected resource.
The server presents its certificate to the client.
The client verifies the server’s certificate.
If successful, the client sends its certificate to the server.
The server verifies the client’s credentials.
If successful, the server grants access to the protected resource requested by the client.
Some sample:
https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and-events/blog/2011/october/mutual-authentication-in-android-and-ios/
With this protocol the man in the middle attack is still possible but the attacker's certificates need to be trusted by both client and server
Another custom approach would be to add another layer of encryption using asymetric cipher.
To remove that possibility you can use Certificate Pinning to make sure that only the specific Certificate you use can be used to prevent the device from using any other Certificate, even if it was signed from a trusted CA. This may still be circumvented by a user, but now he has to modify the application itself in order to disable the check, or change the pinned certificate
Have a look at how Certificate Authority (CA) works. In your case, what happens is that the Packet capture mobile app installs it's own CA. Now Packet capture becomes a trusted CA for your device and certificates signed by them are accepted. Then this app creates its own certificate saying example.com and signs it.
So when it performs man in the middle attack, the client (your app) communicates with Packet capture and not example.com, but your app believes it's communicating with the example.com, since the certificate provided by Packet capture is signed by a trusted CA (Packet capture CA itself).
Hence this works only when your install their CA. However a secured connection is made between Packet capture and example.com
Related
I was trying to get myself familiarised with basic concepts of https when I came across its encryption, which in a nutshell functions as follows,
Now I have seen QA engineers in my company use this tool called burp-suite to intercept request.
What I am confused about is even though the data flows through an encrypted channel, how can any interception tool like burp-suite manage to intercept the request.
Just to try it out I tried to intercept facebook request in burp-suite,
Here you can clearly see the test email test#gmail.com I used in the intercepted request.
Why is this data not encrypted according to https standards?
Or if it is then how do burp-suite manage to decrypt it?
Thank you.
Meta: this isn't really a development or programming question or problem, although Burp is sometimes used for research or debugging.
If you LOOK AT THE DOCUMENTATION on Using Burp Proxy
Burp CA certificate - Since Burp breaks TLS connections between your browser and servers, your browser will by default show a warning message if you visit an HTTPS site via Burp Proxy. This is because the browser does not recognize Burp's TLS certificate, and infers that your traffic may be being intercepted by a third-party attacker. To use Burp effectively with TLS connections, you really need to install Burp's Certificate Authority master certificate in your browser, so that it trusts the certificates generated by Burp.
and following the link provided right there
By default, when you browse an HTTPS website via Burp, the Proxy generates a TLS certificate for each host, signed by its own Certificate Authority (CA) certificate. ...
Using its own generated cert (and matching key, although the webpage doesn't talk about that because it isn't visible to people) instead of the cert from the real site allows Burp to 'terminate' the TLS session from the client, decrypting and examining the data, and then forwarding that data over a different TLS session to the real site, and vice versa on the response (unless configured to do something different like modify the data).
... This CA certificate is generated the first time Burp is run, and stored locally. To use Burp Proxy most effectively with HTTPS websites, you will need to install Burp's CA certificate as a trusted root in your browser.
This is followed by a warning about the risks, and a link to instructions to do so.
Having its own CA cert trusted in the browser means that the generated cert is accepted by the browser and everything looks mostly normal to the browser user (or other client).
I have a problem with insecure SSL certificates. My proyect consist on two parts:
ESP32 iot device with a https server
VUE2 + Vuetify PWA web app deployed to firebase hosting.
Imagine that one client buy my iot device, and connect it to the power. The device will boot in AP mode, creating a WiFi AP net.
The client login to the web app and wants to add his new device. So, for that, the iot device needs clients wifi credentials.
The web app asks to the client his ssid and password, and when the client click on 'Configure device', the web app send a https POST request to the esp32 server, and here is the problem...
Because the SSL certificate used in esp32 server is not validated by an authority, the web app can´t make the POST request...
How can I get a valid server SSL certificate for a lot of iot devices? I don´t know how to manage this situation...
Thanks everyone!!
It is possible to get a valid SSL certificate for the device, but I wouldn't recommend it. Here is how you could do it if you wanted to:
Ensure that when your device is in AP mode, it's always available at the exact same IP address. For example, ensure that the ESP32 is listening at 192.168.1.1.
Register a domain like example.com. Add an A record to your DNS server for iot.example.com, with the value 192.168.1.1.
Obtain a valid SSL certificate for iot.example.com from any trusted authority. Put that certificate and associated key on your device.
Now, when your user connects to your soft AP, they can browse to https://iot.example.com and actually see a valid certificate.
However, I would really recommend not doing this. You'll have three major issues to contend with:
The key for your SSL certificate will be on your device's flash. If anyone extracts it, they can masquerade as iot.example.com. You can mitigate this by using flash encryption, but it's still not great.
The maximum validity period for an SSL certificate is around two years. So your provisioning flow will break after a couple years.
If the CA that issued your certificate hears that the private key is floating around and could potentially be compromised, they will probably revoke your certificate.
Instead, what you should do is secure your soft AP with WPA2, and a password that you can give to users. This will ensure that the connection is encrypted, and you can serve your provisioning form over HTTP instead of HTTPS.
An even better approach rather than trying to implement this yourself, is to use the ESP-IDF unified provisioning API. It takes care of the implementation details, and supports both Wi-Fi and Bluetooth as transports.
Regardless of what you decide to do, I'd highly recommend reading the ESP-IDF documentation on unified provisioning and the documentation on Wi-Fi provisioning, since they'll give you an idea of what's going on under the hood and what all is required for a secure implementation. In particular, you'll see that the Wi-Fi provisioning library does actually use a static WPA2 password like I suggested above.
I am trying to wrap my head around certificates and any help is appreciated. So far this is what I understand, please correct me if I am wrong.
When using the browser when I navigate to the https site the browser downloads the certificate(without the private key) and then continues to send the data over https?
I have come across some sites (especially when developing) that require you to install the certificate on the local machine before making a service call. What is the purpose here and how does it work?
I have also seen some scenarios where you need to install the certificate on the client machine for authentication purposes for example if you are using an email client, how does this work?
When using the browser when I navigate to the https site the browser downloads the certificate(without the private key) and then continues to send the data over https?
No, the browser and the server stablish a SSL/TLS secure channel with a symmetric encryption key. During the handshake process the server presents the https certificate and digitally signs some data with the private key as a proof of authenticity.
I have come across some sites (especially when developing) that require you to install the certificate on the local machine before making a service call. What is the purpose here and how does it work?
The client must trust the server certificate. Usually it has a list with the Certification Authorities for which certificates are accepted. For other certificates is needed to add them to the trust list. If not, the communication will be rejected
I have also seen some scenarios where you need to install the certificate on the client machine for authentication purposes for example if you are using an email client, how does this work?
Probably the same case as the previous one. Also the public part of the certificate of a user can be used to encrypt a message for him
I am working on a product that would be http POSTing some data to my server everyday. The server doesn't send any data/REQUESTS to my device (other than the HTTP status). I use a redpine wireless module RS9113 that does the connectivity piece for me. I want this communication to be https enabled and my web server already has a CA-issued certificate.
Question is :
When I do a POST from my embedded device, my understanding is that the SSL library would check the validity of the server certificate. Am I right ?
If my client doesnt need a certificate, does it mean the public key of the server is stored on the wireless module (and this is used for encryption everytime) ? I can guess that this is something I need to ask the redpine wireless folks, but can you give me a general idea how this works ?
In this setup, do I need to have any certificate ON my embedded device ? I am ok if anybody POSTs the data to the server because we have identifiers that would flush out the non-conforming structure of data. If there is no cert on the device and if we POST, does it mean that the data is encrypted from device-server ?
Bonus question : In this setup, if my cert on the server is renewed, will it cause any problems in sending the data ?
I do not know the redpine wireless module, so take this response as a resolution of doubts about SSL in general
When I do a POST from my embedded device, my understanding is that the SSL library would check the validity of the server certificate. Am I right ?
Yes, the SSL library should check that the issuer of the certificate (the root CA) or the certificate itself are present in the trust store. If you use a self-signed certificate or a CA that is not present in the truststore, you have to include the public key in the truststore
If my client doesnt need a certificate, does it mean the public key of the server is stored on the wireless module (and this is used for encryption everytime) ?
The two things are not related. You need the public key of the server in the wireless module to establish trust. A client certificate would be needed if you use two-ways authentication. The client certificate is presented during SSL handshake to authenticate the client to the server
In this setup, do I need to have any certificate ON my embedded device ?
No, if two ways authentication are not required
If there is no cert on the device and if we POST, does it mean that the data is encrypted from device-server ?
The client certificate, if any, is not used to encrypt. Is used to authenticate during the initial handshake. The handshake stablish a symmetric key used to encrypt and decrypt the communication in both sides.
In this setup, if my cert on the server is renewed, will it cause any problems in sending the data ?
Depending on the setup of the server certificate on your client truststore. If the new certificate is issued on the same side, it is enough to have imported the root CA. If you use self-signed certificate, you will need to import the new one
I am developing browser extension, that sends some data from currently browsed page to my backend server. User is aware of it, it is intended.
I don't want to cause any user-data exposure, when the user is e.g. on unsecured wifi. So I just want to ensure, the data and the url goes over the net encrypted and only my backend will see them.
Do I understand correctly, that any SSL certificate, even free one from StartSSL will do the trick?
What other side effects with free SSL certificate should I consider?
- will the user's http-client trust such a certificate?
Thanks.
The SSL certificate will do the trick as long as it can be validated. That means that the root certificate of the certificate chain needs to be within the trusted certificate store of the browser.
Furthermore, the certificate will have to be for the right address (URL), must not be revoked, CRL's and OCSP must be configured correctly etc. etc. In other words, the usual steps required to have your web-service certificate validated must be met.