OpenID in backend REST API - api

We are designing a web service for an application that takes OpenID as an authentication option. The question came up how do we enable API access for this user at a later time?
For clarity here is an example:
1) user A visits the site and registers using Yahoo (or other) OpenID
2) at a later time we'd like to enable API access to backend synchronization apps that act on behalf of this user.
3) giving an app a key that can access all accounts everywhere is not an option for security reasons
What are examples of using patterns like that?

Standard OpenID requires a browser because it depends on being able to load a page from a foreign site to complete the signin process. Therefore it's not appropriate for server-to-server API use.
It is more common to use OAuth as an authentication mechanism for server-to-server APIs. While standard OAuth also requires a browser and a user-interactive flow to grant access to a new application, it results in a token that can then be used by the application to act on behalf of the user for user-unattended requests.
Facebook is possibly the most high-profile user of OAuth 2 for APIs, and its Login Architecture document describes the various login flows they support at a high level. The one titled "Server-side Login" is the conventional OAuth flow, while others are different approaches that support different use-cases like mobile app sign-in and access from client-side JavaScript embedded on other sites.

Related

OAuth2.0/OIDC Public Clients: What implementation is recommended for authentication & scopes consent when there is no third-party involved?

Context
I am developing a solution with
Two clients, a mobile one and an SPA.
An authorization server under my control.
A resource server / identity provider, that provides user data and features through an API.
I am using OAuth2.0 because it can provide advantages such as allowing third-party apps to easily integrate with my Auth server / IdP, whether it be to have access to user data, or API features. It would also allow the clients to integrate with other IdPs and eventually have their data migrated over to mine.
OAuth Flow
Authentication
During the OAuth flow, there is a redirection to authenticate the user on the authorization server. At that point user enters credentials and consents to the scopes/claims clients want access to. In the case of third-party client applications I understand that:
Mobile: the latest RFCs recommend browser custom tabs for mobile apps.
SPAs: Being browser-based, here a simple redirection.
But that's the use case where it's a third-party client app delegating authentication and account management to my IdP system. This ensures the mobile application can't snoop on user's credentials (and eventually leverage sso solution of IdP so there's no need for credentials input).
In my case, I own both the client and the rest.
My first question is: Since I own the application, whether it be mobile or web, do I necessarily need to implement that redirection to a UI hosted on my IdP? Or can I have a form directly as a part of the mobile/web app and authenticate the user through REST (and then follow the rest of the OAuth flow to deliver an AccessToken + IdToken for OIDC)?
Scopes
When it's third-party client applications, I understand that we must display to the end-user the data (scopes/claims) the client wants access to. User must give an explicit consent and know what data is going to be used by the application.
But in my case, since I own the application, can't I just have a Terms & Conditions page the user approves to use the app and skip the scopes/claims approval in the OAuth flow?
In brief, what's best practice and why when there's no third-party involved?

Do I not need to secure my API endpoints (resources) with OAuth 2 access tokens?

There are multiple partied involved in OAuth2 conversation. Consider the
following diagram from the article here
Consider that I have an application that has data for restaurants and has APIs related to it. Let's call is restaurants APIs. Let us assign some role to each party in context of this example
User - our chefs, who have some recipes in restaurant
Application - Web client written in HTML5, JS, CSS that our Users use to interact with APIs
OAuth Endpoint - Google (who acts as Authorization Server)
API - My application API keeping all data for chefs
The workflow for Implicit (as per above diagram in the link) states the Application gets the access token and then the Application(browser) calls API (my application with chefs recipes) and gets the data back.
Questions
Shouldn't I secure my application endpoints or rather just believe the accesssTokens? Yes, the trust is established between Application and OAuth Endpoint (Google), but there is no trust developed API and Application by confirming the validity of accessToken with OAuth Endpoint (Google)?
If I should secure my application API endpoints, shall I have a /login endpoint for my APIs where my application accepts accessTokens, validate and create a JWT based headers for clients to use for further communication with protected resources like /recipes.
Looking forward to your ideas here.
Thanks in advance
TL;DR - don't blindly trust the access tokens. Ask Google to reveal the user/email associated with them and the client ID that was used when generating them. You can still provide a /login endpoint for scalability purposes mostly.
Let's deal with the core security first
OAuth is a delegation protocol, not an authentication protocol. To quote from the OAuth website:
The OAuth 2.0 specification defines a delegation protocol [...] OAuth is used in a wide variety of applications, including providing mechanisms for user authentication. [...] Let's say that again, to be clear:
OAuth 2.0 is not an authentication protocol.
Because it's not an authentication protocol, your app/API never learns who the user is. It just gets a token. Delegation in this context means that OAuth lets App A request access to resources in App B that belong to a User, by having the User authenticate to App B and then passing the token back to App A. In your example, it can provide your web app with access to Google resources (email, photos, etc. - depending on the required scopes) that are owned by the Users (chefs).
Note that this isn't what you are doing here, since you're accessing resources managed by your app, not by Google. In particular, as you correctly identified, the access token means nothing to your API. I could just as well give it a random string.
You might be tempted to use the following scheme:
Implement the implicit scheme as described in your question.
Have the API server validate the access token with Google, and ask Google for the name or email associated with the token. This will be the identity of the user who actually logged in to Google, and you can then decide whether or not to grant permission to that user.
The problem with this approach is that many apps use OAuth with Google, and so many apps will have Google access tokens that don't belong you app. How can you tell the difference?
You can ask Google, when you present it with the access token, to also provide you with the client ID that was provided when this token was generated (see how your diagram indicates that the client ID is sent?). Since that client ID uniquely identifies your app, then your API can tell that it's been given tokens that only came from your app. Note that this critical part of the OAuth flow is very different in mobile apps which is why the implicit flow should not be used with mobile apps (but it's fine with web apps).
Note that your client ID should be considered common knowledge (e.g. it's found in the .js files on the machines performing this flow), but it cannot be spoofed because as part of the OAuth flow, the user's browser will be redirected to a URL that is pre-configured in Google and belongs to your app. So even if a malicious app uses your client ID, Google will still send the token to your app.
Other practicalities
The above requires you to issue a call to Google on every API call, or at least cache the valid access tokens (which means you keep state, which is a bummer for scalability). If you want to avoid this, you can create a /login endpoint which generates a JWT. Note that you'll still need to validate the access tokens upon login.

Allowing Developer Access tokens for an api secured with Auth0

I have used Auth0 for a while with success, I recently came across a new challenge: allowing external developers to access my API with credentials provided by my web app.
The current system comprises of:
a Web App (not a SPA currently) with Auth0 log in
a back end API with Auth0 api authentication
Currently there is a single client in Auth0. The user logs in on the website and when they call the API via the website the token is passed along in the headers.
My question is: what is the best way to allow developers to request direct access to the api, in a self service manner on my website?
I see two paths forward, either create a client for each developer application via the Auth0 management API (github style), or request a token on behalf of the developer with a VERY long lifespan (like AppVeyor).
I'm assuming that your API provides functionality and/or resources that are associated or owned by an end-user, and you want to allow other application to also access this data on behalf of each end-user. If this isn't the case, and you API is general-purpose and does not require the notion of an end-user identity then other approaches like API keys could also meet your requirements.
Considering the end-user delegation scenario, the approach I would recommend would be going with the creation of separate client applications within Auth0. Like you said, you could automate this process through the Management API so that this process could be handled in a self-service way. Despite being self-service, the application that enabled the registration could still apply constraints in order to make sure only eligible developers could obtain the necessary information to then obtain access tokens to access the API.
This has the benefit that if you wanted to stop an existing developer from using your API you could just remove the associated client application and they wouldn't be allowed to request access tokens anymore and the ones they already had would be short lived and soon expire. This requirement is more complex to implement when using long-lived tokens because they would need to be revoked/blacklisted.
A final note, if these applications don't require to act on behalf an end-user when calling your API and you would prefer to still accept access tokens instead of using a different approach like API keys, then you can consider registering client applications meant to use the client credentials grant.

How to authenticate main application when it is OAuth API based

I am starting a new web project and I intend to make it API based; that is I want to build the API first, authenticated via OAuth, then build a website and possibly mobile app(s) that use the API to handle data. I also have my eye on opening up the API to the public.
Here is my issue; I am struggling to get my head around how to authenticate these 'official' apps, the ones made by me, including the main site.
In OAuth the client creates an account for each user then seeks access rights via the resource owner logging in at the main site. This obviously does not work for me because the main site and the client are the same place and it also implies my users should be creating two accounts just to use my website...
I believe twitter uses its own API to run twitter.com and I get the impression that this approach is becoming quite normal so there must be a standard approach.
I must be missing something, but what?
You are confusing the API (business logic) with the authenticaton of user identity (for example logging in), and the authorization of third party apps (OAuth).
It is correct that twitter.com uses their own API. But they don't use OAuth on their own site. When you're on twitter.com, their APIs are available to themselves over cookie authentication. To put it simply: you're logged in.
Once you move away from twitter.com you have to use OAuth. Now an application is using the API on behalf of a user.
To sum up. You don't specifically need OAuth for your "own" web client to use your own APIs. You need OAuth, or some other authorization mechanism, to publish your APIs and it will also come in handy for your own "official" apps.
There is really no need to distinguish your own official apps from third party apps. Not from a technological perspective anyway.
Host two versions of the "API". One mapped to the external domain api.yoursite.com and it OAuth-enabled to authenticate all requests. The other internal version is accessible only within your pool of servers, your official apps. Since only your official apps can access it in the first place, consider all requests to the internal API trusted.
If you want the same application to manage both external and internal calls, you can choose to
distinguish external and internal requests based on incoming IP addresses
implement your API to accept one of "VIP passes" or OAuth tokens for authentications. External apps use OAuth tokens to perform actions on behalf of certain users. Official apps use "VIP passes" to perform actions on behalf of any user.

Security for "Private" REST API

I am currently developing a web application that is right now comprised of a front end which displays and interacts with the data using a REST API we have written. The only thing that will ever use the API is our front end website, and at some point a mobile app that we will develop.
I have done a lot of reading about how OAuth is the ideal mechanism for securing an API and at this point I am starting to have a good understanding of how it works.
My question is -- since I am never granting access to my API to a third-party client, is OAuth really necessary? Is there any reason it is advantageous? Furthermore, because the back end is simply the API, there is no gateway for a user to authenticate from (like if you were writing an app using the Twitter API, when a user authenticates they would be directed to the Twitter page to grant to access then redirected back to the client).
I am not really sure which direction to go in. It seems like there must be some approach halfway between http authentication and OAuth that would be appropriate for this situation but I'm just not getting it.
From my point of view, one of the scenarios that favor OAuth over other options is to work with untrusted clients, no matter if these are developed by you or a third party.
What's an untrusted client? Think from the point of who handles the credentials that grant access to your API.
For example, your web application could interact with your API in two falvors:
Your web app server side talks to your API. Your web app server is a trusted client because the credentials to access your API can only be access by whom have access to the server...You and your team. You could authenticate your web app server with a client_id and a client_secret.
You may want to make calls directly to your API from your Web app client, which runs on the end user's browser using JavaScript. The end user's browser is an untrusted client. If you were to deliver the credentials to your API down to the browser, anyone could check the JavaScript code and steal your credentials.
A third party Native App is also untrusted. A malicious developer that uses your API could save the credentials of and end user of your platform.
Your Native App is a trusted client and could manage the authentication with a simple username , password and a client id identifying your App.
How can OAuth help? OAuth Authorization code and Implicit grants can help you with this issue. These flows only work with clients that support a redirect, like a browser. And let you authenticate an untrusted client and a user against your Authorization Server to gain access to your Resource Server, your API, without exposing the credentials. Take a look at the RFC to see how it is done.
The good thing of OAuth is that it not only supports these redirect based authentication flows, but it also supports client credentials grant and user credentials grant. So an OAuth Authorization Server would cover all cases.
OAuth 2.0 originally seems like a PITA if you think about having to build a lot of it yourself, but most languages have some really solid OAuth 2.0 setups which you can just bolt in with varying amounts of fiddling. If you're using a framework like Laravel or RoR then it's barely any work.
PHP: http://oauth2.thephpleague.com/
Ruby (Rails or Grape): https://github.com/doorkeeper-gem/doorkeeper
If you don't want to redirect users as suggested in your post then ignore other comments and answers that talk about two legged flows. You can use the client_credentials grant type to have apps just provide their client id and secret in return for an access token, which is nice and easy.
I would ask how private are we talking, because if the only systems talking to it are within the backend and have no interaction with the outside world you could probably leave it wide open and just rely on the network to keep it safe (VPN/Firewall).
But if it's private in the sense of "our iPhone app uses it" then you definitely want to go with OAuth 2.0, or something like it.
2 legged OAuth is probably what you want to use. It's basically hashing a shared key, but you have the advantage of not having to write the code yourself.
Here's a related question: Two-legged OAuth - looking for information
You should use Oauth for mobile device to API layer communication.
However, there is no benefit of Oauth in this web UI layer to middle-layer access (machine to machine).
On the other hand there are some potential issues
Managing the access token expiry becomes a pain. Consider that your UI has to cache the access token across multiple nodes in a cluster. Refresh it when expired, and the fact that UI layer is negotiating security with backend will just take extra time once in a while.
In two legged Oauth (OAuth Client Credential as in v2.0) does not support any encryption. So you still need to send key and secret both to the server for getting an access token.
Backend has to implement issuing access token, refresh token, validating access token etc, without any significant benefit