I came across some SQL in an application which had no space before the "ORDER BY" clause. I was surprised that this even works.
Given a table of numbers, called [counter] where there is simply one column, counter_id that is an incrementing list of integers this SQL works fine in Microsoft SQL Server 2012
select
*
FROM [counter] c
where c.counter_id = 1000ORDER by counter_id
This also works with strings, e.g.:
WHERE some_string = 'test'ORDER BY something
My question is, are there any potential pitfalls or dangers with this query? And conversely, are there any benefits? Other than saving, what, 8 bits of network traffic for that whitespace (whcih may well be a consideration in some applications)
Let me explain the reason why this works with numbers and strings.
The reason is because numbers cannot start identifiers, unless the name is escaped. Basically, the first things that happens to a SQL query is tokenization. That is, the components of the query are broken into identifiers and keywords, which are then analyzed.
In SQL Server, keywords and identifiers and function names (and so on) cannot start with a digit (unless the name is escaped, of course). So, when the tokenizer encounters a digit, it knows that it has a number. The number ends when a non-digit character is encountered. So, a sequence of characters such as 1000ORDER BY is easily turned into three tokens, 1000, ORDER, and BY.
Similarly, the first time that a single quote is encountered, it always represents a string literal. The string literal ends when the final single quote is encountered. The next set of characters represents another token.
Let me add that there is exactly zero reason to ever use these nuances. First, these rules are properties of SQL Server's tokenization and do not necessarily apply to other databases. Second, the purpose of SQL is for humans to be able to express queries. It is way, way more important that we read them.
As jarlh mentioned there might be difference during scanning and parsing the tokens but it creates correctly during execution plan, hence it might not be huge difference in advantages or disadvantages
When parser examines characters ,it checks for keywords,identifiers,string constants and match overall semantic and syntactic structure of the language. Since 'Order by' is a keyword and sql parser knows its possible syntactic location in a query, it will interpret it accordingly without throwing any error. This is the reason why your order by will not throw any error.
Parsing sql query
Parsing SQL
I am trying to do SQL Injection testing but I am currently testing a command line that separates parameters by spaces, so I'm trying to write a sql statement without any spaces. I've gotten it down to:
create table"aab"("id"int,"notes"varchar(100))
But I cannot figure out how to get rid of the space between CREATE and TABLE. The same would apply obviously for DROP and TABLE, etc.
Does anyone have any ideas? This is for Microsoft SQL Server 2014. Thanks!
[Update]: We are evaluating a third party product for vulnerabilities. I am not doing this to test my own code for weaknesses.
You can write comments between lines instead of spaces in many cases. So /**/ instead of spaces.
Sure it is possible to write some pretty elaborate statements without spaces.
Here is one.
select'asdf'as[asdf]into[#MyTable]
You can even do things like execute sp_executesql without spaces.
exec[sp_executesql]N'select''asdf''as[asdf]into[#MyTable]'
This is not possible, you have to check every argument to make sure they are as intended.
If they are supposed to be numbers, make sure they are numbers, is they are supposed to be a string that may contain specific caracters (like ' or ,) you should escape them when executing the request.
There should be a dedicated mechanism in your programmation langage to take care of hat (like PreparedStatement in Java)
You can also using brackets () for every functions without spaces
SELECT(COUNT(id))FROM(users)where(id>5)
Due to a bug in one of our applications, a certain character was duplicated 2^n times in many CLOB fields, where n is anywhere between 1 and 24. For the sake of simplicity, lets say the character would be X. It is safe to assume that any adjacent occurrence of two or more of these characters identifies broken data.
We've thought of running over every CLOB field in the database, and replacing the value where necessary. We've quickly found out that you can easily replace the value by using REGEXP_REPLACE, e.g. like this (might contain syntax errors, typed this by heart):
SELECT REGEXP_REPLACE( clob_value, 'XX*', 'X' )
FROM someTable
WHERE clob_value LIKE 'XX%';
However, even when changing the WHERE part to WHERE primary_key = 1234, for a data set which contains around four million characters in two locations within its CLOB field, this query takes more than fifteen minutes to execute (we aborted the attempt after that time, not sure how long it would actually take).
As a comparison, reading the same value into a C# application, fixing it there using a similar regular expression approach, and writing it back into the database only takes 3 seconds.
We could write such a C# application and execute that, but due to security restrictions it would just be a lot easier to send a database script to our customer which they could execute theirselves.
Is there any way to do a replacement like this much faster on an Oracle 10g (10.2.0.3) database?
Note: There are two configurations, one running the database on a Windows 2003 Server with the Clients being Windows XP, and another one running both the database and the client on a standalone Windows XP notebook. Both configurations are affected
How does your client access the Oracle server? If it is via a Unix environment(which most likely is the case) then maybe you can write a shell script to extract the value from database, fix it using sed, and write back to database. Replacing in unix should be real quick.
Maybe you facing problem with LOB segment space fragmentation. In fact each of your lobs will be shorted that before. Try to create a new table and copy modified clobs into this new table.
As we didn't find any way to make it faster on the database, we delivered the C# tool within an executable patch.
Lately I have been doing a security pass on a PHP application and I've already found and fixed one XSS vulnerability (both in validating input and encoding the output).
How can I query the database to make sure there isn't any malicious data still residing in it? The fields in question should be text with allowable symbols (-, #, spaces) but shouldn't have any special html characters (<, ", ', >, etc).
I assume I should use regular expressions in the query; does anyone have prebuilt regexes especially for this purpose?
If you only care about non-alphanumerics and it's SQL Server you can use:
SELECT *
FROM MyTable
WHERE MyField LIKE '%[^a-z0-9]%'
This will show you any row where MyField has anything except a-z and 0-9.
EDIT:
Updated pattern would be: LIKE '%[^a-z0-9!-# ]%' ESCAPE '!'
I had to add the ESCAPE char since you want to allow dashes -.
For the same reason that you shouldn't be validating input against a black-list (i.e. list of illegal characters), I'd try to avoid doing the same in your search. I'm commenting without knowing the intent of the fields holding the data (i.e. name, address, "about me", etc.), but my suggestion would be to construct your query to identify what you do want in your database then identify the exceptions.
Reason being there are just simply so many different character patterns used in XSS. Take a look at the XSS Cheat Sheet and you'll start to get an idea. Particularly when you get into character encoding, just looking for things like angle brackets and quotes is not going to get you too far.
I realize that parameterized SQL queries is the optimal way to sanitize user input when building queries that contain user input, but I'm wondering what is wrong with taking user input and escaping any single quotes and surrounding the whole string with single quotes. Here's the code:
sSanitizedInput = "'" & Replace(sInput, "'", "''") & "'"
Any single-quote the user enters is replaced with double single-quotes, which eliminates the users ability to end the string, so anything else they may type, such as semicolons, percent signs, etc., will all be part of the string and not actually executed as part of the command.
We are using Microsoft SQL Server 2000, for which I believe the single-quote is the only string delimiter and the only way to escape the string delimiter, so there is no way to execute anything the user types in.
I don't see any way to launch an SQL injection attack against this, but I realize that if this were as bulletproof as it seems to me someone else would have thought of it already and it would be common practice.
What's wrong with this code? Is there a way to get an SQL injection attack past this sanitization technique? Sample user input that exploits this technique would be very helpful.
UPDATE:
I still don't know of any way to effectively launch a SQL injection attack against this code. A few people suggested that a backslash would escape one single-quote and leave the other to end the string so that the rest of the string would be executed as part of the SQL command, and I realize that this method would work to inject SQL into a MySQL database, but in SQL Server 2000 the only way (that I've been able to find) to escape a single-quote is with another single-quote; backslashes won't do it.
And unless there is a way to stop the escaping of the single-quote, none of the rest of the user input will be executed because it will all be taken as one contiguous string.
I understand that there are better ways to sanitize input, but I'm really more interested in learning why the method I provided above won't work. If anyone knows of any specific way to mount a SQL injection attack against this sanitization method I would love to see it.
First of all, it's just bad practice. Input validation is always necessary, but it's also always iffy.
Worse yet, blacklist validation is always problematic, it's much better to explicitly and strictly define what values/formats you accept. Admittedly, this is not always possible - but to some extent it must always be done.
Some research papers on the subject:
http://www.imperva.com/docs/WP_SQL_Injection_Protection_LK.pdf
http://www.it-docs.net/ddata/4954.pdf (Disclosure, this last one was mine ;) )
https://www.owasp.org/images/d/d4/OWASP_IL_2007_SQL_Smuggling.pdf (based on the previous paper, which is no longer available)
Point is, any blacklist you do (and too-permissive whitelists) can be bypassed. The last link to my paper shows situations where even quote escaping can be bypassed.
Even if these situations do not apply to you, it's still a bad idea. Moreover, unless your app is trivially small, you're going to have to deal with maintenance, and maybe a certain amount of governance: how do you ensure that its done right, everywhere all the time?
The proper way to do it:
Whitelist validation: type, length, format or accepted values
If you want to blacklist, go right ahead. Quote escaping is good, but within context of the other mitigations.
Use Command and Parameter objects, to preparse and validate
Call parameterized queries only.
Better yet, use Stored Procedures exclusively.
Avoid using dynamic SQL, and dont use string concatenation to build queries.
If using SPs, you can also limit permissions in the database to executing the needed SPs only, and not access tables directly.
you can also easily verify that the entire codebase only accesses the DB through SPs...
Okay, this response will relate to the update of the question:
"If anyone knows of any specific way to mount a SQL injection attack against this sanitization method I would love to see it."
Now, besides the MySQL backslash escaping - and taking into account that we're actually talking about MSSQL, there are actually 3 possible ways of still SQL injecting your code
sSanitizedInput = "'" & Replace(sInput, "'", "''") & "'"
Take into account that these will not all be valid at all times, and are very dependant on your actual code around it:
Second-order SQL Injection - if an SQL query is rebuilt based upon data retrieved from the database after escaping, the data is concatenated unescaped and may be indirectly SQL-injected. See
String truncation - (a bit more complicated) - Scenario is you have two fields, say a username and password, and the SQL concatenates both of them. And both fields (or just the first) has a hard limit on length. For instance, the username is limited to 20 characters. Say you have this code:
username = left(Replace(sInput, "'", "''"), 20)
Then what you get - is the username, escaped, and then trimmed to 20 characters. The problem here - I'll stick my quote in the 20th character (e.g. after 19 a's), and your escaping quote will be trimmed (in the 21st character). Then the SQL
sSQL = "select * from USERS where username = '" + username + "' and password = '" + password + "'"
combined with the aforementioned malformed username will result in the password already being outside the quotes, and will just contain the payload directly.
3. Unicode Smuggling - In certain situations, it is possible to pass a high-level unicode character that looks like a quote, but isn't - until it gets to the database, where suddenly it is. Since it isn't a quote when you validate it, it will go through easy... See my previous response for more details, and link to original research.
In a nutshell: Never do query escaping yourself. You're bound to get something wrong. Instead, use parameterized queries, or if you can't do that for some reason, use an existing library that does this for you. There's no reason to be doing it yourself.
I realize this is a long time after the question was asked, but ..
One way to launch an attack on the 'quote the argument' procedure is with string truncation.
According to MSDN, in SQL Server 2000 SP4 (and SQL Server 2005 SP1), a too long string will be quietly truncated.
When you quote a string, the string increases in size. Every apostrophe is repeated.
This can then be used to push parts of the SQL outside the buffer. So you could effectively trim away parts of a where clause.
This would probably be mostly useful in a 'user admin' page scenario where you could abuse the 'update' statement to not do all the checks it was supposed to do.
So if you decide to quote all the arguments, make sure you know what goes on with the string sizes and see to it that you don't run into truncation.
I would recommend going with parameters. Always. Just wish I could enforce that in the database. And as a side effect, you are more likely to get better cache hits because more of the statements look the same. (This was certainly true on Oracle 8)
I've used this technique when dealing with 'advanced search' functionality, where building a query from scratch was the only viable answer. (Example: allow the user to search for products based on an unlimited set of constraints on product attributes, displaying columns and their permitted values as GUI controls to reduce the learning threshold for users.)
In itself it is safe AFAIK. As another answerer pointed out, however, you may also need to deal with backspace escaping (albeit not when passing the query to SQL Server using ADO or ADO.NET, at least -- can't vouch for all databases or technologies).
The snag is that you really have to be certain which strings contain user input (always potentially malicious), and which strings are valid SQL queries. One of the traps is if you use values from the database -- were those values originally user-supplied? If so, they must also be escaped. My answer is to try to sanitize as late as possible (but no later!), when constructing the SQL query.
However, in most cases, parameter binding is the way to go -- it's just simpler.
Input sanitation is not something you want to half-ass. Use your whole ass. Use regular expressions on text fields. TryCast your numerics to the proper numeric type, and report a validation error if it doesn't work. It is very easy to search for attack patterns in your input, such as ' --. Assume all input from the user is hostile.
It's a bad idea anyway as you seem to know.
What about something like escaping the quote in string like this: \'
Your replace would result in: \''
If the backslash escapes the first quote, then the second quote has ended the string.
Simple answer: It will work sometimes, but not all the time.
You want to use white-list validation on everything you do, but I realize that's not always possible, so you're forced to go with the best guess blacklist. Likewise, you want to use parametrized stored procs in everything, but once again, that's not always possible, so you're forced to use sp_execute with parameters.
There are ways around any usable blacklist you can come up with (and some whitelists too).
A decent writeup is here: http://www.owasp.org/index.php/Top_10_2007-A2
If you need to do this as a quick fix to give you time to get a real one in place, do it. But don't think you're safe.
There are two ways to do it, no exceptions, to be safe from SQL-injections; prepared statements or prameterized stored procedures.
If you have parameterised queries available you should be using them at all times. All it takes is for one query to slip through the net and your DB is at risk.
Patrick, are you adding single quotes around ALL input, even numeric input? If you have numeric input, but are not putting the single quotes around it, then you have an exposure.
Yeah, that should work right up until someone runs SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER OFF and uses a double quote on you.
Edit: It isn't as simple as not allowing the malicious user to turn off quoted identifiers:
The SQL Server Native Client ODBC driver and SQL Server Native Client OLE DB Provider for SQL Server automatically set QUOTED_IDENTIFIER to ON when connecting. This can be configured in ODBC data sources, in ODBC connection attributes, or OLE DB connection properties. The default for SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER is OFF for connections from DB-Library applications.
When a stored procedure is created, the SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER and SET ANSI_NULLS settings are captured and used for subsequent invocations of that stored procedure.
SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER also corresponds to the QUOTED_IDENTIFER setting of ALTER DATABASE.
SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER is set at parse time. Setting at parse time means that if the SET statement is present in the batch or stored procedure, it takes effect, regardless of whether code execution actually reaches that point; and the SET statement takes effect before any statements are executed.
There's a lot of ways QUOTED_IDENTIFIER could be off without you necessarily knowing it. Admittedly - this isn't the smoking gun exploit you're looking for, but it's a pretty big attack surface. Of course, if you also escaped double quotes - then we're back where we started. ;)
Your defence would fail if:
the query is expecting a number rather than a string
there were any other way to represent a single quotation mark, including:
an escape sequence such as \039
a unicode character
(in the latter case, it would have to be something which were expanded only after you've done your replace)
What ugly code all that sanitisation of user input would be! Then the clunky StringBuilder for the SQL statement. The prepared statement method results in much cleaner code, and the SQL Injection benefits are a really nice addition.
Also why reinvent the wheel?
Rather than changing a single quote to (what looks like) two single quotes, why not just change it to an apostrophe, a quote, or remove it entirely?
Either way, it's a bit of a kludge... especially when you legitimately have things (like names) which may use single quotes...
NOTE: Your method also assumes everyone working on your app always remembers to sanitize input before it hits the database, which probably isn't realistic most of the time.
I'm not sure about your case, but I just encountered a case in Mysql that Replace(value, "'", "''") not only can't prevent SQL injection, but also causes the injection.
if an input ended with \', it's OK without replace, but when replacing the trailing ', the \ before end of string quote causes the SQL error.
While you might find a solution that works for strings, for numerical predicates you need to also make sure they're only passing in numbers (simple check is can it be parsed as int/double/decimal?).
It's a lot of extra work.
It might work, but it seems a little hokey to me. I'd recommend verifing that each string is valid by testing it against a regular expression instead.
Yes, you can, if...
After studying the topic, I think input sanitized as you suggested is safe, but only under these rules:
you never allow string values coming from users to become anything else than string literals (i.e. avoid giving configuration option: "Enter additional SQL column names/expressions here:"). Value types other than strings (numbers, dates, ...): convert them to their native data types and provide a routine for SQL literal from each data type.
SQL statements are problematic to validate
you either use nvarchar/nchar columns (and prefix string literals with N) OR limit values going into varchar/char columns to ASCII characters only (e.g. throw exception when creating SQL statement)
this way you will be avoiding automatic apostrophe conversion from CHAR(700) to CHAR(39) (and maybe other similar Unicode hacks)
you always validate value length to fit actual column length (throw exception if longer)
there was a known defect in SQL Server allowing to bypass SQL error thrown on truncation (leading to silent truncation)
you ensure that SET QUOTED_IDENTIFIER is always ON
beware, it is taken into effect in parse-time, i.e. even in inaccessible sections of code
Complying with these 4 points, you should be safe. If you violate any of them, a way for SQL injection opens.