I am coding in ColdFusion, but trying to stay in cfscript, so I have a function that allows me to pass in a query to run it with
<cfquery blah >
#query#
</cfquery>
Somehow though, when I construct my queries with sql = "SELECT * FROM a WHERE b='#c#'" and pass it in, ColdFusion has replaced the single quotes with 2 single quotes. so it becomes WHERE b=''c'' in the final query.
I have tried creating the strings a lot of different ways, but I cannot get it to leave just one quote. Even doing a string replace has no effect.
Any idea why this is happening? It is ruining my hopes of living in cfscript for the duration of this project
ColdFusion, by design, escapes single quotes when interpolating variables within <cfquery> tags.
To do what you want, you need to use the PreserveSingleQuotes() function.
<cfquery ...>#PreserveSingleQuotes(query)#</cfquery>
This doesn't address, however, the danger of SQL injection to which you are exposing yourself.
Using <cfqueryparam> also allows your database to cache the query, which in most cases will improve performance.
It might be helpful to read an old Ben Forta column and a recent post by Brad Wood for more information about the benefits of using <cfqueryparam>.
The answer to your question, as others have said, is using preserveSingleQuotes(...)
However, the solution you actually want, is not to dynamically build your queries in this fashion. It's Bad Bad Bad.
Put your SQL inside the cfquery tags, with any ifs/switches/etc as appropriate, and ensure all CF variables use the cfqueryparam tag.
(Note, if you use variables in the ORDER BY clause, you'll need to manually escape any variables; cfqueryparam can't be used in ORDER BY clauses)
ColdFusion automatically escapes single quotes quotes in <cfquery> tags when you use the following syntax:
SELECT * FROM TABLE WHERE Foo='#Foo#'
In case you would want to preserve single quotes in #Foo# you must call #PreserveSingleQuotes(Foo)#.
Be aware the the automatic escaping works only for variable values, not for function results.
SELECT * FROM TABLE WHERE Foo='#LCase(Foo)#' /* Single quotes are retained! */
In that light, the function PreserveSingleQuotes() (see Adobe LiveDocs) is not much more than a "null operation" on the value - turning it into a function result to bypass auto-escaping.
I voted up Dave's answer since I thought he did a good job.
I'd like to add however that there are also several different tools designed for ColdFusion that can simplify a lot of the common SQL tasks you're likely to perform. There's a very light-weight tool called DataMgr written by Steve Bryant, as well as Transfer from Mark Mandel, Reactor which was originally created by Doug Hughes and one I developed called DataFaucet. Each of these has its own strengths and weaknesses. Personally I think you're apt to consider DataFaucet to be the one that will give you the best ability to stay in cfscript, with a variety of syntaxes for building different kinds of queries.
Here are a few examples:
qry = datasource.select_avg_price_as_avgprice_from_products(); //(requires CF8)
qry = datasource.select("avg(price) as avgprice","products");
qry = datasource.getSelect("avg(price) as avgprice","products").filter("categoryid",url.categoryid).execute();
qry = datasource.getSelect(table="products",orderby="productname").filter("categoryid",url.categoryid).execute();
The framework ensures that cfqueryparam is always used with these filter statements to prevent sql-injection attacks, and there are similar syntaxes for insert, update and delete statements. (There are a couple of simple rules to avoid sql-injection.)
Related
I ask this question with a bit of sheepishness because I should know the answer. Could someone be kind and explain if and how injection could occur in the following code?
<cfquery>
select * from tableName
where fieldName = '#value#'
</cfquery>
I'm specifically curious about injection attempts and other malicious input, not about best practices or input validation for handling "normal" user input. I see folks strongly advocating use of CFQueryParam, but don't think I see the point. If user input has been validated for consistency to the database schema (e.g. so that input must be numeric for numerical database fields), is there anything else gained by using CFQueryParam? What does <cfqueryparam CFSQLType = "CF_SQL_VARCHAR"> do that '#value#' doesn't do?
Update:
While this answers part of your question, Peter's response is better, in that it directly addresses your question of "Why use cfqueryparam, when CF automatically adds protection by escaping single quotes?". Answer: In short, because the latter does not always work. Bind variables do.
It says in the docs "escapes string variables in single-quotation
marks" but doesn't CF already "magically" do this in CF query tag when
you wrap evaluated variables in single quotes?
Yes, most versions automatically escape single quotes as a protection measure for those not using cfqueryparam. However, as Scott noted above, it is better to use cfqueryparam (ie bind variables) because they ensure parameters are not executed as sql commands. Bind variables work, even in cases where the automatic escaping does not, as Peter's answer demonstrates.
That said, sql injection protection is really just a side effect of using bind variables. The primary reason to use bind variables is performance. Bind variables encourage databases to re-use query plans, instead of creating a new plan every time your #parameters# change. That cuts down on compilation time, improving performance.
Cfqueryparam also has a number of other benefits:
Provides data type checking (length, value, type, ...)
Provides attributes that simplify handling of "lists" and null values
Performs data type checking before any sql is sent to the database, preventing wasted database calls
While it does not really apply to string columns, IMO another big reason to use it is accuracy. When you pass a quoted string to the database, you are relying on implicit conversion. Essentially you are leaving it up to the database to figure out how to best perform the comparison, and the results are not always what you were expecting. (Date strings are a prime example). You may end with inaccurate results, or sometimes slower queries, depending on how the database decides to execute the sql. Using cfqueryparam avoids those issues by eliminating the ambiguity.
doesn't CF already "magically" do this in CF query tag when you wrap evaluated variables in single quotes?
Yep, it'll convert ' to '' for you.
Now guess what SQL you get from this code:
<cfset value = "\'; DROP TABLE tableName -- " />
<cfquery>
select * from tableName
where fieldName = '#value#'
</cfquery>
The cfqueryparam tag works; using query params solves SQL injection.
Any custom written attempts at validating, sanitizing, or escaping (all separate things, btw) are, at best, only as good as the developer's knowledge of the database system the code is running against.
If the developer is unaware of other escape methods, or if the values are modified between validation/escaping and them being rendered into SQL, or even if the codebase is ported to another database system and seems to be fine, there's a chance of custom code breaking down.
When it comes to security, you don't want chances like that. So use cfqueryparam.
To answer the first part of your question, setting your #value# variable to the following:
someValue'; DELETE FROM tableName WHERE '1' = '1
would result in this query being executed:
<cfquery>
select * from tableName
where fieldName = 'someValue'; DELETE FROM tableName WHERE '1' = '1'
</cfquery>
I would like to build a safe dynamic select statement that can handle multiple WHERE clauses.
For example the base SQL would look like:
SELECT * FROM Books Where Type='Novel'
I would pass the function something like:
SafeDynamicSQL("author,=,Herman Melville","pages,>,1000");
Which would sanitize inputs and concatenate like:
SELECT * FROM Books Where Type='Novel' AND author=#author AND pages>#pages
The function would sanitize the column name by checking against an array of predefined column names. The operator would only be allowed to be >,<,=. The value would be added as a normal paramater.
Would this still be vulnerable to SQL injection?
There will be some string manipulation and small loops which will affect performance but my thoughts are that this will only take a few milliseconds compared to the request which on average take 200ms. Would this tax the server more than I am thinking if these requests are made about once a second?
I know this isn't best practice by any means, but it will greatly speed up development. Please give me any other reasons why this could be a bad idea.
It looks like you're reinventing any number of existing ORM solutions which offer a similar API for creating WHERE clauses.
The answer to your question hinges on what you mean by "The value would be added as a normal paramater." If by that you mean performing string concatenation to produce the string you showed then yes, that would still be subject to SQL injection attack. If you mean using an actual parameterized query then you would be safe. In the later case, you would produce something like
SELECT * FROM Books Where Type='Novel' AND author=? AND pages > ?
and then bind that to a list of values like ['Herman Melville', 1000]. Exactly what it would look like depends on what programming language you're using.
Finally, if you pursue this path I would strongly recommend changing from comma-delimited arguments to three separate arguments, you'd save yourself a lot of programming time.
Pretty much any code that appends together (or interpolates) strings to create SQL is bad form from a security point of view, and is probably subject to some SQLi attack vector. Just use bound parameters and avoid the entire problem; avoiding SQL injection is super-easy.
When I started to write the first SQL-Statements in my programs I felt quite comfortable with protecting myself against SQL-Injection with a very simple method that a colleague showed me. It replaced all single quotes with two single quotes.
So for example there is a searchfield in which you can enter a customername to search in the customertable. If you would enter
Peter's Barbershop
The SELECT Statement would look like
SELECT *
FROM Customers
WHERE Customername = 'Peter''s Barbershop'
If now an attacker would insert this:
';DROP TABLE FOO; --
The statement would look like:
SELECT *
FROM Customers
WHERE Customername = ''';DROP TABLE FOO;--'
It would not drop any table, but search the customertable for the customername ';DROP TABLE FOO;-- which, I suppose, won't be found ;-)
Now after a while of writing statements and protecting myself against SQL-Injection with this method, I read that many developers use parameterized statements, but I never read an article where "our" method was used. So definitely there is a good reason for it.
What scenarios would parameterized statements cover but our method doesn't? What are the advantages of parameterized statements compared to our method?
Thanks
Philipp
The parametrized queries has more proc than the defence to sql-injection.
It solves problem with date & time formating & parsing.
You can prepare execution plan for parametrized query.
The sql-injection protection.
I can't remember now for another pros :).
However the way "double every quotes" has problem with fields with limited character length.
For example:
The page has box for "nickname" which can be 10 character long.
The user insert "Don't care" - the exact 10 characters.
Now if you double the quotes, the value has 11 characters and the database will "cut" it, and you got another value in db than user typed.
So I recommend the parameters.
One big dis-advantage is that your solution relies on a developer remembering to add the character, obviously the compiler won't complain. That is dangerous.
Secondly, performance should be enhanced with parameterized SQL statements, as Jeff points out here (in 2005!!!).
One advantage is that the driver itself will determine what he has to escape and what doesn't need to be escaped. Your method could be broken with an input like this:
\'; DROP TABLE foo;--
Which would result in
SELECT *
FROM Customers
WHERE Customername = '\'';DROP TABLE FOO;--'
The first quote gets escaped, the second doesn't and closes the string.
Short answer:
You should use parameterized queries simply because the database server knows better than you do which characters need to be escaped.
Long answer:
' is not necessarily the only special character that needs escaping. These special characters differ from DB server to DB server. MySQL, for example, uses \ as an escape character as well (unless sql_mode=NO_BACKSLASH_ESCAPES is set). Therefore, '' and \' mean the same thing.
This is not true of, say, Oracle.
What are the advantages of
parameterized statements compared to
our method?
The advantage is that it's harder to make a mistake; you can't do the parameterized method, and forget to replace the quotes. Also, replacing quotes is vulnerable if you do it twice.
The disadvantage of parameterized queries (and the reason I never use them) is complexity. You can write ten times as many ad-hoc queries before you get RSI.
I was writing some Unit tests last week for a piece of code that generated some SQL statements.
I was trying to figure out a regex to match SELECT, INSERT and UPDATE syntax so I could verify that my methods were generating valid SQL, and after 3-4 hours of searching and messing around with various regex editors I gave up.
I managed to get partial matches but because a section in quotes can contain any characters it quickly expands to match the whole statement.
Any help would be appreciated, I'm not very good with regular expressions but I'd like to learn more about them.
By the way it's C# RegEx that I'm after.
Clarification
I don't want to need access to a database as this is part of a Unit test and I don't wan't to have to maintain a database to test my code. which may live longer than the project.
Regular expressions can match languages only a finite state automaton can parse, which is very limited, whereas SQL is a syntax. It can be demonstrated you can't validate SQL with a regex. So, you can stop trying.
SQL is a type-2 grammar, it is too powerful to be described by regular expressions. It's the same as if you decided to generate C# code and then validate it without invoking a compiler. Database engine in general is too complex to be easily stubbed.
That said, you may try ANTLR's SQL grammars.
As far as I know this is beyond regex and your getting close to the dark arts of BnF and compilers.
http://savage.net.au/SQL/
Same things happens to people who want to do correct syntax highlighting. You start cramming things into regex and then you end up writing a compiler...
I had the same problem - an approach that would work for all the more standard sql statements would be to spin up an in-memory Sqlite database and issue the query against it, if you get back a "table does not exist" error, then your query parsed properly.
Off the top of my head: Couldn't you pass the generated SQL to a database and use EXPLAIN on them and catch any exceptions which would indicate poorly formed SQL?
Have you tried the lazy selectors. Rather than match as much as possible, they match as little as possible which is probably what you need for quotes.
To validate the queries, just run them with SET NOEXEC ON, that is how Entreprise Manager does it when you parse a query without executing it.
Besides if you are using regex to validate sql queries, you can be almost certain that you will miss some corner cases, or that the query is not valid from other reasons, even if it's syntactically correct.
I suggest creating a database with the same schema, possibly using an embedded sql engine, and passing the sql to that.
I don't think that you even need to have the schema created to be able to validate the statement, because the system will not try to resolve object_name etc until it has successfully parsed the statement.
With Oracle as an example, you would certainly get an error if you did:
select * from non_existant_table;
In this case, "ORA-00942: table or view does not exist".
However if you execute:
select * frm non_existant_table;
Then you'll get a syntax error, "ORA-00923: FROM keyword not found where expected".
It ought to be possible to classify errors into syntax parsing errors that indicate incorrect syntax and errors relating to tables name and permissions etc..
Add to that the problem of different RDBMSs and even different versions allowing different syntaxes and I think you really have to go to the db engine for this task.
There are ANTLR grammars to parse SQL. It's really a better idea to use an in memory database or a very lightweight database such as sqlite. It seems wasteful to me to test whether the SQL is valid from a parsing standpoint, and much more useful to check the table and column names and the specifics of your query.
The best way is to validate the parameters used to create the query, rather than the query itself. A function that receives the variables can check the length of the strings, valid numbers, valid emails or whatever. You can use regular expressions to do this validations.
public bool IsValid(string sql)
{
string pattern = #"SELECT\s.*FROM\s.*WHERE\s.*";
Regex rgx = new Regex(pattern, RegexOptions.IgnoreCase);
return rgx.IsMatch(sql);
}
I am assuming you did something like .\* try instead [^"]* that will keep you from eating the whole line. It still will give false positives on cases where you have \ inside your strings.
If I remove all the ' characters from a SQL query, is there some other way to do a SQL injection attack on the database?
How can it be done? Can anyone give me examples?
Yes, there is. An excerpt from Wikipedia
"SELECT * FROM data WHERE id = " + a_variable + ";"
It is clear from this statement that the author intended a_variable to be a number correlating to the "id" field. However, if it is in fact a string then the end user may manipulate the statement as they choose, thereby bypassing the need for escape characters. For example, setting a_variable to
1;DROP TABLE users
will drop (delete) the "users" table from the database, since the SQL would be rendered as follows:
SELECT * FROM DATA WHERE id=1;DROP TABLE users;
SQL injection is not a simple attack to fight. I would do very careful research if I were you.
Yes, depending on the statement you are using. You are better off protecting yourself either by using Stored Procedures, or at least parameterised queries.
See Wikipedia for prevention samples.
I suggest you pass the variables as parameters, and not build your own SQL. Otherwise there will allways be a way to do a SQL injection, in manners that we currently are unaware off.
The code you create is then something like:
' Not Tested
var sql = "SELECT * FROM data WHERE id = #id";
var cmd = new SqlCommand(sql, myConnection);
cmd.Parameters.AddWithValue("#id", request.getParameter("id"));
If you have a name like mine with an ' in it. It is very annoying that all '-characters are removed or marked as invalid.
You also might want to look at this Stackoverflow question about SQL Injections.
Yes, it is definitely possible.
If you have a form where you expect an integer to make your next SELECT statement, then you can enter anything similar:
SELECT * FROM thingy WHERE attributeID=
5 (good answer, no problem)
5; DROP table users; (bad, bad, bad...)
The following website details further classical SQL injection technics: SQL Injection cheat sheet.
Using parametrized queries or stored procedures is not any better. These are just pre-made queries using the passed parameters, which can be source of injection just as well. It is also described on this page: Attacking Stored Procedures in SQL.
Now, if you supress the simple quote, you prevent only a given set of attack. But not all of them.
As always, do not trust data coming from the outside. Filter them at these 3 levels:
Interface level for obvious stuff (a drop down select list is better than a free text field)
Logical level for checks related to data nature (int, string, length), permissions (can this type of data be used by this user at this page)...
Database access level (escape simple quote...).
Have fun and don't forget to check Wikipedia for answers.
Parameterized inline SQL or parameterized stored procedures is the best way to protect yourself. As others have pointed out, simply stripping/escaping the single quote character is not enough.
You will notice that I specifically talk about "parameterized" stored procedures. Simply using a stored procedure is not enough either if you revert to concatenating the procedure's passed parameters together. In other words, wrapping the exact same vulnerable SQL statement in a stored procedure does not make it any safer. You need to use parameters in your stored procedure just like you would with inline SQL.
Also- even if you do just look for the apostrophe, you don't want to remove it. You want to escape it. You do that by replacing every apostrophe with two apostrophes.
But parameterized queries/stored procedures are so much better.
Since this a relatively older question, I wont bother writing up a complete and comprehensive answer, since most aspects of that answer have been mentioned here by one poster or another.
I do find it necessary, however, to bring up another issue that was not touched on by anyone here - SQL Smuggling. In certain situations, it is possible to "smuggle" the quote character ' into your query even if you tried to remove it. In fact, this may be possible even if you used proper commands, parameters, Stored Procedures, etc.
Check out the full research paper at http://www.comsecglobal.com/FrameWork/Upload/SQL_Smuggling.pdf (disclosure, I was the primary researcher on this) or just google "SQL Smuggling".
. . . uh about 50000000 other ways
maybe somthing like 5; drop table employees; --
resulting sql may be something like:
select * from somewhere where number = 5; drop table employees; -- and sadfsf
(-- starts a comment)
Yes, absolutely: depending on your SQL dialect and such, there are many ways to achieve injection that do not use the apostrophe.
The only reliable defense against SQL injection attacks is using the parameterized SQL statement support offered by your database interface.
Rather that trying to figure out which characters to filter out, I'd stick to parametrized queries instead, and remove the problem entirely.
It depends on how you put together the query, but in essence yes.
For example, in Java if you were to do this (deliberately egregious example):
String query = "SELECT name_ from Customer WHERE ID = " + request.getParameter("id");
then there's a good chance you are opening yourself up to an injection attack.
Java has some useful tools to protect against these, such as PreparedStatements (where you pass in a string like "SELECT name_ from Customer WHERE ID = ?" and the JDBC layer handles escapes while replacing the ? tokens for you), but some other languages are not so helpful for this.
Thing is apostrophe's maybe genuine input and you have to escape them by doubling them up when you are using inline SQL in your code. What you are looking for is a regex pattern like:
\;.*--\
A semi colon used to prematurely end the genuine statement, some injected SQL followed by a double hyphen to comment out the trailing SQL from the original genuine statement. The hyphens may be omitted in the attack.
Therefore the answer is: No, simply removing apostrophes does not gaurantee you safety from SQL Injection.
I can only repeat what others have said. Parametrized SQL is the way to go. Sure, it is a bit of a pain in the butt coding it - but once you have done it once, then it isn't difficult to cut and paste that code, and making the modifications you need. We have a lot of .Net applications that allow web site visitors specify a whole range of search criteria, and the code builds the SQL Select statement on the fly - but everything that could have been entered by a user goes into a parameter.
When you are expecting a numeric parameter, you should always be validating the input to make sure it's numeric. Beyond helping to protect against injection, the validation step will make the app more user friendly.
If you ever receive id = "hello" when you expected id = 1044, it's always better to return a useful error to the user instead of letting the database return an error.