I am working on building an app for a client inside the Dittofi Design Studio. I am on the basic package, so I cannot see by computer code.
I have built a collection of CRUD endpoints & actions & generated the code. Next & I want to make sure that some of my endpoints are only accessible by someone who correctly authenticates against them. Is there a setting for this inside the studio? How would this work for mobile apps authenticating against the endpoints?
Yes you can inside the studio.
If you look at the wrench in the bottom left, you should be able to create an "Authentication Profiles". You'd have to have users model/db table with username and password fields.
You would then have to have some sort of /sign-up, /login, and /logout endpoints (which would call the login web user and logout web user actions) for your authentication flow.
Finally, on the endpoint you want to lock down, if you look under its settings panel below the name, label and content type settings, you should be able to see how you can attach an authentication profile to the endpoint, i.e lock it down by making sure that only authenticated users can access the endpoint.
For mobile apps authentication agains the endpoints, I would generate a JSON web token (JWT) on the Dittofi end and have a secret key that's shared between the mobile apps and Dittofi to validate the token. That way the mobile app can send any requests to the Dittofi endpoints with that token. On the Dittofi end, I would have some token validation logic to validate that token.
This would require writing some custom Golang code to both generate the JWT and validate it using that secret key. That secret key can be stored in a Global variable (which can be though of as environment variables) accessible using that wrench in the bottom left corner of the Design studio.
Let me know if you'd like me to share the Go code that can generate the token and some example code that can validate your token using a secret key.
Related
I am exploring possible solutions for creating something like "API Keys" to consume my API. The goal is to allow for users to generate one or many "API Keys" from the web app and use the static generated key from the CLI app.
The web app and the client app are already using standard OIDC with JWT tokens for authentication and authorization using RBAC (role-based access control). The CLI app can already authenticate the user through the standard browser flow (redirects the user to the browser to authenticate and exchange the token back to the client).
The "API Keys" solution I am trying to achieve should have some fine-grained options where it won't authenticate as the user, but will authorize the client on behalf of the user (something like the GitHub Personal Access Token).
To me it seems like a "solved problem" as multiple services provide this kind of feature and my goal is to do it the most standard way possible using the Oauth2/OIDC protocols but I can't find details on what parts of the protocols should be used.
Can anybody provide any guidance on how it is supposed to be done using the Oauth2/OIDC entities?
Can I achieve it by only using Role-based access control or do I need Resource-based access control?
It went through the path of creating a new client for each "API Key" created, but it didn't feel right to create so many clients in the realm.
Any guidance or links to any materials are appreciated.
Can anybody provide any guidance on how it is supposed to be done
using the Oauth2/OIDC entities?
OIDC is based on OAUth 2.0 so after user login you have id tokens, access token and refresh token on the backend side. To generate new access token without asking user for authentication data you should use refresh token: https://oauth.net/2/refresh-tokens/
Can I achieve it by only using Role-based access control or do I need
Resource-based access control?
resource-based access control is more flexible solution here, but if you business requirement is not complex, then role based might be enough.
It went through the path of creating a new client for each "API Key"
created, but it didn't feel right to create so many clients in the
realm.
It is one application so you should use one client with specific configuration for access token and roles/permissions for users.
Update:
We can use GitHub as an example:
User is authenticated during login
for OIDC code is exchanged for id token, access token and refresh token
session for user is set for web browser
User can request access token
in GitHub authenticated user can request github.com/settings/personal-access-tokens/new endpoint
request is accepted, because user is authenticated based on session
backend service responsible for returning access token can obtain new access token using refresh token from point 1.
access token is returned to GitHub user
To call your API in an OAuth way, CLI users must authenticate periodically. Resulting access tokens can be long lived, as for GitHub keys, if you judge that secure enough. The access token returned can be used exactly like an API key. There may be a little friction here between usability and security.
CONSOLE FLOW
The classic flow for a console app is to use the Native Apps Desktop Flow from RFC8252. This involves the user interactively signing in using the code flow, then receiving the response on a loopback URL. It is an interactive experience, but should only be required occasionally, as for GitHub tokens.
API KEYS
The access token returned is sent in the authorization header and you can use it as an API key. Access tokens can use a reference token format. to make them shorter and confidential, to prevent information disclosure. These will be more natural in a CLI.
API AUTHORIZATION
When your API is called, it must receive access tokens containing scopes and claims, to identify the user. This will enable you to authorize correctly and lock down permissions.
{
sub: 586368,
scope: repos_write,
topic: mobile,
subscription_level: silver
exp: ?
}
TOKEN REFRESH
Sometimes CLI access tokens are long lived, for convenience. A more secure option is for the CLI to use token refresh. It can then store a refresh token in OS secure storage, then renew access tokens seamlessly. My blog post has some screenshots on how this looks, and a desktop app that does not require login upon restart. The CLI needs to deal with expired access tokens and handle 401 responses.
DYNAMIC CLIENT REGISTRATION
Some developer portal scenarios use DCR. It is another option in your security toolbox. It could potentially enable a silent client per CLI user:
User runs a standard authentication flow with a DCR scope
This returns an access token that enables client registration
The resulting token is used to register a new client
This could potentially be a client ID and client secret used in a CLI
Afterwards, the user and client are bound together. Probably not immediately relevant, but worth knowing about.
I'm integrating several web sites/services into my application. I use iframes (or webview for Vue Electron) for UI integration and I also use API to implement cross-communication between those services.
At the moment I have to go through OAuth 2 authentication twice for each service: once as part of natural authentication in iframe and another when I ask the user to give me access to this service (for api reasons).
Is there any way to streamline this process?
The state of the art response would be to modify your application completely.
You should have 1 SPA application and not iframe
This application would authenticate to get OAuth2 token
This application would then call the backend (access multiple backend, or access on api management layer that call backends).
Thing is, with this you can have 2 strategies :
give all permission (scope) at 1st authentication
give the smalled scope possible at 1st authentication, then when needed "reauthenticate" (in fact validate new scope) to get new access token
When an API want to call another API, you have also 3 strategies:
you simply use the same client token the API receive to the service your API call (no human interaction needed)
your API generate a token from a service account (using ROPC authentication scheme) or via a client credential scheme (the access token will be valid but usually not be bind to a real user), (no human interaction needed). (the API will be the client of the 2nd API)
your identity provider have an endpoint to transform access token : Your API can give the client access token, and authorization server will transform this with the client_id of your API. You send this token to 2ndAPI ( token will show subject of your UI application, but client ID will be the 1st API clientId) (no human interaction needed)
Now if you use IFrame with multiple sub-application on the same domain (the domain need to be exactly the same!), it is possible to share the same access token for instance via local storage. (security is not top notch)
You will probably need to authenticate with a bigger scope list sometime but it is your only option. You will simulate a single page application, but issue is that you will have potentially different client_id depending first application you authenticate to.
Edit: Multiple authorization server
From your comment, you have multiple authorization server. One strategy could be to ask user to authenticate, your application can then get an access_token and a refresh_token.
Depending on your authorization server, refresh_token can be used a lot / on a long period of time, so that if you store it somewhere, the next time the user visit your application, your application can silently get an access_token from this refresh token. Your application have then access to remove api without newer interaction from your user.
Of course, this means you have to save this token the most safely you can.
By using OpenID Connect you could combine authentication and authorization in a one step and get both an id_token to logon your user to your app as well as an access_token to access APIs in a single authentication response.
I'm working on a personal project composed of an API and 4 clients (web, android, iOS, windows phone).
I'm using django-rest-framework and oauth2 toolkit on the API side and I wonder which grant_type would be more suitable in my situation.
I read somewhere that the implicit grant_type is appropriate for working with mobile clients.
I'm currently using the resource owner password credentials system.
My current workflow is:
The user creates an account on the API registration page (http://mysite/api/register) then gets redirected on the web client.
The user have to authenticate himself on the API from the web client (the secret and client ID are store in the web client). If the authentication is successful the access_token and refresh_token are both stored in the user session.
Each time the user want to access a page I verify if he is authenticated by requesting the API using his access_token. If the request fails, I retry with the refresh_token. If it's fails again I redirect the user on the auth page.
The user can use the API on a mobile client with the same account without extra manipulations (the secret and client ID are store in a secure location ex. share preferences or keychain)
I like this workflow, it's simple and convenient for the user: he registers once and can use all the clients and I get a perfect separation between the logic (API) and the UI (client). But I'm worried about the security of this system. I don't want to expose my users to threats. Do you guys have any thoughts, recommendations, suggestions?
You help in this matters would be very appreciated.
Thanks in advance!
I am currently using EWS in my application to access Exchange data. I want to add functionality for Office365 using rest api.
With EWS, Authorization was quite simple, just add Authorization tag in header with username and password base64 encoded, I bealive it is called basic Authorization.
But with office 365 the process gets 2 extra steps
On the image above you see that 2 steps are in between my application and office365.
Every office account that will use my application, must do
some configuration steps at Microsoft azure. to get secret key, client it and tenant id.
I would like to avoid that, ideally user needs only to enter his credentials thus I can access all of his data in office 365 programmatically.
Every office account that will use my application, must do some configuration steps at Microsoft azure. to get secret key, client it and tenant id.
If I understand your question correctly, you want to avoid all the steps to configure the client_id, secret key for your app user?
If your app is a browser-based web app, the "Application" block on your diagram actually consists of web server and user/browser. In this case, only the web server needs to pull the configurations from the Azure, client_id, secrect, etc... This being said, the user/web browser only needs to enter his credential, and with implicit consent, you app will have access the the user's data. Such workflow can be described below,
In this case, you app user/browser does not need to pull the configurations from Azure. Only the web server does.
If your app is a native app, when you make a request to the auth endpoint, you app needs to include the client_id and redirect URI in the request. This is shown on the first step below.
In this case, your app user can use the same client_id and redirect URI, you don't need to "force" them to create their own's, so that they only need to input their username and password.
You can find more info on Azure AD authentication from https://azure.microsoft.com/en-us/documentation/articles/active-directory-authentication-scenarios/
I'm having some trouble deciding how to implement authentication for a RESTful API that will be secure for consumption by both a web app and a mobile app.
Firstly, I thought to investigate HTTP Basic Authentication over HTTPS as an option. It would work well for a mobile app, where the username and password could be stored in the OS keychain securely and couldn't be intercepted in transit since the request would be over HTTPS. It's also elegant for the API since it'll be completely stateless. The problem with this is for the web app. There won't be access to such a keychain for storing the username and password, so I would need to use a cookie or localStorage, but then I'm storing the user's private details in a readily accessible place.
After more research, I found a lot of talk about HMAC authentication. The problem I see with this approach is there needs to be a shared secret that only the client and server knows. How can I get this per-user secret to a particular user in the web app, unless I have an api/login endpoint which takes username/password and gives the secret back to store in a cookie? to use in future requests. This is introducing state to the API however.
To throw another spanner into the works, I'd like to be able to restrict the API to certain applications (or, to be able to block certain apps from using the API). I can't see how this would be possible with the web app being completely public.
I don't really want to implement OAuth. It's probably overkill for my needs.
I feel as though I might not be understanding HMAC fully, so I'd welcome an explanation and how I could implement it securely with a web app and a mobile app.
Update
I ended up using HTTP Basic Auth, however instead of providing the actual username and password every request, an endpoint was implemented to exchange the username and password for an access key which is then provided for every authenticated request. Eliminates the problem of storing the username and password in the browser, but of course you could still fish out the token if you had access to the machine and use it. In hindsight, I would probably have looked at OAuth further, but it's pretty complicated for beginners.
You should use OAuth2. Here is how:
1) Mobile App
The mobile app store client credentials as you state yourself. It then uses "Resource Owner Password Credentials Grant" (see https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-4.3) to send those credentials. In turn it gets a (bearer) token it can use in the following requests.
2) Web site
The website uses "Authorization Code Grant" (see https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-4.1):
Website sees unauthorized request and redirects browser to HTML-enabled autorization endpoint in the REST api.
User authenticates with REST service
REST site redirects user back to website with access token in URL.
Website calls REST site and swaps access token to authorization token.
Here after the website uses the authorization token for accessing the REST service (on behalf of the end-user) - usually by including the token as a "bearer" token in the HTTP Authorization header.
It is not rocket science but it does take some time to understand completely.
3) Restricting API access for certain applications
In OAuth2 each client is issued a client ID and client secret (here "client" is your mobile app or website). The client must send these credentials when authorizing. Your REST service can use this to validate the calling client
I resolved this for my own API quite easily and securely without the need to expose any client credentials.
I also split the problem into 2 parts. API authentication - is this a valid request from a recognised entity (website or native app). API authorisation, is that entity allowed to use this particular endpoint and HTTP verb.
Authorisation is coded into the API using an access control list and user permissions and settings that are set up within the API code, configuration and database as required. A simple if statement in the API can test for authorisation and return the appropriate response (not authorised or the results of processing the API call).
Authentication is now just about checking to see if the call is genuine. To do this I issue self signed certificates to clients. A call to the API is made from their server whenever they want - typically when they generate their first page (or when they are performing their own app login checks). This call uses the certificates I have previously provided. If on my side I am happy the certificate is valid I can return a nonce and a time limited generated API key. This key is used in all subsequent calls to other API endpoints, in the bearer header for example, and it can be stored quite openly in an HTML form field or javascript variable or a variable within an app.
The nonce will prevent replay attacks and the API key can be stolen if someone wants - they will not be able to continue using after it expires or if the nonce changes before they make the next call.
Each API response will contain the next nonce of if the nonce doesn't match it will return an authentication error. In fact of the nonce doesn't match I kill the API key too. This will then force a genuine API user to reauthenticate using the certificates.
As long as the end user keeps those certificates safe and doesn't expose the method they use to make the initial authentication call (like making it an ajax request that can be replayed) then the API's are nice and secure.
One way of addressing the issue of user authentication to the API is by requesting an authentication token from the API when the user logs in. This token can then be used for subsequent requests. You've already touched on this approach - it's pretty sound.
With respect to restricting certain web apps. You'll want to have each web app identify itself with each request and have this authentication carried out inside your API implementation. Pretty straight forward.