I am authenticating the client using gRPC's client-side SSL/TLS. How do I find out on the server side which user it is?
Use context->Auth_Context()->FindPropertyValues("x509_pem_cert") in C++ to get the peer's (client's) certificate and the client id (SAN?) in the cert.
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If Tomcat is set up for SSL mutual authentication you can get the client javax.servlet.request.X509Certificate from the servlet request.
In the server app I need a key to encrypt a file.
Is it a good idea to use a part of the Client X509Certificate, e.g. the SubjectPublicKeyInfo as encryption key?
The client Certificate should be as secret as any password, shouldn't it?
(this question has Java API example, but is not Java specific)
I'm working on an authentication method for my NodeJS API.
I'm using TLS certificates to verify the client connected to my API server.
My question is: can we have a way to authenticate the response back to the client? Can we use cert for this to(server to client)?
eg: When we call an API from our client we send the certificate with the request which is authenticated and if found valid the server sends the response, can we do it vice-versa, send a certificate in response and have the client validate the certificate.
The whole TLS protocol and the certificates are already built around this idea that you trust the server. I.e. the server during establishing of TLS connection provides a certificate that client can verify by checking if it trusts the CA that has issued the certificate.
Now while this is generally so, you can have libraries that allows to bypass this by not checking the certificate or checking but proceeding anyway, so you have to double check that is not the case. The browser does this automatically.
If you click on a green "Secure" button that is to the left in URL in Chrome e.g. you can click on "certificate" there and see the certificate that is provided by the server. If it's green, then it's trusted and all's good.
P.S. Neither the client not server sends the certificate the whole time back and forth with each request/response. They do it only once during establishing the connection that is called TLS handshake. It's relatively expensive process so you'd better keep the connection.
I have the following setup:
A self signed certificate for development purposes
An OWIN hosted Web API, deployed on a local Azure Service Fabric Cluster as a ASF service. The Web API uses HTTPS facilitated with the dev certificate in question.
A simple .net client application that calls the Web API. In that application the ServicePointManager.ServerCertificateValidationCallback method is set so it always returns true (since the CA is not trusted)
Both the client application and the Web API are on the same local development machine. The certificate is installed in that same machine on the "machine store"
Now I am able to make calls to the web api using Fiddler by providing the required client certificate. However when I try to do the same via .net code (be it RestSharp or WebRequest) the client certificate is not present in the RequestContext object on the server side. This result in an Unauthorized response. I do not think the problem is with the client code, the certificate is loaded correctly and assigned to the http client or request. Fiddler shows encrypted tunneling to the server. However the client certificate does not seem to be present at the server side.
I am at a complete loss regarding what am I missing that could cause this behavior. Any help will be deeply appreciated.
Install the certificate into the 'Local Machine/Trusted People'.
The server needs to already trust the certificate before it asks. The CertificateRequest message that it sends lists the acceptable CAs that can sign the client certificate. If the client certificate's signer isn't in that message, it can't send it.
How you accomplish that in your environment is left as an exercise for the reader. In general now that SSL certificates are available free there is little reason to indulge in the time costs and administrative inconveniences of self-signed certificates. IMHO there wasn't even if you were paying for a CA signature.
I had a problem when a service called another service over HTTPS and it couldn't setup a secure connection. My problem was that since the service is running as NETWORK SERVICE, it couldn't find the certificate, because it was looking in the localmachine/my certificate store.
When I was running from my web browser it was working fine because then, my browser found the certificate in the currectuser/my certificate store.
Add the certificate to the machine/my store and see if it helps.
I am writing a windows store app with Windows::Web::Http namespace, and I am trying to find a way to get the list of accepted client certificate issuer from server if server requires client certificate.
Same as WINHTTP_OPTION_CLIENT_CERT_ISSUER_LIST when you call WinHttpQueryOption(), which is not supported in store app...
As I know, there is no way to get server acceptable client certificate list in client side through Windows::Http namespace, and the way I use is to use openssl to handle the client cert callback with calling SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb().
I am somewhat confused as to how two-way SSL works. How does the client create its certificate to send to the server? Is it generated from the server and distributed to the client?
Also, what is the advantage of two-way SSL over one-way SSL?
Both certificates should exist prior to the connection. They're usually created by Certification Authorities (not necessarily the same). (There are alternative cases where verification can be done differently, but some verification will need to be made.)
The server certificate should be created by a CA that the client trusts (and following the naming conventions defined in RFC 6125).
The client certificate should be created by a CA that the server trusts.
It's up to each party to choose what it trusts.
There are online CA tools that will allow you to apply for a certificate within your browser and get it installed there once the CA has issued it. They need not be on the server that requests client-certificate authentication.
The certificate distribution and trust management is the role of the Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), implemented via the CAs. The SSL/TLS client and servers and then merely users of that PKI.
When the client connects to a server that requests client-certificate authentication, the server sends a list of CAs it's willing to accept as part of the client-certificate request. The client is then able to send its client certificate, if it wishes to and a suitable one is available.
The main advantages of client-certificate authentication are:
The private information (the private key) is never sent to the server. The client doesn't let its secret out at all during the authentication.
A server that doesn't know a user with that certificate can still authenticate that user, provided it trusts the CA that issued the certificate (and that the certificate is valid). This is very similar to the way passports are used: you may have never met a person showing you a passport, but because you trust the issuing authority, you're able to link the identity to the person.
You may be interested in Advantages of client certificates for client authentication? (on Security.SE).
What you call "Two-Way SSL" is usually called TLS/SSL with client certificate authentication.
In a "normal" TLS connection to example.com only the client verifies that it is indeed communicating with the server for example.com. The server doesn't know who the client is. If the server wants to authenticate the client the usual thing is to use passwords, so a client needs to send a user name and password to the server, but this happens inside the TLS connection as part of an inner protocol (e.g. HTTP) it's not part of the TLS protocol itself. The disadvantage is that you need a separate password for every site because you send the password to the server. So if you use the same password on for example PayPal and MyPonyForum then every time you log into MyPonyForum you send this password to the server of MyPonyForum so the operator of this server could intercept it and try it on PayPal and can issue payments in your name.
Client certificate authentication offers another way to authenticate the client in a TLS connection. In contrast to password login, client certificate authentication is specified as part of the TLS protocol. It works analogous to the way the client authenticates the server: The client generates a public private key pair and submits the public key to a trusted CA for signing. The CA returns a client certificate that can be used to authenticate the client. The client can now use the same certificate to authenticate to different servers (i.e. you could use the same certificate for PayPal and MyPonyForum without risking that it can be abused). The way it works is that after the server has sent its certificate it asks the client to provide a certificate too. Then some public key magic happens (if you want to know the details read RFC 5246) and now the client knows it communicates with the right server, the server knows it communicates with the right client and both have some common key material to encrypt and verify the connection.
In two way ssl the client asks for servers digital certificate and server ask for the same from the client. It is more secured as it is both ways, although its bit slow. Generally we dont follow it as the server doesnt care about the identity of the client, but a client needs to make sure about the integrity of server it is connecting to.