Agents on Author Dialog Options in AEM - replication

I am not able to understand that what is the use case when we can use NTLM Domain,
NTLM Host, SSL,Allow expired certs been used.
Any help will be appreciated.

NTLM is Microsoft's implementation of the Kerberos protocol. It is used when the author and publishers have one or more of following conditions valid:
Not on same Windows domain.
Don't share a common AD provider.
Kerberos ports (for eg. 88) is blocked.
Windows server is being accessed via IP address rather than it's host name.
NTLM is a challenge-response protocol so these NTLM host and domain names are parameters used by the protocol to identify the client (which is author server in this case) along with the user name and password.
In reality, you will never use it in a Linux environment and rarely use it in modern Windows network as you have better AD security options (like trusted domains and subnets).
SSL options are there as a workaround in situations where your publisher's HTTPS certificate has expired and you want to continue with replication. Assuming that you own the publisher server in your network, it is very likely that you will trust the publisher server's identity and ignore expired certificated until you renew them. You can also relax the SSL rules so that lower level of encryption and self signed certificates are allowed. It's normally ok for trusted networks but not recommended in general.

Related

What's the easiest security mode for implementation in WCF?

What's the easiest security mode for implementation in WCF when:
Both client and service are .NET applications.
Client and service are negotiating over internet.
SSL in not available.
Port 80 (web) is preferred for communication.
And Using a x 509 certificate should be the last option (same credentials in configuration file at both sides is preferred, if possible)
Security means a lot of things:
Authentication
Authorization
Confidentiality
Integrity
To name a few. You need to decide what are your requirements for each.
Since SSL is not available you must use message level security. But assuming machines do not necessarily live on the same windows domain you cannot use windows authentication and must use x.509 certificate, at least on the serve side. So:
<customBinding authenticationMode="usernameForCertificate" />
where the client authenticates with a username and the server with a certificate (client need to install this certificate).
You could also use a WSHttpBinding with all default settings except:
messageClientCredentialType=UserName
In which case client does not need to install the certificate, it gets it automatically in runtime via negotiation.
Both client and service are .NET applications.
Take a look here http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/ee707353(v=vs.91).aspx

How can a process authenticate and communicate securely with another process on the same host

I was trying to do this with Java RMI over SSL, but later I discovered that SSL certificates will provide host level authentication and NOT process level authentication.
Also, I was storing the keystore's password in configuration; so the certificates can be used by another attacker process and it can get authenticate.
An X.509 certificate used for SSL/TLS could potentially be used to identify something else than a host name (this is already typically done for client certificates).
There are two types of verification involved when establishing an SSL/TLS connection to a server:
The certificate verification itself: this verifies that the certificate is trusted and valid for the required purpose at the time of use, usually with a PKI as described in RFC 3280/RFC 5280.
The host name verification: once it trusts the certificate to be genuine, the client checks that it's for the server it was looking for. This is protocol specific (e.g. RFC 2818, Section 3.1 for HTTPS), but has been generalised for most protocols in RFC 6125. (This is similar to checking that the picture on a passport matches the name in front of you, instead of just accepting any valid passport.)
By default, Java's SSLSockets don't perform the second step unless you add something to do it. (In Java 7, some new SSL parameters allow you to do so within the trust manager, but only for specific protocols.)
What you'd need is to find a way to define how you want to identify your other applications and processes, using something else than the host name, issues certificates with these naming conventions, and have your client application check this.
You should be able to implement your own identity verification mechanism within anSSLSocketFactory, before returning the sockets in each method, an use that factory for your RMI application, as described here: https://blogs.oracle.com/lmalventosa/entry/using_the_ssl_tls_based1

Is it safe to use HTTPS without SSL certificates for my own domains?

I'd like to run some encrypted connections between some of my own servers. One can use Curl (or some other mechanism) to connect using HTTPS without SSL certificate verification. I'm using PHP, but the language probably isn't significant for this question.
I'm assuming using HTTPS without a SSL certificate is atleast more secure than doing the exact same connection over plain HTTP, since atleast it's encrypted and an evildoer would have to make a much larger effort to intercept en decrypt the information.
As far as I know an SSL certificate only says "this trusted third party says the server you connect to is owned by the guys that claim to own it". If I connect using my own domainname or IP address, I know I'm the owner. What additional value does an SSL certificate provide if I'm the owner of both ends of a connection?
Not verifying the identity of the server you connect to leaves the connection open to potential MITM attacks. SSL/TLS can be used without certificates (with anonymous cipher suites), but they're insecure (and disabled by default); as the TLS RFC says: "Note that this mode is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks and is therefore deprecated."
In addition, the HTTPS specification itself expects there to be an X.509 certificate.
Checking the identity of the remote party is a necessary element for securing your system. It's not very useful to exchange data secretly with a remote party who may not be who they claim they are (even if the secrecy is guaranteed).
This being said, you don't have to go via a commercial CA. You can either use self-signed certificates, which you would have to import individually into each client as trusted certificate, or create your own institutional CA. There are tools to do this, ranging from OpenSSL's CA.pl (see man-page), TinyCA or OpenCA amongst others. Some operating systems also provide their own small CA capabilities.
If I connect using my own domainname or IP address, I know I'm the
owner. What additional value does an SSL certificate provide if I'm
the owner of both ends of a connection?
The certificate assures you that you're indeed connecting to your machine and that the traffic hasn't been intercepted. That's why you need to check that it's a certificate that you recognise.
SSL certificates are more for the piece of mind of your customers or those using your site. In either case, the data is being transmitted over the same connections - it's just a matter of whether or not a third party is certifying you as being safe.
At my last job, we did all of our internal data transfers at my last job via https/ftps but did not have an SSL certificate until very recently. Since the data transfers were internal, it made no difference.

SSL client cert authentication for only some URLs?

If I authenticate my clients using SSL client certs, is that necessarily a site-wide filter, or can I either require or not require authentication per-URL from within an application? So I'd like
https://mysite.com/my_url doesn't care who the client is, just uses 'normal' https
https://mysite.com/my_sensitive_url requires that the client is using a valid client cert
I'm working in Ruby on Rails, but I'm interested in the general question of whether SSL client cert authentication is flexible enough for this. I can imagine that a hand-written apache conf with different settings for different URLs could probably do it, but I'd really much rather define this kind of thing at the application level.
You would (a) set the server to do authentication via SSL certificates; (b) set the server to to 'want' rather than 'need' SSL client authentication, and then (c) define access rules for the specific URLs or patterns that required the user to be logged in, and not for the others.

Difference between SSL and Kerberos authentication?

I am trying to understand what's the actual difference between SSL and Kerberos authentications, and why sometimes I have both SSL traffic and Kerberos.
Or does Kerberos use SSL in any way?
Anyone could help?
Thank you!
SSL uses public key cryptography:
You (or your browser) has a public/private keypair
The server has a public/private key as well
You generate a symmetric session key
You encrypt with the server's public key and send this encrypted session key to the server.
The server decrypts the encrypted session key with its private key.
You and the server begin communicating using the symmetric session key (basically because symmetric keys are faster).
Kerberos does not use public key cryptography. It uses a trusted 3rd party. Here's a sketch:
You both (server and client) prove your identity to a trusted 3rd party (via a secret).
When you want to use the server, you check and see that the server is trustworthy. Meanwhile, the server checks to see that you are trustworthy. Now, mutually assured of each others' identity. You can communicate with the server.
2
While Kerberos and SSL are both protocols, Kerberos is an authentication protocol, but SSL is an encryption protocol. Kerberos usually uses UDP, SSL uses (most of the time) TCP. SSL authentication is usually done by checking the server's and the client's RSA or ECDSA keys embedded in something called X.509 certificates. You're authenticated by your certificate and the corresponding key. With Kerberos, you can be authenticated by your password, or some other way. Windows uses Kerberos for example, when used in domain.
Keep in mind: Recent versions of SSL are called TLS for Transport Layer Security.
To put simply, Kerberos is a protocol for establishing mutual identity trust, or authentication, for a client and a server, via a trusted third-party, whereas SSL ensures authentication of the server alone, and only if its public key has already been established as trustworthy via another channel. Both provides secure communication between the server and client.
More formally (but without getting into mathematical proofs), given a client C, server S, and a third-party T which both C and S trust:
After Kerbeos authentication, it is established that:
C believes S is who it intended to contact
S believes C is who it claims to be
C believes that it has a secure connection to S
C believes that S believes it has a secure connection to C
S believes that it has a secure connection to C
S believes that C believes it has a secure connection to S
SSL, on the other hand, only establishes that:
C believes S is who it intended to contact
C believes it has a secure connection to S
S believes it has a secure connection to C
Clearly, Kerberos establishes a stronger, more complete trust relationship.
Additionally, to establish the identity of S over SSL, C needs prior knowledge about S, or an external way to confirm this trust. For most people's everyday use, this comes in the form of Root Certificates, and caching of S's certificate for cross-referencing in the future.
Without this prior knowledge, SSL is susceptible to man-in-the-middle attack, where a third-party is able to pretend to be S to C by relaying communication between them using 2 separate secure channels to C and S. To compromise a Kerberos authentication, the eavesdropper must masquerade as T to both S and C. Note, however, that the set of trusts is still unbroken according to the goal of Kerberos, as the end-state is still correct according to the precondition "C and S trusts T".
Finally, as it has been pointed out in a comment, Kerberos can be and has been extended to use SSL-like mechanism for establishing the initial secure connection between C and T.
In short:
Kerberos usually does not encrypt transferring data, but SSL and TLS do.
"there are no standard APIs for accessing these messages. As of
Windows Vista, Microsoft does not provide a mechanism for user
applications to produce KRB_PRIV or KRB_SAFE messages." - from
http://www.kerberos.org/software/appskerberos.pdf
In opposite, SSL and TLS usually do not transfer and proof Yours Windows domain login name to the server, but Kerberos does.
A short answer: SSL and Kerberos both use encryption but SSL uses a key that is unchanged during a session while Kerberos uses several keys for encrypting the communication between a client and a client.
In SSL, encryption is dealt with directly by the two ends of communication while in Kerberos, the encryption key is provided by a third party - some kind of intermediate - between the client and the server.
From http://web.mit.edu/kerberos/:
Kerberos was created by MIT as a solution to these network security problems. The Kerberos protocol uses strong cryptography so that a client can prove its identity to a server (and vice versa) across an insecure network connection. After a client and server has used Kerberos to prove their identity, they can also encrypt all of their communications to assure privacy and data integrity as they go about their business.
Meanwhile:
SSL is used for establishing server<-->server authentication via public key encryption.
From https://www.eldos.com/security/articles/7240.php?page=all,
Kerberos and TLS are not the things to compare. Their have different objectives and different methods. In the beginning of our article we mentioned the frequently asked questions like “which is better” and “what to choose”. The former is not a question at all: nothing is better and everything is good if you use it in a right way. The latter question is worth a serious consideration: what to choose depends on what you have and what you want.
If you want to secure your communications in a sense that nobody can read it or tamper it, perhaps the right choice is to use TLS or some other protocols based on it. A good example of TLS usage for securing World Wide Web traffic carried by HTTP is to use HTTPS. For secure file transferring you may use FTPS, and take into account that SMTP (though it stands for a “simple” mail transfer protocol, not “secure”) is also may be protected with TLS.
On the other hand, if you need to manage user access to services, you may want to use Kerberos. Imagine, for example, that you have several servers like Web server, FTP, SMTP and SQL servers, and optionally something else, everything on one host. Some clients are allowed to use SMTP and HTTP, but not allowed to use FTP, others may use FTP but don’t have access to your databases. This is exactly the situation when Kerberos is coming to use, you just have to describe user rights and your administrative policy in Authentication Server.
SSL authentication uses certifiactes to verify youself to server whereas Kerberos works entirely different.
SSL can be imported manually and added as per configurations in client and host manually.
Whereas kerberos is authentication where no password are transmitted over network. Here kerberos KDC server doesn't need to communicate with any service or host to verify the client. Client uses principle stored in kerberos to communicate with kerberos server. In return kerberos server provides ticket using keytab of other server stored beforehand. In the other server, the client provides the ticket and services matches the ticket with their own keytab and verify the client.
Simply put,
SSL is to encrypt the data so that the data cannot be understood by someone who is trying to steal it out in the network.
Kerberos is a network authentication protocol which helps in authenticating a client to talk to server without sharing any password/token during the time of the request.