I want to understand why its not possible to inject sql statements in the form POST parameters. I tried it with sqlmap and manually without success.
There is a defined function:
function mysql_get_result($sQuery, $hSocket) //$sQuery: mysql query,
$hSocket:MySQLSocket(mysql_connect).
{
$sResource = mysql_query($sQuery, $hSocket);
list($sValue) = mysql_fetch_row($sResource);
return $sValue;
}
and there is the actual query for the POST parameter:
(mysql_get_result("SELECT place FROM towns
WHERE place = '".$sR_place."' AND num = '".$iR_num."'", $hMySQLSocket)
== $sR_place and $sR_place != '')
No input sanitiazion at all. So why isnt it working ? Does sql injection only work when its mysql_query function without more steps to do?
Your code should vulnerable to SQL injection, since you're not sanitizing with mysql_real_escape_string, or parameterizing the query.
You should try revising your POST parameters, because the issue is most likely that your attack isn't properly formatted. Try a variety of attacks.
Related
I have something like this, using Akka, Alpakka + Slick
Slick
.source(
sql"""select #${onlyTheseColumns.mkString(",")} from #${dbSource.table}"""
.as[Map[String, String]]
.withStatementParameters(rsType = ResultSetType.ForwardOnly, rsConcurrency = ResultSetConcurrency.ReadOnly, fetchSize = batchSize)
.transactionally
).map( doSomething )...
I want to update this plain sql query with skipping the first N-th element.
But that is very DB specific.
Is is possible to get the pagination bit generated by Slick? [like for type-safe queries one just do a drop, filter, take?]
ps: I don't have the Schema, so I cannot go the type-safe way, just want all tables as Map, filter, drop etc on them.
ps2: at akka level, the flow.drop works, but it's not optimal/slow, coz it still consumes the rows.
Cheers
Since you are using the plain SQL, you have to provide a workable SQL in code snippet. Plain SQL may not type-safe, but agile.
BTW, the most optimal way is to skip N-th element by Database, such as limit in mysql.
depending on your database engine, you could use something like
val page = 1
val pageSize = 10
val query = sql"""
select #${onlyTheseColumns.mkString(",")}
from #${dbSource.table}
limit #${pageSize + 1}
offset #${pageSize * (page - 1)}
"""
the pageSize+1 part tells you whether the next page exists
I want to update this plain sql query with skipping the first N-th element. But that is very DB specific.
As you're concerned about changing the SQL for different databases, I suggest you abstract away that part of the SQL and decide what to do based on the Slick profile being used.
If you are working with multiple database product, you've probably already abstracted away from any specific profile, perhaps using JdbcProfile. In that case you could place your "skip N elements" helper in a class and use the active slickProfile to decide on the SQL to use. (As an alternative you could of course check via some other means, such as an environment value you set).
In practice that could be something like this:
case class Paginate(profile: slick.jdbc.JdbcProfile) {
// Return the correct LIMIT/OFFSET SQL for the current Slick profile
def page(size: Int, firstRow: Int): String =
if (profile.isInstanceOf[slick.jdbc.H2Profile]) {
s"LIMIT $size OFFSET $firstRow"
} else if (profile.isInstanceOf[slick.jdbc.MySQLProfile]) {
s"LIMIT $firstRow, $size"
} else {
// And so on... or a default
// Danger: I've no idea if the above SQL is correct - it's just placeholder
???
}
}
Which you could use as:
// Import your profile
import slick.jdbc.H2Profile.api._
val paginate = Paginate(slickProfile)
val action: DBIO[Seq[Int]] =
sql""" SELECT cols FROM table #${paginate.page(100, 10)}""".as[Int]
In this way, you get to isolate (and control) RDBMS-specific SQL in one place.
To make the helper more usable, and as slickProfile is implicit, you could instead write:
def page(size: Int, firstRow: Int)(implicit profile: slick.jdbc.JdbcProfile) =
// Logic for deciding on SQL goes here
I feel obliged to comment that using a splice (#$) in plain SQL opens you to SQL injection attacks if any of the values are provided by a user.
I'm using squeel gem in my project, and I have code something like this :
def self.search(query)
return self.scoped if query.blank?
self.joins(:supplier).where{lower(supplier.supplier_name).like_any(["%#{query}%"])}
end
My questions is this code vulnerable to SQL injection? And how do I fix it? I tried to do sanitize(query) but it just adds extra set of quotes and the SQL statement doesn't get generated appropriately
UPDATED:
Squeel will automatically escape strings, so your query is fine and won't open you up to injection. See question about sql injection - Squeel - Github
OLD (INCORRECT) ANSWER:
This is the active record version
Someone correct me if i'm wrong, but since you are passing in #{query} as a STRING and not an argument, then you are opening yourself up to injection. See the docs for passing in arguments
Using arguments will escape the 'query' STRING
Your query using arguments:
self.joins(:supplier).where{lower(supplier.supplier_name).like_any(["%"+?+"%"], query)}
I am trying to avoid a sql injection. This topic has been dealt with in Java (How to prevent query injection on Google Big Query) and Php.
How is this accomplished in App Scripts? I did not find how to add a parameter to a SQL statement. Here is what I had hoped to do:
var sql = 'SELECT [row],etext,ftext FROM [hcd.hdctext] WHERE (REGEXP_MATCH(etext, esearch = ?) AND REGEXP_MATCH(ftext, fsearch = ?));';
var queryResults;
var resource = {
query: sql,
timeoutMs: 1000,
esearch='r"[^a-zA-z]comfortable"',
fsearch='r"[a-z,A-z]confortable"'
};
queryResults = BigQuery.Jobs.query(resource,projectNumber);
And then have esearch and fsearch filled in with the values (which could be set elsewhere).
That does not work, according to the doc.
Any suggestions on how to get a parameter in an SQL query? (I could not find a setString function...)
Thanks!
Unfortunately, BigQuery doesn't support this type of parameter substitution. It is on our list of features to consider, and I'll bump the priority since it seems like this is a common request.
The only suggestion that I can make in the mean time is that if you are building query strings by hand, you will need to make sure you escape them carefully (which is a non-trivial operation).
If I were retrieving the data I wanted from a plain sql query, the following would suffice:
select * from stvterm where stvterm_code > TT_STUDENT.STU_GENERAL.F_Get_Current_term()
I have a grails domain set up correctly for this table, and I can run the following code successfully:
def a = SaturnStvterm.findAll("from SaturnStvterm as s where id > 201797") as JSON
a.render(response)
return false
In other words, I can hardcode in the results from the Oracle function and have the HQL run correctly, but it chokes any way that I can figure to try it with the function. I have read through some of the documentation on Hibernate about using procs and functions, but I'm having trouble making much sense of it. Can anyone give me a hint as to the proper way to handle this?
Also, since I think it is probably relevant, there aren't any synonyms in place that would allow the function to be called without qualifying it as schema.package.function(). I'm sure that'll make things more difficult. This is all for Grails 1.3.7, though I could use a later version if needed.
To call a function in HQL, the SQL dialect must be aware of it. You can add your function at runtime in BootStrap.groovy like this:
import org.hibernate.dialect.function.SQLFunctionTemplate
import org.hibernate.Hibernate
def dialect = applicationContext.sessionFactory.dialect
def getCurrentTerm = new SQLFunctionTemplate(Hibernate.INTEGER, "TT_STUDENT.STU_GENERAL.F_Get_Current_term()")
dialect.registerFunction('F_Get_Current_term', getCurrentTerm)
Once registered, you should be able to call the function in your queries:
def a = SaturnStvterm.findAll("from SaturnStvterm as s where id > TT_STUDENT.STU_GENERAL.F_Get_Current_term()")
I have this site with the following parameters:
http://www.example.com.com/pagination.php?page=4&order=comment_time&sc=desc
I use the values of each of the parameters as a value in a SQL query.
I am trying to test my application and ultimately hack my own application for learning purposes.
I'm trying to inject this statement:
http://www.example.com.com/pagination.php?page=4&order=comment_time&sc=desc' or 1=1 --
But It fails, and MySQL says this:
Warning: mysql_fetch_assoc() expects parameter 1 to be resource,
boolean given in /home/dir/public_html/pagination.php on line 132
Is my application completely free from SQL injection, or is it still possible?
EDIT: Is it possible for me to find a valid sql injection statement to input into one of the parameters of the URL?
The application secured from sql injection never produces invalid queries.
So obviously you still have some issues.
Well-written application for any input produces valid and expected output.
That's completely vulnerable, and the fact that you can cause a syntax error proves it.
There is no function to escape column names or order by directions. Those functions do not exist because it is bad style to expose the DB logic directly in the URL, because it makes the URLs dependent on changes to your database logic.
I'd suggest something like an array mapping the "order" parameter values to column names:
$order_cols = array(
'time' => 'comment_time',
'popular' => 'comment_score',
... and so on ...
);
if (!isset($order_cols[$_GET['order'])) {
$_GET['order'] = 'time';
}
$order = $order_cols[$_GET['order']];
Restrict "sc" manually:
if ($_GET['sc'] == 'asc' || $_GET['sc'] == 'desc') {
$order .= ' ' . $_GET['sc'];
} else {
$order .= ' desc';
}
Then you're guaranteed safe to append that to the query, and the URL is not tied to the DB implementation.
I'm not 100% certain, but I'd say it still seems vulnerable to me -- the fact that it's accepting the single-quote (') as a delimiter and then generating an error off the subsequent injected code says to me that it's passing things it shouldn't on to MySQL.
Any data that could possibly be taken from somewhere other than your application itself should go through mysql_real_escape_string() first. This way the whole ' or 1=1 part gets passed as a value to MySQL... unless you're passing "sc" straight through for the sort order, such as
$sql = "SELECT * FROM foo WHERE page='{$_REQUEST['page']}' ORDER BY data {$_REQUEST['sc']}";
... which you also shouldn't be doing. Try something along these lines:
$page = mysql_real_escape_string($_REQUEST['page']);
if ($_REQUEST['sc'] == "desc")
$sortorder = "DESC";
else
$sortorder = "ASC";
$sql = "SELECT * FROM foo WHERE page='{$page}' ORDER BY data {$sortorder}";
I still couldn't say it's TOTALLY injection-proof, but it's definitely more robust.
I am assuming that your generated query does something like
select <some number of fields>
from <some table>
where sc=desc
order by comment_time
Now, if I were to attack the order by statement instead of the WHERE, I might be able to get some results... Imagine I added the following
comment_time; select top 5 * from sysobjects
the query being returned to your front end would be the top 5 rows from sysobjects, rather than the query you try to generated (depending a lot on the front end)...
It really depends on how PHP validates those arguments. If MySQL is giving you a warning, it means that a hacker already passes through your first line of defence, which is your PHP script.
Use if(!preg_match('/^regex_pattern$/', $your_input)) to filter all your inputs before passing them to MySQL.