I'm designing a software that manages configuration file at application layer in embedded Linux.
Generally, it maintains two copies of the configuration file, one in RAM and one in flash memory. As soon as end-users update setting(s) by UI, the software saves it to the file in RAM, and then copy-paste it to the file in flash memory.
This scheme makes sure best stability in that the software reflects reality at the next second. However, the scheme compromises longevity to flash memory by accessing it every time.
As to longevity issue, I've thought about it by having a dedicated program doing this housekeeping, and adds this program to crontab then let it run like every 30 mins.
(Note: flash memory wears off only during erase cycles; the program only does housekeeping if the both files are not the same.)
But if the file in RAM is waiting for the program to do housekeeping and system shuts down unexpectedly, the file will lose.
So I'm thinking is there a way to have both longevity and not losing file at the same time? Or am I missing something?
There are many different reasons why flash can get corrupted: data retention over time, erase/write failures which are primarily caused by erase/write cycle wear, clock inaccuracies, read disturb in case of NAND flash, and even less likely errors sources such as cosmic rays or EMI. But also as in your case, algorithmic layer problems such as a flash erase/write getting interrupted by power loss or reset caused by EMI.
Similarly, there are many ways to deal with these various problems.
CRC16 or CRC32 depending on flash size is the classic way to deal with pretty much all possible flash errors, particularly with data retention since it most often manifests itself as single-bit errors, which CRC is great at discovering. It should ideally be designed so that the checksum is placed at the end of each erase-size segment. Or in case erase-size is very small (emulated eeprom/data flash etc), maybe a single CRC32 at the end of all data. Modern MCUs often have a CRC hardware peripheral which might be helpful.
Optionally you can let the CRC algorithm repair single bit errors, though this practice is often banned in high integrity systems.
ECC is used on NAND flash or in high integrity systems. Traditionally done through software (which is quite cumbersome), but lately also available through built-in hardware support, particularly on the "safety/chassis" kind of automotive microcontrollers. If you wish to use ECC then I highly recommend picking a part with such built-in support, then it can be used to replace manual CRC (which is somewhat painful to deal with real-time wise).
These parts with hardware ECC may also support a feature with an area where you can write down variables to have the hardware handle writing them to flash in the background, kind of similar to DMA.
Using the flash segment as FIFO. When storing reasonably small amounts of data in memory with large erase sizes, you can save flash erase/write cycles by only erasing the whole segment once, after which it will likely be set to "all ones" 0xFFFF... When writing, you look for the last available chunk of memory which is "all ones" and write there, even though the same data was previously written just before it. And when reading, you fetch the last written chunk before "all ones". Only when the whole erase size is used up do you perform an erase and start over from the beginning - data needs to be stored in RAM during this.
I strongly recommend picking a part with decent data flash though, meaning small erase sizes - so that you don't need to resort to hacks like this.
Mirror segments where all memory is stored as duplicates in two separate segments is mandatory practice for high integrity systems, though this can also be used to prevent corruption during power loss/unexpected resets and of course flash corruption in general. The idea is to always have at least one segment of intact data at all times, and optionally repair a corrupt one by overwriting it with the correct one at start-up. Also meaning that one segment must be verified to be correct and complete before writing to the next.
Keep the product cool. This is a hardware solution obviously, but data retention in particular is heavily affected by ambient temperature. The manufacturer normally guarantees some 15-20 years or so up to 85°C, but that might mean 100 years if you keep it at <25°C. As in, whenever possible, avoid mounting your MCU PCB near exhausts, oil coolers, hydraulics, heating elements etc etc.
Mirror segments in combination with CRC and/or ECC is likely the solution you are looking for here. Again, I strongly recommend to pick a MCU with dedicated data flash, meaning small erase segments and often far more erase/write cycles, ideally >100k.
I'm required to do a code verification using CRC. In this case, all I do is pass every byte found flash memory through an algorithm to calculate the CRC and compare the result to a predefined CRC value.
However, I'm hung up on the idea that the flash memory might change at some point, causing the CRC verification to fail.
Assuming that the code isn't touched again whatsoever, is it possible that flash memory will change during execution? If so, what can cause it to change? And how do I avoid said change?
Flash memory only means it retains its content in the absence of power; flash memory is definitely erasable / reprogrammable. The separate term Read-Only-Memory (ROM) means it cannot be altered after the initial write.
But memory doesn't change unless a CPU instruction touches it or it degrades or is affected by external factors. Flash memory contents might last ten years unperturbed. Usually it is the number of read/write cycles that degrade flash memory before age does. High static electrical charges could corrupt flash but magnetic fields should have little effect.
If you have any influence over the hardware specs, ROM should be considered if that is the primary intent; it has several advantages over flash for this purpose.
Lastly, you note that you will pass "every byte" of memory through your CRC algorithm. If the correct checksum is to be stored within the same memory medium, you have a recursive problem of trying to precompute a checksum that contains it's own checksum. In most cases, the valid checksum should be located in some segment of the memory that is not itself subjected to the scan.
In any event if it were to change spontaneously that is exactly what your code verification is intended to catch and you would want and expect the CRC to fail, so there is no problem - it is doing its job
It is mostly not a matter of spontaneously changing, but rather one of not being written correctly in the first instance, or possibly protecting against malicious or accidental tampering. If part of the flash is used for variable non-volatile storage, you would obviously not include that area in your CRC. If you are partitioning the same flash into code space and NV storage, potentially errors in the NV storage code could inadvertently modify the code space, so your CRC protects against that and also external tampering (via JTAG for example).
Flash memory is subject to erase/write cycle endurance, and after a number of cycles some bits may stick "high". Endurance varies between parts from around 10000 to 100000, and is seldom a problem for code storage. Flash memory also has a nominal data retention time; this is normally quoted at 10 years; but that is worst-case extreme condition rating - again your CRC guards against these effects.
I am wondering if I should be worried about excessive writes to the embedded controller registers on my laptop. I am guessing that if they are true registers, they probably act more like RAM rather than flash memory so this isn't a problem.
However, I have a script to modify the registers in my laptop's EC to better control the fan speed curve. It has to be re-applied after each power change event such as sleep/wake as well as power cable events, so it happens fairly often. I just want to make sure I am not burning out my chips in the process.
The script I am using to write to the EC is located here:
https://github.com/RayfenWindspear/perl-acpi-fanspeed
Well, it seems you're writing to ACPI registers. Registers here do not refer to any specific hardware; it just means its a specific address that you can reach using a specific bus. It's however highly unlikely that something that you have to re-write after every power cycle is overwriting permanent storage, so for all practical aspects I'd assume that you can rely on this for as long as your laptop lives.
Hardware peripherals are almost universally implemented as SRAM cells. They will not wear out first. The fan you are controlling will have a limited number of start/stop cycles. So it is much more likely that the act of toggling these registers will wear something else out prematurely (than the SRAM type memory cell itself).
To your particular case, correctly driving a fan/motor can significantly improve it's life time. Over driving a fan/motor does not always make it go faster, but instead creates heat. The heat weakens the wiring and eventually the coils will short reducing drive and eventually wearing out. That said, the element being cooled can be damaged by excess heat so tuning things just to reduce sound may not make sense.
Background details
Generally, the element is called a Flip-Flop with various forms. SystemRDL is an example as well as SystemC and others where digital engineers will model these. In digital hardware, the flip-flops have default or reset values. This is fixed like ROM on each chip and is not normally re-programmable, uses EEPROM technologyNote1 or is often configured via input lines which the hardware designer can pull them high/low with a resistor or connect them to another elements 'GPIO'.
It is analogous to 'initdata'. Program values that aren't zero get copied from flash, disk, etc to memory at program startup. So the flip-flops normally do not hold state over a power cycle; something else does this.
The 'Flash' technology is based off of a floating gate and uses 'quantum tunnelling' to program the floating gates. This process is slightly destructive. It was invented by Fowler and Nordheim in 1967, but wide spread electronics industry did not start to produce them until the early 90s with NOR flash followed by NAND flash and many variants. But the underlying physics is the same; just the digital connections are different. So as well as this defect you are concerned about, the flash technology actually followed many hardware chips such as 68k, i386, etc. So 'flip-flops' were well established and typically the 'register' part of the logic is not that great of a typical chip and a flip-flop uses the same logic (gates) as the rest of the chip logic. Meaning that using flash would be an extra overhead with little benefit.
Some additional take-away is that the startup up and shutdown of chips is usually the most destructive time. Often poor hardware designers do not put proper voltage supervision and some lines maybe floating with the expectation that system programs will set them immediately. Reset events, ESD, over heating, etc will all be more harmful than just the act of writing a peripheral register.
Note 1: EEPROM typically has 100,000+ cycles. These features are typically only used once at manufacture time to set a chip configuration for the system. These are actually quite rare, but possible.
The MLC (multi-level) NAND flash in SSD has pathetically low cycles like 8,000 in some cases. The SLC (single level) old school flash have 10,000+ cycles, but people demand large data formats.
Clarified Question:
When the OS sends the command to write a sector to disk is it atomic? i.e. Write of new data succeeds fully or old data is left intact should the power fail immediately following the write command. I don't care about what happens in multiple sector writes - torn pages are acceptable.
Old Question:
Say you have old data X on disk, you write new data Y over it, and a tree falls on the power line during that write. With no fancy UPS or battery backed disk controller, you can end up with a torn page, where the data on disk is part X and part Y. Can you ever end up with a situation where the data on disk is part X, part Y, and part garbage?
I've been trying to understand the design of ACID systems like databases, and to my naive thinking, it seems firebird, which does not use a write-ahead log, is relying that a given write will not destroy old data (X) - only fail to fully write new data (Y). That means that if part of X is being overwritten, only the part of X that is being overwritten can be changed, not the part of X we intend to keep.
To clarify, this means if you have a page sized buffer, say 4096 bytes, filled with half Y, half X that we want to keep - and we tell the OS to write that buffer over X, there is no situation short of serious disk failure where the half X that we want to keep is corrupted during the write.
The traditional (SCSI, ATA) disk protocol specifications don't guarantee that any/every sector write is atomic in the event of sudden power loss (but see below for discussion of the NVMe spec). However, it seems tacitly agreed that non-ancient "real" disks quietly try their best to offer this behaviour (e.g. Linux kernel developer Christoph Hellwig mentions this off-hand in the 2017 presentation "Failure-Atomic file updates for Linux").
When it comes to synthetic disks (e.g. network attached block devices, certain types of RAID etc.) things are less clear and they may or may not offer sector atomicity guarantees while legally behaving per their given spec. Imagine a RAID 1 array (without a journal) comprised of a disk that offers 512 byte sized sectors but where the other disk offered a 4KiB sized sector thus forcing the RAID to expose a sector size of 4KiB. As a thought experiment, you can construct a scenario where each individual disk offers sector atomicity (relative to its own sector size) but where the RAID device does not in the face of power loss. This is because it would depend on whether the 512 byte sector disk was the one being read by the RAID and how many of the 8 512-byte sectors compromising the 4KiB RAID sector it had written before the power failed.
Sometimes specifications offer atomicity guarantees but only on certain write commands. The SCSI disk spec is an example of this and the optional WRITE ATOMIC(16) command can even give a guarantee beyond a sector but being optional it's rarely implemented (and thus rarely used). The more commonly implemented COMPARE AND WRITE is also atomic (potentially across multiple sectors too) but again it's optional for a SCSI device and comes with different semantics to a plain write...
Curiously, the NVMe spec was written in such a way to guarantee sector atomicity thanks to Linux kernel developer Matthew Wilcox. Devices that are compliant with that spec have to offer a guarantee of sector write atomicity and may choose to offer contiguous multi-sector atomicity up to a specified limit (see the AWUPF field). However, it's unclear how you can discover and use any multi-sector guarantee if you aren't currently in a position to send raw NVMe commands...
Andy Rudoff is an engineer who talks about investigations he has done on the topic of write atomicity. His presentation "Protecting SW From Itself: Powerfail Atomicity for Block Writes" (slides) has a section of video where he talks about how power failure impacts in-flight writes on traditional storage. He describes how he contacted hard drive manufacturers about the statement "a disk's rotational energy is used to ensure that writes are completed in the face of power loss" but the replies were non-committal as to whether that manufacturer actually performed such an action. Further, no manufacturer would say that torn writes never happen and while he was at Sun, ZFS added checksums to blocks which led to them uncovering cases of torn writes during testing. It's not all bleak though - Andy talks about how sector tearing is rare and if a write is interrupted then you usually get only the old sector, or only the new sector, or an error (so at least corruption is not silent). Andy also has an older slide deck Write Atomicity and NVM Drive Design which collects popular claims and cautions that a lot of software (including various popular filesystems on multiple OSes) are actually unknowingly dependent on sector writes being atomic...
(The following takes a Linux centric view but many of the concepts apply to general-purpose OSes that are not being deployed in a tightly controlled hardware environments)
Going back to 2013, BtrFS lead developer Chris Mason talked about how (the now defunct) Fusion-io had created a storage product that implemented atomic operation (Chris was working for Fusion-io at the time). Fusion-io also created a proprietary filesystem "DirectFS" (written by Chris) to expose this feature. The MariaDB developers implemented a mode that could take advantage of this behaviour by no longer doing double buffering resulting in "43% more transactions per second and half the wear on the storage device". Chris proposed a patch so generic filesystems (such as BtrFS) could advertise that they provided atomicity guarantees via a new flag O_ATOMIC but block layer changes would also be needed. Said block layer changes were also proposed by Chris in a later patch series that added a function blk_queue_set_atomic_write(). However, neither of the patch series ever entered the mainline Linux kernel and there is no O_ATOMIC flag in the (current 2020) mainline 5.7 Linux kernel.
Before we go further, it's worth noting that even if a lower level doesn't offer an atomicity guarantee, a higher level can still provide atomicity (albeit with performance overhead) to its users so long as it knows when a write has reached stable storage. If fsync() can tell you when writes are on stable storage (technically not guaranteed by POSIX but the case on modern Linux) then because POSIX rename is atomic you can use the create new file/fsync/rename dance to do atomic file updates thus allowing applications to do double buffering/Write Ahead Logging themselves. Another example lower down in the stack are Copy On Write filesystems like BtrFS and ZFS. These filesystems give userspace programs a guarantee of "all the old data" or "all the new data" after a crash at sizes greater than a sector because of their semantics even though a disk many not offer atomic writes. You can push this idea all the way down into the disk itself where NAND based SSDs don't overwrite the area currently used by an existing LBA and instead write the data to a new region and keep a mapping of where the LBA's data is now.
Resuming our abridged timeline, in 2015 HP researchers wrote a paper Failure-Atomic Updates of Application Data
in a Linux File System (PDF) (media) about introducing a new feature into the Linux port of AdvFS (AdvFS was originally part of DEC's Tru64):
If a file is opened with a new O_ATOMIC flag, the state of its application data will always reflect the most recent successful msync, fsync, or fdatasync. AdvFS furthermore includes a new syncv operation that combines updates to multiple files into a failure-atomic bundle [...]
In 2017, Christoph Hellwig wrote experimental patches to XFS to provide O_ATOMIC. In the "Failure-Atomic file updates for Linux" talk (slides) he explains how he drew inspiration from the 2015 paper (but without the multi-file support) and the patchset extends the XFS reflink work that already existed. However, despite an initial mailing list post, at the time of writing (mid 2020) this patchset is not in the mainline kernel.
During the database track of the 2019 Linux Plumbers Conference, MySQL developer Dimitri Kravtchuk asked if there were plans to support O_ATOMIC (link goes to start of filmed discussion). Those assembled mention the XFS work above, that Intel claim they can do atomicity on Optane but Linux doesn't provide an interface to expose it, that Google claims to provide 16KiB atomicity on GCE storage1. Another key point is that many database developers need something larger than 4KiB atomicity to avoid having to do double writes - PostgreSQL needs 8KiB, MySQL needs 16KiB and apparently the Oracle database needs 64KiB. Further, Dr Richard Hipp (author of the SQLite database) asked if there's a standard interface to request atomicity because today SQLite makes use of the F2FS filesystem's ability to do atomic updates via custom ioctl()s but the ioctl was tied to one filesystem. Chris replied that for the time being there's nothing standard and nothing provides the O_ATOMIC interface.
At the 2021 Linux Plumbers Conference Darrick Wong re-raised the topic of atomic writes (link goes to start of filmed discussion). He pointed out there are two different things that people mean when they say they want atomic writes:
Hardware provides some atomicity API and this capability is somehow exposed through the software stack
Make the filesystem do all the work to expose some sort of atomic write API irrespective of hardware
Darrick mentioned that Christoph had ideas for 1. in the past but Christoph has not come back to the topic and further there are unanswered questions (how you make userspace aware of limits, if the feature was exposed it would be restricted to direct I/O which may problematic for many programs). Instead Darrick suggested tackling 2. was to propose his FIEXCHANGE_RANGE ioctl which swaps the contents of two files (the swap is restartable if it fails part way through). This approach doesn't have the limits (e.g. smallish contiguous size, maximum number of scatter gather vectors, direct I/O only) that a hardware based solution would have and could theoretically be implementable in the VFS thus being filesystem agnostic...
TLDR; if you are in tight control of your whole stack from application all the way down the the physical disks (so you can control and qualify the whole lot) you can arrange to have what you need to make use of disk atomicity. If you're not in that situation or you're talking about the general case, you should not depend on sector writes being atomic.
When the OS sends the command to write a sector to disk is it atomic?
At the time of writing (mid-2020):
When using a mainline 4.14+ Linux kernel
If you are dealing with a real disk
a sector write sent by the kernel is likely atomic (assuming a sector is no bigger than 4KiB). In controlled cases (battery backed controller, NVMe disk which claims to support atomic writes, SCSI disk where the vendor has given you assurances etc.) a userspace program may be able to use O_DIRECT so long as O_DIRECT wasn't reverting to being buffered, the I/O didn't get split apart/merged at the block layer / you are sending device specific commands and are bypassing the block layer. However, in the general case neither the kernel nor a userspace program can safely assume sector write atomicity.
Can you ever end up with a situation where the data on disk is part X, part Y, and part garbage?
From a specification perspective if you are talking about a SCSI disk doing a regular SCSI WRITE(16) and a power failure happening in the middle of that write then the answer is yes: a sector could contain part X, part Y AND part garbage. A crash during an inflight write means the data read from the area that was being written to is indeterminate and the disk is free to choose what it returns as data from that region. This means all old data, all new data, some old and new, all zeros, all ones, random data etc. are all "legal" values to return for said sector. From an old draft of the SBC-3 spec:
4.9 Write failures
If one or more commands performing write operations are in the task set and are being processed when power is lost (e.g., resulting in a vendor-specific command timeout by the application client) or a medium error or hardware error occurs (e.g., because a removable medium was incorrectly unmounted), the data in the logical blocks being written by those commands is indeterminate. When accessed by a command performing a read or verify operation (e.g., after power on or after the removable medium is mounted), the device server may return old data, new data, or vendor-specific data in those logical blocks.
Before reading logical blocks which encountered such a failure, an application client should reissue any commands performing write operations that were outstanding.
1 In 2018 Google announced it had tweaked its cloud SQL stack and that this allowed them to use 16k atomic writes MySQL's with innodb_doublewrite=0 via O_DIRECT... The underlying customisations Google performed were described as being in the virtualized storage, kernel, virtio and the ext4 filesystem layers. Further, a no longer available beta document titled Best practices for 16 KB persistent disk and MySQL (archived copy) described what end users had to do to safely make use of the feature. Changes included: using an appropriate Google provided VM, using specialized storage, changing block device parameters and carefully creating an ext4 filesystem with a specific layout. However, at some point in 2020 this document vanished from GCE's online guides suggesting such end user tuning is not supported.
I think torn pages are not the problem. As far as I know, all drives have enough power stored to finish writing the current sector when the power fails.
The problem is that everybody lies.
At least when it comes to the database knowing when a transaction has been committed to disk, everybody lies. The database issues an fsync, and the operating system only returns when all outstanding writes have been committed to disk, right? Maybe not. It's common, especially with RAID cards and/or SATA drives, for your program to be told everything has committed (that is, fsync returns) and yet there is data not yet on the drive.
You can try using Brad's diskchecker to find out if the platform you are going to use for your database can survive pulling the plug without losing data. The bottom line: If diskchecker fails, the platform is not safe for running a database. Databases with ACID rely upon knowing when a transaction has been committed to backing store and when it has not. This is true whether or not the databases uses write-ahead loggin (and if the database returns to the user without having done an fsync, then transactions can be lost in the event of a failure, so it should not claim that it provides ACID semantics).
There's a long thread on the Postgresql mailing list discussing durability. It starts out talking about SSDs, but then it gets into SATA drives, SCSI drives, and file systems. You may be surprised to learn how exposed your data can be to loss. It's a good thread for anyone with a database that needs durability, not just those running Postgresql.
Nobody seems to agree on this question. So I spent a lot of time trying different Google queries until I finally found an answer.
from Dr. Stephen Tweedie, RedHat employee and linux kernel filesystem and virtual memory developer in a talk on ext3 (which he developed) transcript here. If anyone knows, it'd be him.
"It's not sufficient just to write the thing to the journal, because there's got to be some mark in the journal which says: well, (has this journal record actually) does this journal record actually represent a complete consistency to the disk? And the way you do that is by having some atomic operation which marks that transaction as being complete on disk" [23m, 14s]
"Now, disks these days actually make these guarantees. If you start a write operation to a disk, then even if the power fails in the middle of that sector write, the disk has enough power available, and it can actually steal power from the rotational energy of the spindle; it has enough power to complete the write of the sector that's being written right now. In all cases, the disks make that guarantee." [23m, 41s]
No, they are not. Worse yet, disks may lie and say the data is written when it is in fact in the disk cache, under default settings. For performance reasons, this may be desirable (actual durability is up to an order of magnitude slower) but it means if you lose power and the disk cache is not physically written, your data is gone.
Real durability is both hard and slow unfortunately, since you need to make at least one full rotation per write, or 2+ with journalling/undo. This limits you to a couple hundred DB transactions per second, and requires disabling write caching at a fairly low level.
For practical purposes though, the difference is not that big of a deal in most cases.
See:
How (not) to achieve durability.
FSync() may not flush to disk
People don't seem to agree on what happens during a sector write if the power fails. Maybe because it depends on the hardware being used, and even the filesystem.
From wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Journaling_file_system):
Some disk drives guarantee write
atomicity during a power failure.
Others, however, may stop writing
midway through a sector after power is
lost, leaving it mismatched against
its error-correcting code. The sector
is thus corrupt and its contents lost.
A physical journal guards against such
corruption because it holds a complete
copy of the sector, which it can
replay over the corruption upon next
mount.
Seems to suggest that some hard drives will not finish writing the sector, but that a journaling filesystem can protect you from data loss the same way the xlog protects a database.
From the linux kernel mailing list in a discussion on ext3 journaling filesystem:
In any case bad sector checksum is
hardware bug. Sector write is supposed
to be atomic, it either happens or
not.
I'd tend to believe that over the wiki comment. Actually, the very existence of a database (firebird) with no xlog implies that sector write is atomic, that it cannot clobber data you did not mean to change.
There's quite a bit of discussion Here about atomicity of sector writes, and again no agreement. But the people who are disagreeing seem to be talking about multiple-sector writes (which are not atomic on many modern hard-drives.) Those who are saying sector writes are atomic do seem to know more about what they're talking about.
The answer to your first question depends on the hardware involved. At least with some older hardware, the answer was yes -- a power failure could result it garbage being written to the disk. Most current disks, however, have a bit of a "UPS" built into the disk itself -- a capacitor that's large enough to power the disk long enough to write the data in the on-disk cache out to the disk platter. They also have circuitry to detect whether the power supply is still good, so when the power gets flaky, they write the data in the cache to the platter, and ignore garbage they might receive.
As far as a "torn page" goes, a typical disk only accepts commands to write an entire sector at a time, so what you'll get will normally be an integral number of sectors written correctly, and others remaining unchanged. If, however, you're using a logical page size that's larger than a single sector, you can certainly end up with a page that's partially written.
That, however, mostly applies to a direct connection to a normal moving-platter type hard drive. With almost anything else, the rules can and often will be different. Just for an obvious example, if you're writing over the network, you're mostly at the mercy of the network protocol in use. If you transmit data over TCP, data that doesn't match up with the CRC will be rejected, but the same data transmitted over UDP, with the same corruption, might be accepted.
I suspect this assumption is wrong.
Modern HDDs encode the data in sectors - and additionally protect it with ECC. Therefore you can end-up with garbaging all the sector content - it will just not make sense with the encoding used.
As for increasingly poplular SSDs, the situation is even more gruesome - the block is cleared prior to being overwritten, so, depending on the firmware being used and the amount of free space, entirely unrelated sectors can be damaged.
By the way, an OS crash will not lead to data being damaged within single sector.
I would expect one torn page to consist of part X, part Y, and part unreadable sector. If a head is in the middle of writing a sector when the power fails, the drive should park the heads immediately, so that the rest of the drive (aside from that one sector) will remain undamaged.
In some cases I would expect several torn pages consisting of part X and part Y, but only one torn page would include an unreadable sector. The reason for several torn pages is that the drive can buffer lots of writes internally, and the order of writing might interleave various sectors from various pages.
I've read conflicting stories about whether a new write to the unreadable sector will make it readable again. Even if the answer is yes, that will be new data Z, neither X nor Y.
when updating the
disk, the only guarantee drive manufactures make is that a single 512-
byte write is atomic (i.e., it will either complete in its entirety or it won’t
complete at all); thus, if an untimely power loss occurs, only a portion of
a larger write may complete (sometimes called a torn write).
I was doing some benchmarks for the performance of code on Windows mobile devices, and noticed that some algorithms were doing significantly better on some hosts, and significantly worse on others. Of course, taking into account the difference in clock speeds.
The statistics for reference (all results are generated from the same binary, compiled by Visual Studio 2005 targeting ARMv4):
Intel XScale PXA270
Algorithm A: 22642 ms
Algorithm B: 29271 ms
ARM1136EJ-S core (embedded in a MSM7201A chip)
Algorithm A: 24874 ms
Algorithm B: 29504 ms
ARM926EJ-S core (embedded in an OMAP 850 chip)
Algorithm A: 70215 ms
Algorithm B: 31652 ms (!)
I checked out floating point as a possible cause, and while algorithm B does use floating point code, it does not use it from the inner loop, and none of the cores seem to have a FPU.
So my question is, what mechanic may be causing this difference, preferrably with suggestions on how to fix/avoid the bottleneck in question.
Thanks in advance.
One possible cause is that the 926 has a shorter pipeline (5 cycles vs. 8 cycles for the 1136, iirc), so branch mispredictions are less costly on the 926.
That said, there are a lot of architectural differences between those processors, too many to say for sure why you see this effect without knowing something about the instructions that you're actually executing.
Clock speed is only one factor. Bus width and latency are big if not bigger factors. Cache is a factor. Speed of the media the program is run from if run from media and not memory.
Is this test using any shared libraries at all at any point in the test or is it all internal code? Fetching shared libraries on media that will vary from platform to platform (even if it is say the same sd card).
Is this the same algorithm compiled separately for each platform or the same binary? You can and will see some compiler induced variation as well. 50% faster and slower can easily come from the same compiler on the same platform by varying compiler settings. If possible you want to execute the same binary, and insure that no shared libraries are used in the loop under test. If not the same binary disassemble the loop under test for each platform and insure that there are no variations other than register selection.
From the data you have presented, its difficult to point the exact problem, but we can share some of the prior experience
Cache setting (check if all the
processors has the same CACHE
setting)
You need to check both D-Cache and I-Cache
For analysis,
Break down your code further, not just as algorithm but at a block level, and try to understand the block that causes the bottle-neck. After you find the block that causes the bottle-neck, try to disassemble the block's source code, and check the assembly. It may help.
Looks like the problem is in cache settings or something memory-related (maybe I-Cache "overflow").
Pipeline stalls, branch miss-predictions usually give less significant differences.
You can try to count some basic operations, executed in each algorithm, for example:
number of "easy" arithmetical/bitwise ops (+-|^&) and shifts by constant
number of shifts by variable
number of multiplications
number of "hard" arithmetics operations (divides, floating point ops)
number of aligned memory reads (32bit)
number of byte memory reads (8bit) (it's slower than 32bit)
number of aligned memory writes (32bit)
number of byte memory writes (8bit)
number of branches
something else, don't remember more :)
And you'll get info, that things get 926 much slower. After this you can check suspicious blocks, making using of them more or less intensive. And you'll get the answer.
Furthermore, it's much better to enable assembly listing generation in VS and use it (but not your high-level source code) as base for research.
p.s.: maybe the problem is in OS/software/firmware? Did you testing on clean system? OS is the same on all devices?