How to incercept IP based HTTPS connections using burp proxy? - ssl

I have setup burp proxy on the default gateway in a transparent mode. Burp suite is displaying self signed certificate to web based HTTPS clients and intercepting the traffic. However, it is not able to intercept the IP based traffic.
E.g. It can intercept https://abc.xyz.com but not https://192.168.132.129
Is there any way to intercept such traffic? I am open to solution other than Burp as well.

In that case I'll suggest the OWASP Zed Attack Proxy :)
Its free, open source, and easy to use (I'm biased;)
You can create your own root CA cert which you can then import into your browser so that HTTPS traffic can be handled correctly.
You can also tell ZAP which IP addresses it should ignore.
Let me know if you have any questions about it.
Simon (ZAP Project Lead)

Related

SSL packets monitoring

I am testing SSL on the localhost server.
It looks like HTTPS is displayed in the address bar and it seems to be successful HTTPS communication.
However, when I use ZAP to break the request and response, and see them the contents are just plain text.
Is this the right thing?
As the https part of the URL has a red line across it I'm guessing you launched the browser from ZAP. When you do that ZAP configures the browser to proxy via ZAP and ignore certificate warnings. ZAP can then use its CA certificate to intercept and re-sign the request.

Is CloudFlare's free SSL actually secure?

I've just set up CloudFlare on my web app. The free version, since my app isn't generating any revenue right now.
Now all my traffic is routing through CloudFlare's servers, correct? And that connection is "secure" because it's under HTTPS -- Chrome even displays the green padlock.
But CloudFlare is still communicating with my server over HTTP (unsecure connection), are they not?
Doesn't that mean all my client's data is sent in the clear between CloudFlare and my server? And that makes it not really secure at all, despite what Chrome thinks?
No.
The "Flexible" option of the "Crypto / SSL (with SPDY)" setting is not secure. If you read the "Help" text it says:
There is an encrypted connection between your website visitors and CloudFlare, but not from CloudFlare to your server.
You must install an SSL certificate on your own server and then select the "Full SSL (strict)" option to be secure.
You can configure the origin for the CDN (i.e. your servers that provide the original version of the content to be distributed across the CDN) to provide data using HTTPS. With the pro version (which you are not currently using) you can also use the SPDY protocol. HTTPS communication between the CDN and your servers protects that part of the communication path.
Additionally, and optionally, you can use Authenticated Origin Pulls (also available in the free version) to ensure that the CDN and origin (you) are both who you claim to be.

Centralizing outgoing two-way SSL connections

We are currently using Apache to handle incoming SSL requests. These are two-way SSL connections. Apache accepts the https connection and pass the request on as http connection to the application server. This works well for us.
We would like to use the same kind of centralized mechanism for outgoing two-way SSL connections. Is there a way do this with Apache or another product? To complicate things the client certificate needed to identify out client can vary depending on the destination.
In short:
- Internal clients connect through http to Apache or another product.
- Apache or another product knows based on a rule (?) that a two-way ssl connection is required and sets this up with the destination.
- Depending on the destination the correct certificate is sent to identify our client.
Regards,
Nidkil
What you're talking about is, or course, an HTTP proxy server. In the first scenario you are using it as a transparent proxy to provide SSL support for connections to a set of web pages. In the second scenario you want to use it to provide connections to secure-only pages on behalf of clients speaking HTTP.
You can do this with the Squid proxy, which is free and open-source, provided that your machine sits between the clients and the Internet. Look for "SSLBump". You do need a certificate which the clients would consider valid for all web pages to be accessed (otherwise they will notice what you are doing, which is basically a man-in-the-middle attack).
However, I would strongly recommend against this - if a site requires SSL, it is likely to do so for a reason. It is almost certainly not OK to have internal clients connecting to an online banking site and have you bumping down their encryption so that you can monitor their traffic or whatever...

Google SSL security

I need to implement some search functionalities in my app and want to use Google SSL.
https://encrypted.google.com
Can the ISP still see what you are searching by analyzing the querystring? If so then what's the point of this service?
When using SSL (https) all traffic including the query string is encrypted. All that ISP can see is host address and TCP port number. If the page that you are viewing contains insecure content (http) you should be warned by your browser.

Difference between https protocol and SSL Certificate

What is difference between https protocol and SSL Certificate that we use in web browser?
Aren't both of these used to encrypt communication between client (browser) and server?
HTTPS is HTTP (HyperText Transfer Protocol) plus SSL (Secure Socket Layer). You need a certificate to use any protocol that uses SSL.
SSL allows arbitrary protocols to be communicated securely. It enables clients to (a) verify that they are indeed communicating with the server they expect and not a man-in-the-middle and (b) encrypt the network traffic so that parties other than the client and server cannot see the communication.
An SSL certificate contains a public key and certificate issuer. Not only can clients use the certificate to communicate with a server, clients can verify that the certificate was cryptographically signed by an official Certificate Authority. For example, if your browser trusts the VeriSign Certificate Authority, and VeriSign signs my SSL certificate, your browser will inherently trust my SSL certificate.
There's some good reading here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transport_Layer_Security
Two pieces of one solution.
https is the protocol that defines how the client and server are going to negotiate a secure connection.
The SSL Certificate is the document that they will use to agree upon the servers authenticity.
HTPS is the new HTTPS.
HTTPS is highly vulnerable to SSL Stripping / MITM (man in the middle).
to quote adam langley's (google) blog imperial violet:
"HTTPS tends to cause people to give talks mocking certificate security and the ecosystem around it. "
The problem is that the page isn't served over HTTPS. It should have been, but when a user types a hostname into a browser, the default scheme is HTTP. The server may attempt to redirect users to HTTPS, but that redirect is insecure: a MITM attacker can rewrite it and keep the user on HTTP, spoofing the real site the whole time. The attacker can now intercept all the traffic to this perfectly well configured and secure website.
This is called SSL stripping and it's terribly simple and devastatingly effective. We probably don't see it very often because it's not something that corporate proxies need to do, so it's not in off-the-shelf devices. But that respite is unlikely to last very long and maybe it's already over: how would we even know if it was being used?
In order to stop SSL stripping, we need to make HTTPS the only protocol. We can't do that for the whole Internet, but we can do it site-by-site with HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS).
HSTS tells browsers to always make requests over HTTPS to HSTS sites. Sites become HSTS either by being built into the browser, or by advertising a header:
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=8640000; includeSubDomains
The header is in force for the given number of seconds and may also apply to all subdomains. The header must be received over a clean HTTPS connection.
Once the browser knows that a site is HTTPS only, the user typing mail.google.com is safe: the initial request uses HTTPS and there's no hole for an attacker to exploit.
(mail.google.com and a number of other sites are already built into Chrome as HSTS sites so it's not actually possible to access accounts.google.com over HTTP with Chrome - I had to doctor that image! If you want to be included in Chrome's built-in HSTS list, email me.)
HSTS can also protect you, the webmaster, from making silly mistakes. Let's assume that you've told your mother that she should always type https:// before going to her banking site or maybe you setup a bookmark for her. That's honestly more than we can, or should, expect of our users. But let's say that our supererogatory user... ]
because of obstructing/very stupid link-rules for new users on stackoverflow i cannot give you the rest of adam's answer and you'll have to visit adam langley's blog yourself at
https://www.imperialviolet.org/2012/07/19/hope9talk.html
"Adam Langley works on both Google's HTTPS serving infrastructure and Google Chrome's network stack."
HTTPS is an application layer protocol. It can provide non-repudiation of individual requests or responses through digital signatures.
SSL is a lower level protocol and does not have this capability. SSL is a transport level encryption.
HTTPS is more flexible than SSL: an application can configure the level of security it needs. SSL has fewer options so it is easier to setup and administer.